delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), we held that an accused person in custody who has “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Id., at 484-485. In Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638 (1984), we reiterated that “Edwards established a bright-line rule to safeguard pre-existing rights,” id., at 646: “once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, any subsequent conversation must be initiated by him.” Id., at 641.
The question presented by these two cases is whether the same rule applies to a defendant who has been formally charged with a crime and who has requested appointment of counsel at his arraignment. In both cases, the Michigan Supreme Court held that postarraignment confessions were improperly obtained — and the Sixth Amendment violated— because the defendants had “requested counsel during their arraignments, but were not afforded an opportunity to consult with counsel before the police initiated further interrogations.” 421 Mich. 39, 67-68, 365 N. W. 2d 56, 69 (1984). We agree with that holding.
H-{
The relevant facts may be briefly stated. Respondent Bladel was convicted of the murder of three railroad employees at the Amtrak Station in Jackson, Michigan, on Decem*627ber 31, 1978. Bladel, a disgruntled former employee, was arrested on January 1, 1979, and, after being questioned on two occasions, was released on January 3. He was arrested again on March 22, 1979, and agreed to talk to the police that evening without counsel. On the following morning, Friday, March 23, 1979, Bladel was arraigned. He requested that counsel be appointed for him because he was indigent. The detective in charge of the Bladel investigation was present at the arraignment. A notice of appointment was promptly mailed to a law firm, but the law firm did not receive it until Tuesday, March 27. In the interim, on March 26, 1979, two police officers interviewed Bladel in the county jail and obtained a confession from him. Prior to that questioning, the officers properly advised Bladel of his Miranda rights.1 Although he had inquired about his representation several times since the arraignment, Bladel was not told that a law firm had been appointed to represent him.
The trial court overruled Bladel’s objection to the admissibility of all four statements. On appeal from his conviction and sentence, Bladel challenged only the postarraignment confession. The Michigan Court of Appeals first rejected that challenge and affirmed the conviction, 106 Mich. App. 397, 308 N. W. 2d 230 (1981), but, after reconsideration in the light of a recent decision by the State Supreme Court, it reversed and remanded for a new trial. 118 Mich. App. 498, 325 N. W. 2d 421 (1982). The Michigan Supreme Court then granted the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal and considered the case with respondent Jackson’s appeal of his conviction. 421 Mich. 39, 365 N. W. 2d 56 (1984).
*628Respondent Jackson was convicted of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. He was one of four participants in a wife’s plan to have her husband killed on July 12, 1979. Arrested on an unrelated charge on July 30, 1979, he made a series of six statements in response to police questioning prior to his arraignment at 4:30 p.m. on August 1. During the arraignment, Jackson requested that counsel be appointed for him. The police involved in his investigation were present at the arraignment. On the following morning, before he had an opportunity to consult with counsel, two police officers obtained another statement from Jackson to “confirm” that he was the person who had shot the victim. As was true of the six prearraignment statements, the questioning was preceded by advice of his Miranda rights and Jackson’s agreement to proceed without counsel being present.
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the seventh statement was properly received in evidence. 114 Mich. App. 649, 319 N. W. 2d 613 (1982). It distinguished Edwards on the ground that Jackson’s request for an attorney had been made at his arraignment whereas Edwards’ request had been made during a custodial interrogation by the police. Accordingly, it affirmed Jackson’s conviction of murder, although it set aside the conspiracy conviction on unrelated grounds.
