delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620 (1980), this Court, with one dissenting vote, concluded that a municipal ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of contributions by a charitable organization that did not use at least 75% of its receipts for “charitable purposes” was unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The issue in the present case is whether a Maryland statute with a like percentage limitation, but with provisions that render it more “flexible” than the *950Schaumburg ordinance, can withstand constitutional attack. The Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that, even with this increased flexibility, the percentage restriction on charitable solicitation was an unconstitutional limitation on protected First Amendment solicitation activity. We agree with that conclusion and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc. (Munson), an Indiana corporation, instituted this action in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Md., seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of State of Maryland (Secretary). Munson is a professional for-profit fundraiser in the business of promoting fundraising events and giving advice to customers on how those events should be conducted. Its Maryland customers include various chapters of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP).
Section 103A et seq., Art. 41, Md. Ann. Code (1982),1 concern charitable organizations. Section 103D prohibits such an organization, in connection with any fundraising activity, from paying or agreeing to pay as expenses more than 25% of the amount raised.2 Munson in its complaint alleged that it *951regularly charges an FOP chapter an amount in excess of 25% of the gross raised for the event it promotes. App. 4. Munson also alleged that the Secretary had informed it that it was subject to § 103D and would be prosecuted if it failed to comply with the provisions of that statute. App. 5.
In its initial complaint, filed March 7, 1978, Munson took the position that its contracts with the FOP should not be subject to § 103A et seq. The Circuit Court dismissed that challenge for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded, however, that Munson could attack the statutes as an improper delegation of legislative authority, in *952violation of the Maryland Constitution. App. 13. Munson then amended its complaint to allege that the statutes effected an unconstitutional infringement on its right to free speech and assembly under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Id., at 26.
The Secretary questioned Munson’s standing to assert its claims. He urged that § 103D is directed to acts of charitable organizations and, therefore, that only an organization of that kind can challenge the statute’s constitutionality. The Secretary also urged that Munson’s claims presented no actual controversy, because Munson had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and, consequently, there had been no binding determination that the statute would apply to Munson’s contracts. App. 29.
The Circuit Court did not address the standing argument, but upheld the statute on the merits. App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a. It concluded that because the statute included a provision authorizing a waiver of the percentage limitation “in those instances where the 25% limitation would effectively prevent a charitable organization from raising contributions,” it was sufficiently flexible to accommodate legitimate First Amendment interests. Id., at 46a. The court also rejected Munson’s state-law claim that the statute was an impermissible delegation of legislative authority.
Munson appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. The Secretary did not take a cross-appeal. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. 48 Md. App. 273, 426 A. 2d 985 (1981).
Both Munson and the Secretary then petitioned the Court of Appeals of Maryland for writs of certiorari. Munson challenged the validity of the statute and the Secretary challenged Munson’s standing. The court granted both petitions and, by a unanimous vote, reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 294 Md. 160, 448 A. 2d 935 (1982). It expressed doubt about the Secretary’s ability to challenge Munson’s standing when the Secretary had not taken an appeal from the Circuit Court’s judgment, but, assuming that *953the issue was properly before the court, nonetheless concluded that Munson did have standing to challenge the facial validity of § 103D. The court found that, based on the allegations of its complaint and under the facts as stipulated in the trial court, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a, Munson clearly had suffered injury as a result of § 103D.3 The court rejected the contention that Munson may not assert the First Amendment rights of the FOP chapters, noting that where a statute is directed at persons with whom the plaintiff has a business or professional relationship, and impairs the plaintiff in that relationship, it normally is accorded standing to challenge the validity of the statute. 294 Md., at 171, 448 A. 2d, at 941. In addition, as this Court in Schaumburg held, 444 U. S., at 634, “[g]iven a case or controversy, a litigant whose own activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court.” 294 Md., at 172, 448 A. 2d, at 942.
