dissenting.
The Court finds the way open to reverse the judgment in this case because “[t]he opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court, which makes use of both federal and state cases in its analysis, lacks the requisite ‘plain statement’ that it rests on state grounds.” Ante, at 678, n. 3.1 In so holding, the Court *690continues down the path it marked in Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1037-1044 (1983), when it announced that it would henceforth presume jurisdiction to review state-court judgments absent a “plain statement” that such judgments rest on state grounds.2
Despite the directness of the route chosen, today’s destination was not foreordained. Unlike Michigan v. Long, this case concerns whether the Court should presume jurisdiction to review a state supreme court’s remedy for a federal constitutional violation. Since courts have traditionally enjoyed broad discretion to fashion remedies — even remedies forbidding otherwise lawful acts — once a constitutional violation *691has been proved,3 the more logical direction would have been to presume that a state court is merely exercising its normal supervisory power over state officials unless it clearly states that federal law requires a particular procedure to be followed. The Court’s contrary presumption works a further advancement of its own power, but it flouts this Court’s best traditions: it deviates from our normal approach to questions of subject-matter jurisdiction, and it departs from our longstanding practice of reserving decision on federal constitutional law. Even considered purely from the standpoint of managing our own discretionary docket, the Court’s presumption includes a selection bias inconsistent with the lessons of history as revealed in this Court’s statutory jurisdiction over the judgments of state courts. Finally, the Court’s willingness to presume jurisdiction to review state remedies evidences a lack of respect for state courts and will, I fear, be a recurrent source of friction between the federal and state judiciaries.
I
The rules that govern this Court’s jurisdiction to review state-court judgments should, of course, be consistent with the jurisdictional principles that govern the entire federal ju*692dicial system. Indeed, because the example that this Court sets for the entire system inevitably affects the way in which all federal judges tend to evaluate their own powers, we have a special obligation to make sure that our conclusions concerning our own jurisdiction rest on a firm and legitimate foundation.
In origin and design, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they exercise only the authority conferred on them by Art. Ill and by congressional enactments pursuant thereto. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., ante, at 541, and cases cited therein. Like all other federal courts, this Court has only the power expressly given it. Because it is our inescapable duty — in contrast to that of the political branches — to construe authoritatively the very instruments which define and limit that power, the Court early in its history wisely adopted a presumption that every federal court is “without jurisdiction” unless “the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.” King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U. S. 225, 226 (1887). Accord, Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U. S. 207, 210 (1904); Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U. S. 48, 62-63 (1904). That presumption is just as “inflexible” in this Court as in any other federal court.4
Even for cases unquestionably within this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, we have disclaimed any pretension to *693reach questions arising under the Federal Constitution when an alternative basis of decision fairly presented itself. Thus, in one of the most respected opinions ever written by a Member of this Court, Justice Brandéis wrote:
“The Court [has] developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision. They are:
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“. . . The Court will not pass upon a [federal] constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.” Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346-347 (1936) (concurring opinion).6
The Court has remained faithful to these basic tenets when it is reviewing cases that arise in the federal system. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., ante, at 545-549; Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214, 222-223 (1985). Ironically, however — and contrary to tradition6 — the Court has taken a different stance when it is *694asked to review cases coming to us from state courts. Although “[w]e cannot perform our duty to refrain from interfering in state law questions and also to review federal ones without making a determination whether the one or the other controls the judgment,” Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 125-126 (1945), the jurisdictional precepts that serve us so well in reviewing judgments rendered in federal court merit observance in review of state-court judgments too. Abjuring the federal analogy, the Court unwisely marks for special scrutiny the decisions of courts to which I believe it owes special respect.
II
The jurisdictional presumption that the Court applies — and extends — today harbors a hidden selection bias that in turn reveals a disturbing conception of this Court’s role. Because a state ground can only support a judgment consistent with a *695federal claim, the Court’s jurisdictional presumption operates to expand this Court’s review of state remedies that overcompensate for violations of federal constitutional rights. Historically, however, such cases have been outside the province of this Court. For well over a century the Judiciary Act of 1789 denied this Court authority to review state-court judgments upholding federal claims.7 By conferring no power to review these judgments, “the first Congress assembled under the Constitution” — whose Members had “taken part in framing that instrument,” Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 297 (1888), in addition to having enacted the First Judiciary Act — codified their conviction that this Court’s overriding concern was to ensure that state courts respect federal rights. Only in 1914 did Congress authorize this Court to take jurisdiction over state-court judgments upholding claims of federal constitutional right, Act of Dec. 23, 1914, 38 Stat. 790, and even that legislation reflected an un*696derstanding that the Court’s role is primarily to vindicate such rights.8 Most of the bills on this subject gave “the litigant an absolute right to appeal or take a writ of error to *697the Supreme Court. . . even though the decision is in favor of a claim of right under the Federal Constitution.” S. Rep. No. 161, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1914). Rather than adopt these bills, which would have placed uniformity of federal law on a par with vindication of federal rights by making review of such judgments at least nominally mandatory, Congress “substitute^] a grant of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of the United States to issue a writ of certiorari or otherwise to review the decision of the State court.” Ibid. Compare Act of Sept. 24,1789, § 25,1 Stat. 85-86, with Act of Dec. 23, 1914, 38 Stat. 790. Thus, although this Court now has the power to review decisions defending federal constitutional rights, the claim of these cases on our docket is secondary to the need to scrutinize judgments disparaging those rights.9 *698When the state-court decision to be reviewed is ambiguous, and it is not even clear that the judgment rests on a federal ground, the basis for exercising jurisdiction is even less tenable.