The Michigan Supreme Court held that the postarraignment statements in both cases should have been suppressed. Noting that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at the time of the arraignments, the court concluded that the Edwards rule “applies by analogy to those situations where an accused requests counsel before the arraigning magistrate. Once this request occurs, the police may not conduct further interrogations until counsel has been made available to the accused, unless the accused initiates further communications, exchanges, or conversations with the police. . . . The police cannot simply ignore a defendant’s unequivocal request for counsel.” 421 Mich., at 66-67, 365 N. W. 2d, at 68-69 *629(footnote omitted). We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. 1124 (1985), and we now affirm.2
II
The question is not whether respondents had a right to counsel at their postarraignment, custodial interrogations. The existence of that right is clear. It has two sources. The Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination provides the right to counsel at custodial interrogations. Edwards, 451 U. S., at 482; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 470 (1966). The Sixth Amendment guarantee of the assistance of counsel also provides the right to counsel at postarraignment interrogations. The arraignment signals “the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings” and thus the attachment of the Sixth Amendment, United States v. Gouveia, 467 U. S. 180, 187, 188 (1984);3 there*630after, government efforts to elicit information from the accused, including interrogation, represent “critical stages” at which the Sixth Amendment applies. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. 159 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964). The question in these cases is whether respondents validly waived their right to counsel at the postarraignment custodial interrogations.
In Edwards, the request for counsel was made to the police during custodial interrogation, and the basis for the Court’s holding was the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The Court noted the relevance of various Sixth Amendment precedents, 451 U. S., at 484, n. 8, but found it unnecessary to rely on the possible applicability of the Sixth Amendment. Id., at 480, n. 7. In these cases, the request for counsel was made to a judge during arraignment, and the basis for the Michigan Supreme Court opinion was the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the assistance of counsel.4 The State argues that the Edwards rule should not apply to these circumstances because there are legal differences in the basis for the claims; because there are *631factual differences in the contexts of the claims; and because respondents signed valid waivers of their right to counsel at the postarraignment custodial interrogations. We consider these contentions in turn.
The State contends that differences in the legal principles underlying the Fifth and Sixth Amendments compel the conclusion that the Edwards rule should not apply to a Sixth Amendment claim. Edwards flows from the Fifth Amendment’s right to counsel at custodial interrogations, the State argues; its relevance to the Sixth Amendment’s provision of the assistance of counsel is far less clear, and thus the Edwards principle for assessing waivers is unnecessary and inappropriate.
In our opinion, however, the reasons for prohibiting the interrogation of an uncounseled prisoner who has asked for the help of a lawyer are even stronger after he has been formally charged with an offense than before. The State’s argument misapprehends the nature of the pretrial protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment. In United States v. Gouveia, we explained the significance of the formal accusation, and the corresponding attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel:
“[G]iven the plain language of the Amendment and its purpose of protecting the unaided layman at critical confrontations with his adversary, our conclusion that the right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings ‘is far from a mere formalism.’ Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S., at 689. It is only at that time ‘that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecuto-rial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.’” 467 U. S., at 189.
*632As a result, the “Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a ‘medium’ between him and the State.” Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S., at 176. Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a postarraignment interrogation requires at least as much protection as the Fifth Amendment right to counsel at any custodial interrogation.
Indeed, after a formal accusation has been made — and a person who had previously been just a “suspect” has become an “accused” within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment— the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is of such importance that the police may no longer employ techniques for eliciting information from an uncounseled defendant that might have been entirely proper at an earlier stage of their investigation. Thus, the surreptitious employment of a cellmate, see United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980), or the electronic surveillance of conversations with third parties, see Maine v. Moulton, supra; Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), may violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel even though the same methods of investigation might have been permissible before arraignment or indictment.5 Far from undermining the Edwards rule, the difference between the legal basis for the rule applied in Edwards and the Sixth Amendment claim asserted in these cases actually provides additional support for the application of the rule in these circumstances.