On the merits, the court concluded that Schaumburg required that the Maryland statute be ruled unconstitutional. It rejected the Secretary’s argument that the statute was valid because it did not require a permit prior to solicitation, and imposed criminal penalties only for solicitation in violation of the statute. 294 Md., at 176-179, 448 A. 2d, at 944-945. The court also concluded that the flaws in the statute were not remedied by the provision authorizing a waiver of the 25% limitation whenever it would effectively prevent the charitable organization from raising contributions. Id., at 179-181, 448 A. 2d, at 945-946. The court found that the statutory authorization for an exemption from the percentage limitation is “extremely narrow.” It did not remedy the flaw *954inherent in a percentage limitation on solicitation costs — that charities that make a policy decision to use more than 25% of the proceeds raised for purposes other than “charitable” are denied their constitutional right to do so, and are lumped together with those engaging in fraud. Id., at 180-181, 448 A. 2d, at 946. In sum, in the view of the Court of Appeals, the 25% limitation, like that in the ordinance addressed in Schaumburg, is not a “narrowly drawn regulatio[n] designed to serve [the State’s legitimate] interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms.” 444 U. S., at 637.
We granted certiorari to review both determinations of the Court of Appeals, namely, that Munson had standing to challenge the validity of §103D, and that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. 459 U. S. 1102 (1983).
I — i I — i
Standing. The first element of the standing inquiry that Munson must satisfy in this Court is the “case” or “controversy” requirement of Art. Ill of the United States Constitution. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112 (1976).4 Munson is a professional fundraising company. Because its contracts call for payment in excess of 25% of the funds raised for a given event, it is subject, under § 103L, to civil restraint and criminal liability. Prior to initiation of the present lawsuit, the Secretary informed Munson that if it refused to comply with § 103D, it would be prosecuted. The parties stipulated before trial that the Montgomery County Chapter of the FOP was reluctant to enter into a contract with Munson because of the limitation imposed by § 103D. Munson has *955suffered both threatened and actual injury as a result of the statute. See Singleton v. Wulff, supra; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26 (1976); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973).
In addition to the limitations on standing imposed by Art. Ill’s case-or-controversy requirement, there are prudential considerations that limit the challenges courts are willing to hear. “[T]he plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975) (citing Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44 (1943); United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17 (1960); and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953)). The reason for this rule is twofold. The limitation “frees the Court not only from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also from premature interpretations of statutes in areas where their constitutional application might be cloudy,” United States v. Raines, 362 U. S., at 22, and it assures the court that the issues before it will be concrete and sharply presented.5 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). Munson is not a charity and does not claim that its own First Amendment rights have been or will be infringed by the challenged statute.6 Accordingly, the Secretary insists that *956Munson should not be heard to complain that the State’s charitable-solicitation rule violates the First Amendment.
The Secretary concedes, however, that there are situations where competing considerations outweigh any prudential rationale against third-party standing, and that this Court has relaxed the prudential-standing limitation when such concerns are present. Where practical obstacles prevent a party from asserting rights on behalf of itself, for example, the Court has recognized the doctrine of jus tertii standing. In such a situation, the Court considers whether the third party has sufficient injury-in-fact to satisfy the Art. Ill case- or-controversy requirement, and whether, as a prudential matter, the third party can reasonably be expected properly to frame the issues and present them with the necessary adversarial zeal. See, e. g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 193-194 (1976).
Within the context of the First Amendment, the Court has enunciated other concerns that justify a lessening of prudential limitations on standing. Even where a First Amendment challenge could be brought by one actually engaged in protected activity, there is a possibility that, rather than risk punishment for his conduct in challenging the statute, he will refrain from engaging further in the protected activity. Society as a whole then would be the loser. Thus, when there is a danger of chilling free speech, the concern that constitutional adjudication be avoided whenever possible may be outweighed by society’s interest in having the statute challenged. “Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption *957that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 612 (1973).7
In the instant case, the Secretary’s most serious argument against allowing Munson to challenge the statute is that there is no showing that a charity cannot bring its own lawsuit. Although such an argument might defeat a party’s standing outside the First Amendment xcontext, this Court has not found the argument dispositive in determining whether standing exists to challenge a statute that allegedly chills free speech. To the contrary, where the claim is that a statute is overly broad in violation of the First Amendment, the Court has allowed a party to assert the rights of another without regard to the ability of the other to assert his own claims and “‘with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.’” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S., at 612, quoting Dom-browski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 486 (1965). See also Schaumburg, 444 U. S., at 634 (“Given a case or controversy, a litigant whose own activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that it substan*958tially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court”).