Ill
The Court’s decision to monitor state-court decisions that may or may not rest on nonfederal grounds is not only historically disfavored but risks the very confrontations and tensions a more humble jurisdictional stance would avoid. The presumption applied today allocates the risk of error in favor of the Court’s power of review; as a result, over the long run *699the Court will inevitably review judgments that in fact rest on adequate and independent state grounds. Even if the Court is unconcerned by the waste inherent in review of such cases, even if it is unmoved by the incongruity between the wholly precatory nature of our pronouncements on such occasions and Art. Ill’s prohibition of advisory opinions, it should be concerned by the inevitable intrusion upon the prerogatives of state courts that can only provide a potential source of friction and thereby threaten to undermine the respect on which we must depend for the faithful and conscientious application of this Court’s expositions of federal law.
Less obvious is the impact on mutual trust when the state court on remand — perhaps out of misplaced sense of duty— confines its state constitution to the boundaries marked by this Court for the Federal Constitution. In Montana v. Jackson, 460 U. S. 1030 (1983), for example, this Court vacated and remanded “for further consideration in light of South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553 (1983).” In so doing, this Court presumed that the judgment of the Montana Supreme Court did not rest on Montana’s Constitution. Justice Sheehy, joined by the author of the state court’s original opinion, rather bitterly disagreed:
“In our original opinion in this case, we had examined the rights guaranteed our citizens under state constitutional principles, in the light of federal constitutional decisions. Now the United States Supreme Court has interjected itself, commanding us in effect to withdraw the constitutional rights which we felt we should extend to our state citizens back to the limits prescribed by the federal decisions. Effectively, the United States Supreme Court has intruded upon the rights of the judiciary of this sovereign state.
“Instead of knuckling under to this unjustified expansion of federal judicial power into the perimeters of our state power, we should show our judicial displeasure by insisting that in Montana, this sovereign state can inter*700pret its constitution to guarantee rights to its citizens greater than those guaranteed by the federal constitution.
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“If a majority of this Court had the will to press the issue, we could put the question to the United States Supreme Court four-square, that this State judiciary has the right to interpret its constitution in the light of federal decisions, and to go beyond the federal decisions in granting and preserving rights to its citizens under its state constitution.” State v. Jackson, 206 Mont. 338, 349-351, 672 P. 2d 255, 260-261 (1983) (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
See id., at 357-358, 672 P. 2d, at 264-265 (Shea, J., dissenting).
The Court’s two-sentence analysis notwithstanding, one cannot be confident that we have not trenched on state prerogatives in this very case. Here, the Delaware Supreme Court applied a rule reversing convictions when the defendant had been totally denied the right to cross-examine a witness for bias. The rule was expressly found to be “consistent with Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974) and with our ruling in Weber [v. State, 457 A. 2d 674 (1983),] for determining whether a violation of the confrontation clause is harmless.” 486 A. 2d 1, 7 (1984) (emphasis added and citations omitted). Weber itself emphasized that “[b]oth the United States and Delaware Constitutions guarantee the right of a defendant to confront the witnesses against him. U. S. Const, amend. VI; Del. Const, art. I, § 7.” Weber v. State, 457 A. 2d, at 682 (footnote omitted). At no point did the Delaware Supreme Court imply that it reversed the defendant’s conviction only because that result was compelled by its understanding of federal constitutional law; rather, the conclusion that its rule was “consistent with” a case of this Court construing the federal Confrontation Clause suggests that it was interested merely in respecting the bounds of federal law as opposed to carrying out its command. The Court rewards *701the Delaware Supreme Court’s circumspection by unceremoniously reversing its judgment.
h-i <!
