concurring in the judgment.
Some public officials are “shielded by absolute immunity from civil damages liability.” Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 748 (1982). For Members of Congress that shield is expressly provided by the Constitution.1 For various state officials the shield is actually a conclusion that the Congress that enacted the 1871 Civil Rights Act did not intend to subject them to damages liability.2 Federal officials have also been accorded immunity by cases holding that Congress did not intend to subject them to individual liability even for constitutional violations. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367 (1983). The absolute immunity of the President of the United States rests, in part, on the absence of any indication that the authors of either the constitutional text or any relevant statutory text intended to subject him to damages liability predicated on his official acts.
The practical consequences of a holding that no remedy has been authorized against a public official are essentially the same as those flowing from a conclusion that the official has absolute immunity. Moreover, similar factors are evaluated in deciding whether to recognize an implied cause of action or a claim of immunity. In both situations, when Congress is *539silent, the Court makes an effort to ascertain its probable intent. In my opinion, when Congress has legislated in a disputed area, that legislation is just as relevant to any assertion of official immunity as to the analysis of the question whether an implied cause of action should be recognized.
In Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,3 Congress-enacted comprehensive legislation regulating the electronic interception of wire and oral communications. See 18 U. S. C. §§2510-2520. One section of that Act, §2511(3) (1976 ed.), specifically exempted “any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the President” for national security purposes.4 In United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972) (Keith), the Court held that certain wiretaps authorized by the Attorney General were covered by the proviso in §2511(3) and therefore exempt from the prohibitions in Title III. Id., at 301-308.5 The wiretap in this case was authorized on *540November 6, 1970, by then Attorney General Mitchell. The affidavit later submitted to the District Court justifying the wiretap on national security grounds is a virtual carbon copy of the justification the Attorney General offered for the electronic surveillance involved in Keith. App. 23. For that reason, on the authority of Keith, the Court holds that this case involves a national security wiretap undertaken under the “authority of the President” which is exempted from Title III by §2511(3). See ante, at 532-533, n. 11, and 535-536, n. 13.
The Court’s determination in this case and in Keith that Attorney General Mitchell was exercising the discretionary “power of the President” in the area of national security when he authorized these episodes of surveillance inescapably leads to the conclusion that absolute immunity attached to the special function then being performed by Mitchell. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982), the Court explicitly noted that absolute immunity may be justified for Presidential “aides entrusted with discretionary authority in such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy ... to protect the unhesitating performance of functions vital to the national interest.” Id., at 812. In “such ‘central’ Presidential domains as foreign policy and national security” the President cannot “discharge his singularly vital mandate without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his owm.” Id., at 812, n. 19.
Here, the President expressly had delegated the responsibility to approve national security wiretaps to the Attorney General.6 The Attorney General determined that the wire*541tap in this case was essential to gather information about a conspiracy that might be plotting to kidnap a Presidential adviser and sabotage essential facilities in Government buildings. That the Attorney General was too vigorous in guaranteeing the personal security of a Presidential aide and the physical integrity of important Government facilities does not justify holding him personally accountable for damages in a civil action that has not been authorized by Congress.
When the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense make erroneous decisions on matters of national security and foreign policy, the primary liabilities are political. Intense scrutiny, by the people, by the press, and by Congress, has been the traditional method for deterring violations of the Constitution by these high officers of the Executive Branch. Unless Congress authorizes other remedies, it presumably intends the retributions for any violations to be undertaken by political action. Congress is in the best position to decide whether the incremental deterrence added by a civil damages remedy outweighs the adverse effect that the exposure to personal liability may have on governmental decisionmaking. However the balance is struck, there surely is a national interest in enabling Cabinet officers with responsibilities in this area to perform their sensitive duties with decisiveness and without potentially ruinous hesitation.7
The passions aroused by matters of national security and foreign policy8 and the high profile of the Cabinet officers *542with functions in that area make them “easily identifiable target[s] for suits for civil damages.” Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 753. Persons of wisdom and honor will hesitate to answer the President’s call to serve in these vital positions if they fear that vexatious and politically motivated litigation associated with their public decisions will squander their time and reputation, and sap their personal financial resources when they leave office. The multitude of lawsuits filed against high officials in recent years only confirms the rationality of this anxiety.9 The availability of qualified immunity is hardly comforting when it took 13 years for the federal courts to determine that the plaintiff’s claim in this case was without merit.
If the Attorney General had violated the provisions of Title III, as Justice White argued in Keith, he would have no immunity. Congress, however, had expressly refused to enact a civil remedy against Cabinet officials exercising the President’s powers described in §2511(3). In that circumstance, I believe the Cabinet official is entitled to the same absolute immunity as the President of the United States. Indeed, it is highly doubtful whether the rationale of Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), even supports an implied cause of action for damages after Congress has enacted legislation comprehensively regulating the field of electronic surveillance but has specifically declined to impose a remedy for the national security wiretaps described in §2511(3). See id., at 396-397; Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367, 378 (1983). Congress’ failure to act after careful consideration of the matter is a factor counsel-ling some hesitation.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment to the extent that it requires an entry of summary judgment in favor of former Attorney General Mitchell.
“The Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
See, e. g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976).
82 Stat. 212.
At the time the Attorney General authorized the wiretap involved in this ease 18 U. S. C. § 2511(3) (1976 ed.) provided:
“Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934. . . shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence in any trial hearing, or other proceeding only where such interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power” (emphasis added).
As the Court points out, ante, at 514, n. 1, this section has been repealed.
Attorney General Mitchell’s affidavit justifying the warrantless electronic surveillance in Keith is quoted in the Court’s opinion. 407 U. S., *540at 300-301, n. 2. In his separate opinion disagreeing with the Court’s construction of § 2511(3), Justice White pointed out that the language of that section by no means compelled the conclusion that the Court reached. See id., at 336-343. The Court’s construction of § 2511(3) is nevertheless controlling in this case.
See Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (June 30, 1965), reprinted in United States v. United States District Court for Eastern Dist. of Mich., Southern Div., 444 F. 2d 651, 670-671 (CA6 1971), aff’d, 407 U. S. 297 (1972).
Cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554 (1967) (“[A judge’s] errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice and corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation”); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 424-425 (“The public trust of the prosecutor’s office would suffer if he were constrained in making every decision by the consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit for damages”).
Cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S., at 554 (“It is a judge’s duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants”).
The many lawsuits filed against Attorney General Mitchell for his authorization of pre-Keith wiretaps is only one example of such litigation. See ante, at 522, n. 6.