The fact that, because Munson is not a charity, there might not be a possibility that the challenged statute could restrict Munson's own First Amendment rights does not alter the analysis. Facial challenges to overly broad statutes are allowed not primarily for the benefit of the litigant, but for the benefit of society — to prevent the statute from chilling the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court. Munson’s ability to serve that function has nothing to do with whether or not its own First Amendment rights are at stake. The crucial issues are whether Munson satisfies the requirement of “injury-in-fact,” and whether it can be expected satisfactorily to frame the issues in the case. If so, there is no reason that Munson need also be a charity. If not, Munson could not bring this challenge even if it were a charity.
The Secretary concedes that the Art. Ill ease-or-controversy requirement has been met, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 5, and the Secretary has come forward with no reason why Munson is an inadequate advocate to assert the charities’ rights. The activity sought to be protected is at the heart of the business relationship between Munson and its clients, and Munson’s interests in challenging the statute are completely consistent with the First Amendment interests of the charities it represents. We see no prudential reason not to allow it to challenge the statute.
Besides challenging Munson’s standing as a “noncharity” to bring its claim, the Secretary urges that Munson should not have standing to challenge the statute as overbroad because it has not demonstrated that the statute’s overbreadth is “substantial.” See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S., at 615. The Secretary raises a point of valid concern. The Court has indicated that application of the overbreadth doctrine is “strong medicine” that should be invoked only “as a last resort.” Id., at 613. The Secretary’s concern, however, is one that is more properly reserved for the determina*959tion of Munson’s First Amendment challenge on the merits. The requirement that a statute be “substantially overbroad” before it will be struck down on its face is a “standing” question only to the extent that if the plaintiff does not prevail on the merits of its facial challenge and cannot demonstrate that, as applied to it, the statute is unconstitutional, it has no “standing” to allege that, as applied to others, the statute might be unconstitutional. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 760 (1974); United States v. Raines, 362 U. S., at 21. See generally Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 S. Ct. Rev. 1. We therefore move on to the merits of Munson’s First Amendment claim.
Ill
The Merits. In Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, supra, the Court struck down a municipal ordinance that required every charitable organization, which utilized door-to-door solicitation, to apply for a permit obtainable only on “ ‘[satisfactory proof that at least seventy-five per cent of the proceeds of such solicitations will be used directly for the charitable purpose of the organization.’” Id., at 624. The question before us is whether the distinctions between the Schaumburg ordinance and the Maryland statute are sufficient to render the statute constitutionally acceptable. To answer that question, we reexamine the bases for the conclusion the Court reached in Schaumburg.
A
The Court in Schaumburg determined first that charitable solicitations are so intertwined with speech that they are entitled to the protections of the First Amendment:
“Prior authorities, therefore, clearly establish that charitable appeals for funds, on the street or door to door, involve a variety of speech interests — communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes — that are within the protection of the First Amendment. Solicit*960ing financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable regulation but the latter must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease.” Id., at 632.8
Because the percentage limitation restricted the ways in which charities might engage in solicitation activity, the Court concluded that it was a “direct and substantial limitation on protected activity that cannot be sustained unless it *961serves a sufficiently strong, subordinating interest that the Village is entitled to protect.” Id., at 636. In addition, in order to be valid, the limitation would have to be a “narrowly drawn regulatio[n] designed to serve [the] interes[t] without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms.” Id., at 637.
Although the Court in Schaumburg recognized that the Village had legitimate interests in protecting the public from fraud, crime, and undue annoyance, it rejected the limitation because it was not a precisely tailored means of accommodating those interests. The Village’s asserted interests were only peripherally promoted by the limitation and could be served by measures less intrusive than a direct prohibition on solicitation.
In particular, although the Village’s primary interest was in preventing fraud, the Court concluded that the limitation was simply too imprecise an instrument to accomplish that purpose. The justification for the limitation was an assumption that any organization using more than 25% of its receipts on fundraising, salaries, and overhead was not charitable, but was a commercial, for-profit enterprise. Any such enterprise that represented itself as a charity thus was fraudulent.