I agree with Justice Marshall that “the Delaware Supreme Court remains free on remand to decide that... its harmless-error analysis was the product of state rather than federal law.” Ante, at 689. Because the Court’s approach does nothing to minimize, and indeed multiplies, future occasions on which state courts may be called upon to clarify whether their judgments were in fact based on state law, it is appropriate to amplify the opinion I expressed in Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U. S. 727, 736 (1984) (concurring in judgment), that the proper “sequence of analysis when an arguable violation of the State Constitution is disclosed by the record” is for the state court to consider the state constitutional claim in advance of any federal constitutional claim. In that case, I described the Oregon Supreme Court’s practice of considering state constitutional claims before reaching issues of federal constitutional law: *702Since that time, at least four other state courts have expressly endorsed the practice of considering state constitutional claims first.11 In response to Michigan v. Long, 463 *703U. S. 1032 (1983), for example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded:
*701‘“The proper sequence is to analyze the state’s law, including its constitutional law, before reaching a federal constitutional claim. This is required, not for the sake either of parochialism or of style, but because the state does not deny any right claimed under the federal Constitution when the claim before the court in fact is fully met by state law.’ Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Ore. 611, 614, 625 P. 2d 123, 126 (1981).” Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U. S., at 736.10
*703“When a defendant, as in this case, has invoked the protections of the New Hampshire Constitution, we will first address these claims.
*704“. . . We live under a unique concept of federalism and divided sovereignty between the nation and fifty States. The New Hampshire Constitution is the fundamental charter of our State. The sovereign people gave limited powers to the State government, and the Bill of Rights in part I of the New Hampshire Constitution protects the people from governmental excesses and potential abuses. When State constitutional issues have been raised, this court has a responsibility to make an independent determination of the protections afforded in the New Hampshire Constitution. If we ignore this duty, we fail to live up to our oath to defend our constitution and we help to destroy the federalism that must be so carefully safeguarded by our people. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon recently recognized this responsibility and stated:
“ ‘The point is . .. that a state’s constitutional guarantees . . . were meant to be and remain genuine guarantees against misuse of the state’s governmental powers, truly independent of the rising and falling tides of federal case law both in method and specifics. State courts cannot abdicate their responsibility for these independent guarantees, at least not unless the people of the State themselves choose to abandon them and entrust their rights entirely to federal law.’ State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 271, 666 P. 2d 1316, 1323 (1983).” State v. Ball, 124 N. H. 226, 231, 471 A. 2d 347, 350 (1983).
Since 1983, in over a dozen cases,12 the New Hampshire Supreme Court has thereby averted unnecessary disquisitions on the meaning of the Federal Constitution.
*705The emerging preference for state constitutional bases of decision in lieu of federal ones is, in my view, the analytical approach best suited to facilitating the independent role of state constitutions and state courts in our federal system. There is much wisdom in The Chief Justice’s admonition that.“State courts . . . are responsible first for resolving issues arising under their constitutions and statutes and then for passing on matters concerning federal law.” Year-End Report on the Judiciary 18 (1981).
It must be remembered that every State but Rhode Island had a written constitution by the close of the Revolutionary War in 1783. “[F]or the first century of this Nation’s history, the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States was solely a protection for the individual in relation to federal authorities. State Constitutions protected the liberties of the people of the several States from abuse by state authorities.” Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U. S., at 738-739 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). The independent significance of state constitutions clearly informed this Court’s conclusion, in Barron v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 247-248 (1833), that the Bill of Rights applied only to the Federal Government:
“The question thus presented is, we think, of great importance, but not of much difficulty.
“The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own *706government, and not for the government of the individual states. Each state established a constitution for itself, and, in that constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its judgment dictated.
“. . . In their several constitutions they have imposed such restrictions on their respective governments as their own wisdom suggested; such as they deemed most proper for themselves. It is a subject on which they judge exclusively, and with which others interfere no farther than they are supposed to have a common interest.”
While the holding of the Barron case has since been superseded by ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights, the concomitant atrophy of state constitutional theory was both unnecessary and unfortunate.13 State constitutions preceded the Federal Constitution and were obviously intended to have independent significance.14 The frequent amendments to state *707constitutions likewise presuppose their continued importance. Thus, whether the national minimum set by the Federal Constitution is high or low, state constitutions have their own unique origins, history, language, and structure — all of which warrant independent attention and elucidation. State courts remain primarily responsible for reviewing the conduct of their own executive branches, for safeguarding the rights of their citizenry, and for nurturing the jurisprudence of state constitutional rights which it is their exclusive province to expound.15
*708Because I would not presume that the Delaware Supreme Court failed to discharge this responsibility, I would dismiss the writ.
A determination that a state-court judgment rests on a federal ground is a prerequisite to the exercise of our jurisdiction in such a case. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935) (“[W]here the judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment”); *690Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 626, 633, 641 (1875) (construing requirement as part of jurisdictional statute). See also Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 S. Ct. Rev. 187, 188-189, and n. 6 (discussing possible constitutional basis for the adequate and independent state ground rule).