The State also relies on the factual differences between a request for counsel during custodial interrogation and a request for counsel at an arraignment. The State maintains that respondents may not have actually intended their re*633quest for counsel to encompass representation during any further questioning by the police. This argument, however, must be considered against the backdrop of our standard for assessing waivers of constitutional rights. Almost a half century ago, in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), a case involving an alleged waiver of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court explained that we should “indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.” Id., at 464. For that reason, it is the State that has the burden of establishing a valid waiver. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S., at 404. Doubts must be resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim. This settled approach to questions of waiver requires us to give a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation to a defendant’s request for counsel — we presume that the defendant requests the lawyer’s services at every critical stage of the prosecution.6 We thus reject the State’s suggestion that respondents’ requests for the appointment of counsel should be construed to apply only to representation in formal legal proceedings.7
*634The State points to another factual difference: the police may not know of the defendant’s request for attorney at the arraignment. That claimed distinction is similarly unavailing. In the cases at bar, in which the officers in charge of the investigations of respondents were present at the arraignments, the argument is particularly unconvincing. More generally, however, Sixth Amendment principles require that we impute the State’s knowledge from one state actor to another. For the Sixth Amendment concerns the confrontation between the State and the individual.8 One set of state actors (the police) may not claim ignorance of defendants’ unequivocal request for counsel to another state actor (the court).
The State also argues that, because of these factual differences, the application of Edwards in a Sixth Amendment context will generate confusion. However, we have frequently emphasized that one of the characteristics of Edwards is its clear, “bright-line” quality. See, e. g., Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S. 91, 98 (1984); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S., at 646; Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U. S. 1039, 1044 (1983) (plurality opinion); id., at 1054, n. 2 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We do not agree that applying the rule when the accused requests counsel at an arraignment, rather than in the police station, somehow diminishes that clarity. To the extent that there may have been any doubts about interpreting a request *635for counsel at an arraignment, or about the police responsibility to know of and respond to such a request, our opinion today resolves them.
Finally, the State maintains that each of the respondents made a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights by signing a postarraignment confession after again being advised of his constitutional rights. In Edwards, however, we rejected the notion that, after a suspect’s request for counsel, advice of rights and acquiescence in police-initiated questioning could establish a valid waiver. 451 U. S., at 484. We find no warrant for a different view under a Sixth Amendment analysis. Indeed, our rejection of the comparable argument in Edwards was based, in part, on our review of earlier Sixth Amendment cases.9 Just as written waivers are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Fifth Amendment analysis, so too they are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Sixth Amendment analysis.10
*636r — H l-H
Edwards is grounded in the understanding that “the assertion of the right to counsel [is] a significant event,” 451 U. S., at 485, and that “additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel.” Id., at 484. We conclude that the assertion is no less significant, and the need for additional safeguards no less clear, when the request for counsel is made at an arraignment and when the basis for the claim is the Sixth Amendment. We thus hold that, if police initiate interrogation after a defendant’s assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.
Although the Edwards decision itself rested on the Fifth Amendment and concerned a request for counsel made during custodial interrogation, the Michigan Supreme Court correctly perceived that the reasoning of that case applies with even greater force to these cases. The judgments are accordingly affirmed.
It is so ordered.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). The Miranda warnings were also given prior to the questioning on January 1, January 2, and March 22. Although Bladel made certain inculpatory statements on those occasions, he denied responsibility for the murder until after the arraignment. As the Michigan Supreme Court noted, even without his own statements, the evidence against Bladel was substantial. 421 Mich., at 44, and n. 2, 365 N. W. 2d, at 58-59, and n. 2.
Respondent Jackson points out that the Michigan Supreme Court also held that his fourth, fifth, and sixth statements should have been suppressed on grounds of prearraignment delay under a state statute. He therefore argues that the decision rests on an adequate and independent state ground and that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed. The state-court opinion, however, does not apply that prearraignment-delay holding to the seventh statement. Thus, although the Michigan court’s holding on the other statements does mean that Jackson’s conviction must be reversed regardless of this Court’s decision, the admissibility of the seventh statement is controlled by that court’s Sixth Amendment analysis, and is properly before us.