The flaw in the Village’s assumption, as the Court recognized, was that there is no necessary connection between fraud and high solicitation and administrative costs. A number of other factors may result in high costs; the most important of these is that charities often are combining solicitation with dissemination of information, discussion, and advocacy of public issues, an activity clearly protected by the First Amendment and as to which the Village had asserted no legitimate interest in prohibiting. In light of the fact that the interest in protecting against fraud can be accommodated by measures less intrusive than a direct prohibition on solicitation,9 the Court concluded that the limitation was *962insufficiently related to the governmental interests asserted to justify its interference with protected speech.10
B
Schaumburg left open the primary question now before this Court — whether the constitutional deficiencies in a percentage limitation on funds expended in solicitation are remedied by the possibility of an administrative waiver of the limitation for a charity that can demonstrate financial necessity. The Court there distinguished a case in which a percentage limitation on solicitation costs had been upheld, see National Foundation v. Fort Worth, 415 F. 2d 41 (CA5 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1040 (1970), noting that under the ordinance in Fort Worth, a charity had the opportunity to demonstrate that its solicitation costs, though high, nevertheless were reasonable. See 444 U. S., at 635, n. 9.
Section 103D has a provision similar to that in the Fort Worth ordinance. It directs the Secretary of State to “issue rules and regulations to permit a charitable organization to pay or agree to pay for expenses in connection with a fund-raising activity more than 25% of its total gross income in those instances where the 25% limitation would effectively prevent the charitable organization from raising contributions.” See n. 2, supra. Having now considered the question left open in Schaumburg, however, we conclude that the waiver provision does not save the statute.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the exception in § 103D was “extremely narrow,” being confined to instances “where the 25% limitation would effectively prevent the char*963itable organization from raising contributions,” 294 Md., at 180, 448 A. 2d, at 946, and of no avail to an organization whose high fundraising costs were attributable to legitimate policy decisions about how to use its funds, rather than to inability to raise funds. Under the Court of Appeals’ interpretation, the Secretary has no discretion to determine that reasons other than financial necessity warrant a waiver. The statute does not help the charity whose solicitation costs are high because it chooses, as was stipulated here, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a, to disseminate information as a part of its fundraising. Thus, the organizations that were of primary concern to the Court in Schaumburg, those whose high costs were due to “ ‘information dissemination, discussion, and advocacy of public issues,”’11 444 U. S., at 635, quoting from *964Citizens for a Better Environment v. Schaumburg, 590 F. 2d 220, 225 (CA7 1978), remain barred by the statute from carrying on those protected First Amendment activities.12
C
The Secretary urges that even though there may remain charities whose First Amendment activity is limited by the statute, we should not strike down the statute on its face because, with the waiver provision, it no longer is “substantially overbroad.” We are not persuaded.
“Substantial overbreadth” is a criterion the Court has invoked to avoid striking down a statute on its face simply because of the possibility that it might be applied in an unconstitutional manner. It is appropriate in cases where, despite some possibly impermissible application, the “ ‘remainder of *965the statute . . . covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable . . . conduct . . . .' CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 580-581 (1973).” Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S., at 760. See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 770, n. 25 (1982). In such a case, the Court has required a litigant to demonstrate that the statute “as applied” to him is unconstitutional. Id., at 774.
This is not such a case.13 Here there is no core of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable conduct that the *966statute prohibits. While there no doubt are organizations that have high fundraising costs not due to protected First Amendment activity and that, therefore, should not be heard to complain that their activities are prohibited, this statute cannot distinguish those organizations from charities that have high costs due to protected First Amendment activities. The flaw in the statute is not simply that it includes within its sweep some impermissible applications, but that in all its applications it operates on a fundamentally mistaken premise that high solicitation costs are an accurate measure of fraud.14 That the statute in some of its applications actually prevents the misdirection of funds from the organization’s purported charitable goal is little more than fortu*967itous.15 It is equally likely that the statute will restrict First Amendment activity that results in high costs but is itself a part of the charity’s goal or that is simply attributable to the fact that the charity’s cause proves to be unpopular. On the other hand, if an organization indulges in fraud, there is nothing in the percentage limitation that prevents it from misdirecting funds. In either event, the percentage limitation, though restricting solicitation costs, will have done nothing to prevent fraud.
Where, as here, a statute imposes a direct restriction on protected First Amendment activity,16 and where the defect *968in the statute is that the means chosen to accomplish the State’s objectives are too imprecise, so that in all its applications the statute creates an unnecessary risk of chilling free speech, the statute is properly subject to facial attack. Schaumburg, 444 U. S., at 637; First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 786 (1978). See also Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 565, n. 8 (1980); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 800, n. 19 (1984) (“[W]here the statute unquestionably attaches sanctions to protected conduct, the likelihood that the statute will deter that conduct is ordinarily sufficiently great to justify an overbreadth attack,” citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 217 (1975)).
The possibility of a waiver may decrease the number of impermissible applications of the statute, but it does nothing to remedy the statute’s fundamental defect. We conclude that, regardless of the waiver provision, Schaumburg requires that the percentage limitation in the Maryland statute be rejected.
IV
Our conclusion is not altered by the presence of other distinctions the Secretary urges between this statute and the ordinance at issue in Schaumburg.
The Secretary points out, for example, that § 103D does not impose a prior restraint on protected activities. An organization may register as a charity and solicit funds without first demonstrating that it satisfies § 103D. The statute, it is said, regulates only after the fact. We are unmoved by the claimed distinction. As the Court of Appeals noted, several elements of the regulatory scheme suggest the possibil*969ity of a “before-the-fact” prohibition on solicitation. Section § 103D requires that every contract or agreement between a professional fundraiser and a charitable organization shall be filed with the Secretary of State prior to any solicitation. Under § 103F, no solicitation may begin until the Secretary “shall approve the registration” of a professional fundraiser counsel or professional solicitor. And the Secretary is to approve the professional fundraiser’s registration only if she finds that the application is in conformity with the requirements of the subtitle as well as the rules and regulations of the Secretary.
More important, whether the statute regulates before- or after-the-fact makes little difference in this case. Whether the charity is prevented from engaging in First Amendment activity by the lack of a solicitation permit or by the knowledge that its fundraising activity is illegal if it cannot satisfy the percentage limitation, the chill on the protected activity is the same. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572, n. 3 (1942).
The Secretary also points out that § 103D restricts only fundraising expenses and not the multitude of other expenses that are not spent directly on the organization’s charitable purpose, and that the charity may elect whether to be bound by its fundraising percentage for the prior year or to apply the 25% limitation on a campaign-by-campaign basis. Those distinctions, however, mean only that the statute will not apply to as many charities as did the ordinance in Schaum-burg. They do nothing to alter the fact that significant fundraising activity protected by the First Amendment is barred by the percentage limitation.
Finally, the fact that the statute regulates all charitable fundraising, and not just door-to-door solicitation, does not remedy the fact that the statute promotes the State’s interest only peripherally. The distinction made in Schaumburg was between regulation aimed at fraud and regulation aimed at something else in the hope that it would sweep fraud in *970during the process. The statute’s aim is not improved by the fact that it fires at a number of targets.
We agree with the Court of Appeals of Maryland that §103D is unconstitutionally overbroad. The judgment of that court therefore is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Effective July 1, 1984, the Maryland Legislature has revised its charitable organizations law. See 1984 Md. Laws, ch. 787. No changes are made in § 103D, but changes are made in the definitional section and in the registration requirement imposed on professional fundraisers. Those changes do not affect this case.
Section § 103D reads in full:
“(a) A charitable organization other than a charitable salvage organization may not pay or agree to pay as expenses in connection with any fund-raising activity a total amount in excess of 25 percent of the total gross income raised or received by reason of the fund-raising activity. The Secretary of State shall, by rule or regulation in accordance with the ‘standard of accounting and fiscal reporting for voluntary health and welfare organizations' provide for the reporting of actual cost, and of allocation of expenses, of a charitable organization into those which are in connection with a fund-raising activity and those which are not. The Secretary of State shall issue rules and regulations to permit a charitable organization to pay *951or agree to pay for expenses in connection with a fund-raising activity more than 25% of its total gross income in those instances where the 25% limitation would effectively prevent the charitable organization from raising contributions.