In Jackson, the State concedes that the arraignment represented the initiation of formal legal proceedings, and that the Sixth Amendment attached at that point. Brief for Petitioner in No. 84-1531, p. 10. In Bladel, however, the State disputes that contention, Brief for Petitioner in No. 84-1539, pp. 24-26. In view of the clear language in our decisions about the significance of arraignment, the State’s argument is untenable. See, e. g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 398 (1977) (“[A] person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him — ‘whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment’”) (emphasis added), quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion). See also United States v. Gouveia, 467 U. S., at 187-188 (quoting *630Kirby); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454, 469-470 (1981) (quoting Kirby); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U. S. 220, 226 (1977) (quoting Kirby). Cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 57 (1932) (“[T]he most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants” was “from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial”) (emphasis added). The question whether arraignment signals the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, moreover, is distinct from the question whether the arraignment itself is a critical stage requiring the presence of counsel, absent a valid waiver. Cf. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52 (1961) (Alabama arraignment is a “critical stage”).
The Michigan Supreme Court found that “defendants’ request to the arraigning magistrate for appointment of counsel implicated only their Sixth Amendment right to counsel,” 421 Mich., at 52, 365 N. W. 2d, at 62, because the request was not made during custodial interrogation. It was for that reason that the Michigan court did not rely on a Fifth Amendment Edwards analysis. We express no comment on the validity of the Michigan court’s Fifth Amendment analysis.
Similarly, after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, the Sixth Amendment provides a right to counsel at a “critical stage” even when there is no interrogation and no Fifth Amendment applicability. See United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967) (Sixth Amendment provides right to counsel at postindictment lineup even though Fifth Amendment is not implicated).
In construing respondents’ request for counsel, we do not, of course, suggest that the right to counsel turns on such a request. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S., at 404 (“[T]he right to counsel does not depend upon a request by the defendant”); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 513 (1962) (“[I]t is settled that where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does not depend on a request”). Rather, we construe the defendant’s request for counsel as an extremely important fact in considering the validity of a subsequent waiver in response to police-initiated interrogation.
We also agree with the comments of the Michigan Supreme Court about the nature of an accused’s request for counsel:
“Although judges and lawyers may understand and appreciate the subtle distinctions between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, the average person does not. When an accused requests an attorney, either before a police officer or a magistrate, he does not know which constitutional right he is invoking; he therefore should not be expected to articulate exactly why or for what purposes he is seeking counsel. It makes little sense to afford relief from further interrogation to a defendant who asks a *634police officer for an attorney, but permit further interrogation to a defendant who makes an identical request to a judge. The simple fact that defendant has requested an attorney indicates that he does not believe that he is sufficiently capable of dealing with his adversaries singlehandedly.” 421 Mich., at 63-64, 365 N. W. 2d, at 67.
See, e. g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. 159, 170-171 (1985):
“Once the right to counsel has attached and been asserted, the State must of course honor it. This means more than simply that the State cannot prevent the accused from obtaining the assistance of counsel. The Sixth Amendment also imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the accused’s choice to seek this assistance” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
After stating our holding that “when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights,” 451 U. S., at 484, we appended this footnote:
“In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977), where, as in Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had accrued, the Court held that a valid waiver of counsel rights should not be inferred from the mere response by the accused to overt or more subtle forms of interrogation or other efforts to elicit incriminating information. In Massiah and Brewer, counsel had been engaged or appointed and the admissions in question were elicited in his absence. But in McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U. S. 356 (1965), we summarily reversed a decision that the police could elicit information after indictment even though counsel had not yet been appointed.” Id., at 484, n. 8.
The State also argues that the Michigan Supreme Court’s finding of a valid Fifth Amendment waiver should require the finding of a valid Sixth Amendment waiver. The relationship between the validity of waivers for Fifth and Sixth Amendment purposes has been the subject of considerable attention in the courts, 421 Mich., at 55-62, 365 N. W. 2d, at 63-67 (discussing and collecting eases), and the commentaries, id., at 54, n. 15, 365 *636N. W. 2d, at 63, n. 15. In view of our holding that the Edwards rule applies to the Sixth Amendment and that the Sixth Amendment requires the suppression of the postarraignment statements, we need not decide either the validity of the Fifth Amendment waiver in this case, see n. 4, supra, or the general relationship between Fifth and Sixth Amendment waivers.