“The 25% limitation in this subsection shall not apply to compensation or expenses paid by a charitable organization to a professional fund-raiser counsel for conducting feasibility studies for the purpose of determining whether or not the charitable organization should undertake a fund-raising activity, such compensation or expenses paid for feasibility studies or preliminary planning not being considered to be expenses paid in connection with a fund-raising activity.
“(b) For purposes of this section, the total gross income raised or received shall be adjusted so as not to include contributions received equal to the actual cost to the charitable organization of (1) goods, food, entertainment, or drink sold or provided to the public, nor should these costs be included as fund-raising costs; (2) the actual postage paid to the United States Postal Service and printing expense in connection with the soliciting of contributions, nor should these costs be included as fund-raising costs.
“(c) Every contract or agreement between a professional fund-raiser counsel or a professional solicitor and a charitable organization shall be in writing, and a copy of it shall be filed with the Secretary of State within ten days after it is entered into and prior to any solicitations.”
Other related Maryland statutes require that a charity intending to solicit contributions within or without the State file a registration statement with the Secretary of State providing information about its purpose and its finances, § 103B, and that professional fundraisers register with and be approved by the Secretary, § 103F. Section 103L(a) subjects both the charitable organization and the professional fundraiser to criminal liability for wilfully violating the statutory requirements.
The court also rejected the Secretary’s claim that Munson could not question the validity of the statute because there had been no final administrative determination that the statute was applicable to Munson. The court concluded that Munson did not need to exhaust administrative remedies in order to attack the statute on its face. 294 Md., at 171, 448 A. 2d, at 941. The Secretary does not challenge that determination here.
The Court of Appeals concluded that Munson had suffered sufficient injury as a result of § 103D to have standing to challenge the statute. The Secretary does not dispute that determination. Nevertheless, because the “ease” or “controversy” requirement is jurisdictional here, we must satisfy ourselves that the requirements of Art. Ill are met. Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429, 434 (1952).
As the various formulations of the prudential-standing limitations illustrate, the second factor counseling against allowing a litigant to assert the rights of third parties is not completely separable from Art. Ill’s requirement that a plaintiff have a “sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of [the] suit to make it a case or controversy.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112 (1976). The prudential limitations add to the constitutional min-ima a healthy concern that if the claim is brought by someone other than one at whom the constitutional protection is aimed, the claim not be an abstract, generalized grievance that the courts are neither well equipped nor well advised to adjudicate. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists To Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 217-222 (1974).
In the Circuit Court, Munson claimed that § 103D intruded upon its own First Amendment rights. Now, however, it focuses its argument solely on its ability to assert the First Amendment rights of Maryland char*956ities. Because of our disposition of the Secretary's standing challenge, we have no occasion to address the extent to which Munson might assert its own First Amendment right to disseminate information as part of a charitable solicitation. It is clear that the fact that Munson is paid to disseminate information does not in itself render its activity unprotected. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 266 (1964).
See also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 380 (1977) (“The use of overbreadth analysis reflects the conclusion that the possible harm to society from allowing unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech will be muted”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 445 (1972) (in determining whether a litigant should be able to assert third-party rights, a crucial factor is “the impact of the litigation on the third-party interests”); id., at 445, n. 5 (“Indeed, in First Amendment cases we have relaxed our rules of standing without regard to the relationship between the litigant and those whose rights he seeks to assert precisely because application of those rules would have an intolerable, inhibitory effect on freedom of speech. E. g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97-98 (1940). See United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 22 (1960)”).
The types of speech regulated by the Maryland statute clearly encompass the types of speech determined in Schaumburg to be entitled to First Amendment protection. The statute defines “solicit” as meaning “to request, directly or indirectly, money, credit, property, a credit card contribution ... or other financial assistance in any form on the plea or representation that the money, credit, property, a credit card contribution ... or other financial assistance will be used for a charitable purpose. It includes:
“(1) An oral or written request;
“(2) An announcement to the news media for further dissemination by it of an appeal or campaign seeking contributions from the public for one or more charitable purposes.
“(3) The distribution, circulation, posting, or publishing of any handbill, written advertisement, or other publication which, directly or by implication, seeks contributions by the public for one or more charitable purposes; and
“(4) The sale of, or offer or attempt to sell, any advertisement, advertising space, book card, tag, coupon, device, magazine, membership, subscription, ticket, admission, chance, merchandise, or other tangible item in connection with which (i) an appeal is made for contributions to one or more charitable purposes, or (ii) the name of a charitable organization is used or referred to as an inducement to make such a purchase, or (iii) a statement is made that the whole or any part of the proceeds from the sale is to be used for one or more charitable purposes. A solicitation is deemed to have taken place when the request is made, whether or not the person making it actually receives a contribution.” § 103A(i).
The Court noted, for instance, that the Village could punish fraud directly and could require disclosure of the finances of a charitable orga*962nization so that a member of the public could make an informed decision about whether to contribute. Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S., at 637-638.
The Court also found little connection between the percentage limitation and the protection of public safety or residential privacy. Both goals were better furthered by provisions addressed directly to the asserted interest — such as a prohibition on the use of convicted felons as solicitors and a provision allowing homeowners to post signs barring solicitors from their property. Id., at 638-639.
The regulations make clear that public education activity is included in the solicitation costs regulated by the 25% limitation. Section 01.02.04.04A(3) of the Code of Maryland Regulations (1983) provides: “The expenses of public education materials and activities, which include an appeal, specific or implied, for financial support, shall be fully allocated to fund-raising expenses.”
In light of the clarity of the regulation and the absence of any indication by the State that the regulation is not consistent with the statute, we can only wonder at the basis for the dissent’s conclusion that § 103D(a) appears to call for a pro rata allocation between advocacy and fundraising expenses, with advocacy and education expenses exempted from the statute’s reach. The statute itself gives no indication that such an exemption is envisioned. It imposes a cap on “expenses in connection with any fund-raising activity” and includes within that activity “[t]he distribution, circulation, posting, or publishing of any handbill, written advertisement, or other publication which, directly or by implication, seeks contributions by the public for one or more charitable purposes.” See nn. 2 and 8, supra. And the State’s own highest court, interpreting the reach of § 103D, apparently found no basis for a presumption that advocacy and education expenses would be exempted. In any event, while the notion of a pro rata allocation sounds appealing, it ignores the “reality,” recognized by the Court in Schaumburg, that solicitation is intertwined with protected speech. See 444 U. S., at 632. Written materials, for example, no doubt serve both purposes. A public official would have to be charged with the responsibility of determining how expenses should be allocated, which publications should be licensed, and which restricted by the statute. See n. 12, infra.
The Secretary disagrees with the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the scope of her discretion. She urges that she has discretion to grant a waiver “whenever necessary” and that she has done so “in an extremely liberal manner, with special care shown for the rights of advocacy groups.” Brief for Petitioner 33. We have no reason to second-guess the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of its own state law. But even if the Secretary were correct, and the waiver provision were broad enough to allow for exemptions “whenever necessary,” we would find the statute only slightly less troubling. Our cases make clear that a statute that requires such a “license” for the dissemination of ideas is inherently suspect. By placing discretion in the hands of an official to grant or deny a license, such a statute creates a threat of censorship that by its very existence chills free speech. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451 (1938). See also Schaumburg, 444 U. S., at 640-643 (dissenting opinion). Under the Secretary’s interpretation, charities whose First Amendment rights are abridged by the fundraising limitation simply would have traded a direct prohibition on their activity for a licensing scheme that, if it is available to them at all, is available only at the unguided discretion of the Secretary of State. Particularly where the percentage limitation itself is so poorly suited to accomplishing the State’s goal, and where there are alternative means to serve the same purpose, there is little justification for straining to salvage the statute by invoking the possibility of official dispensation to engage in protected activity.
The dissenters suggest that striking down the Maryland statute on its face is a radical departure from the Court’s practice and that it is done only in overbreadth cases. Post, at 977-978. But as the Court recognized earlier this Term, legislation repeatedly has been struck down “on its face” because it was apparent that any application of the legislation “would create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas.” City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 797 (1984). See, e. g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938). See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 768, n. 21 (1982); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965); Teitel Film Corp v. Cusack, 390 U. S. 139 (1968); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 516 (1939) (plurality opinion). In those cases a litigant has claimed that his own activity was protected by the First Amendment, and the Court has not limited itself to refining the law by preventing improper applications on a case-by-case basis. Facial challenges also have been upheld in contexts other than the First Amendment. See, e. g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352 (1983); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566 (1974) (vagueness challenge to criminal statute); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969)(due process challenge to garnishment statute); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939) (vagueness challenge to criminal statute). In addition, though the dissenters are loath to admit it, the State’s highest court has had an opportunity to construe the statute to avoid constitutional infirmities and has been unable to do so. Cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 216 (1975).
The dissenters appear to overlook the fact that “overbreadth” is not used only to describe the doctrine that allows a litigant whose own conduct is unprotected to assert the rights of third parties to challenge a statute, even though “as applied” to him the statute would be constitutional. E. g., New York v. Ferber, supra. “Overbreadth” has also been used to describe a challenge to a statute that in all its applications directly restricts *966protected First Amendment activity and does not employ means narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Schaumburg, 444 U. S., at 637-639; First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 786 (1978); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 250 (1967). Cf. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, supra (recognizing the validity of a facial challenge but suggesting that it should not be called “overbreadth”); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 565, n. 8 (1980) (same).
It was on the basis of the latter failing that the Court in Schaumburg struck down the Village ordinance as unconstitutional. Whether that challenge should be called “overbreadth” or simply a "facial” challenge, the point is that there is no reason to limit challenges to case-by-case “as applied” challenges when the statute on its face and therefore in all its applications falls short of constitutional demands. The dissenters’ efforts to chip away at the possibly impermissible applications of the statute do nothing to address the failing that the Schaumburg Court found dispos-itive — that a percentage limitation on fundraising unnecessarily restricts protected First Amendment activity.
The state legislature’s announced purpose in enacting the 1976 revision of the charitable organization provisions of Md. Ann. Code, Art. 41, was to “assure that contributions will be used to benefit the intended purpose.” Preamble to 1976 Md. Laws, ch. 679. The State’s justification therefore may be read as an interest in preventing mismanagement as well as fraud. The flaw in the statute, however, remains. The percentage limitation is too imprecise a tool to achieve that purpose.
The Secretary’s own records illustrate the tenuous connection between low fundraising costs and a valid charitable endeavor. Between October 14, 1980, and June 29, 1982, the Secretary apparently granted 13 of 16 applications for exemption from the 26% limitation. The lowest one contemplated fundraising costs of 48% of receipts. Five were between 70% and 77.1%. Another five were between 80% and 85%. Five of the applications granted were from lodges of the FOP; their solicitors were other than Munson. Exhibits to Brief for Petitioner A.6.
The dissenters’ suggestion that, because the Maryland statute regulates only the economic relationship between charities and professional fundraisers, it is not a direct restriction on the charities’ First Amendment activity is perplexing. Post, at 978-980. Any restriction on the amount of money a charity can pay to a third party as a fundraising expense could be labeled “economic regulation.” The fact that paid solicitors are used to disseminate information did not alter the Schaumburg Court’s conclusion that a limitation on the amount a charity can spend in fundraising activity is a direct restriction on the charity’s First Amendment rights. See 444 U. S., at 635-636. Whatever the State’s purpose in enacting the statute, the fact remains that the percentage limitation is a direct restriction on the amount of money a charity can spend on fundraising activity.
For similar reasons, it is the dissent that “simply misses the point” when it urges that there is an element of “fraud” in a professional fundraiser’s soliciting money for a charity if a high proportion of those funds are expended in fundraising. Post, at 980, and n. 2. The point of the Schaumburg Court’s conclusion that the percentage limitation was not an accurate measure of fraud was that the charity’s “purpose” may include public education. It is no more fraudulent for a charity to pay a professional fundraiser to engage in legitimate public educational activity than it is for the *968charity to engage in that activity itself. And concerns about unscrupulous professional fundraisers, like concerns about fraudulent charities, can and are accommodated directly, through disclosure and registration requirements and penalties for fraudulent conduct.