The principal question in Michigan v. Long was whether a state court’s determination that a search violated the State Constitution was independent of its conclusion that it violated the Federal Constitution. The Court surveyed the various approaches, decided that “none of [them] thus far recommends itself as the preferred method,” 463 U. S., at 1039, and then selected the presumption it did as the most administrable of the available choices, id., at 1041. I agreed with the Court that “we are left with a choice between two presumptions: one in favor of our taking jurisdiction, and one against it,” id., at 1066, but explained that “in reviewing the decisions of state courts, the primary" — although not exclusive — “role of this Court is to make sure that persons who seek to vindicate federal rights have been fairly heard,” id., at 1068 (first emphasis added). See Florida v. Meyers, 466 U. S. 380, 385 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“But we must not forget that a central purpose of our written Constitution, and more specifically of its unique creation of a life-tenured federal judiciary, was to ensure that certain rights are firmly secured against possible oppression by the Federal or State Governments”). Compare the Michigan v. Long Court’s misreading of my dissent as “proposing] the novel view that this Court should never review a state court decision unless the Court wishes to vindicate a federal right that has been endangered.” 463 U. S., at 1043, n. 8 (emphasis added).
See, e. g., Teachers v. Hudson, ante, at 309-310, n. 22, and cases cited therein. As I explained in my opinion concurring in the judgment in Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U. S. 73, 88 (1983) (footnotes omitted):
“If federal constitutional error occurs in a state criminal trial, federal law places certain limits on the state appellate court’s disposition of the case. If the error is sufficiently grievous, it must reverse. If the error is less grievous, it also must reverse unless it declares its conviction beyond a reasonable doubt that the federal error was harmless. But federal law does not require a state appellate court to make a harmless-error determination; it merely 'permits the state court to do so in appropriate cases. This is all the Court held in Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967).”
Justice Marshall is therefore quite right to point out that “this Court cannot require state courts to apply harmless-error analysis to violations of the Federal Constitution.” Ante, at 689.
Cf. Mansfield C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382 (1884) (“[T]he rule, springing from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States, is inflexible and without exception, which requires this court, of its own motion, to deny its own jurisdiction, and, in the exercise of its appellate power, that of all other courts of the United States, in all cases where such jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the record on which, in the exercise of that power, it is called to act. On every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes. This question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to it”).
See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 176, 193 (1909) (duty of the Federal District Court to decide first a question of state law, over which it has merely pendent jurisdiction, in order to avoid if possible a federal constitutional question); Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U. S. 394, 410-411, 416-417 (1886). Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89 (1984), did not qualify this avoidance principle; it held only that the Eleventh Amendment proscribed the award of injunctive relief for violations of state law in certain cases, thereby removing the basis for avoiding decision of federal constitutional questions in this class of eases. See id., at 119, n. 28 (“Nothing in our decision is meant to cast doubt on the desirability of applying the Siler principle in cases where the federal court has jurisdiction to decide the state-law issues”).
The Court’s time-honored “policy of strict necessity in disposing of [federal] constitutional issues,” by which “constitutional issues . . . will not *694be determined if the record presents some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of,” Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 568, 569 (1947), received one of its most forceful expositions in an appeal from a judgment rendered by a state court:
“[T]he policy ... is one of substance, grounded in considerations which transcend all such particular limitations. Like the case and controversy limitation itself and the policy against entertaining political questions, it is one of the rules basic to the federal system and this Court’s appropriate place within that structure.
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“The policy’s ultimate foundations, some if not all of which also sustain the jurisdictional limitation, lie in all that goes to make up the unique place and character, in our scheme, of judicial review of governmental action for constitutionality. They are found in the delicacy of that function, particularly in view of possible consequences for others stemming also from constitutional roots; the comparative finality of those consequences; the consideration due to the judgment of other repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope of their authority; the necessity, if government is to function constitutionally, for each to keep within its power, including the courts; the inherent limitations of the judicial process, arising especially from its largely negative character and limited resources of enforcement; withal in the paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our system.” Id., at 568-571 (footnotes omitted).
Section 25 of the Act of Sept. 24,1789,1 Stat. 85-86, as the First Judiciary Act was also known, provided for review only if the validity of a treaty or of a federal or state statute or “authority,” or the construction of a federal treaty, statute, or commission of the Constitution was drawn in question, and then only if “the decision [was] against their validity” or “against the title, right, privilege or exemption” claimed.
In 1867 the post-Civil War Congress, which was not overly concerned with state sovereignty, revised the section to allow review without respect to questions of validity or construction, “where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under the constitution, or any treaty or statute of or commission held, or authority exercised under the United States. ” Act of Feb. 5,1867, § 2,14 Stat. 386. The question raised by this amendment, however, was not whether the Court could or should review state-court decisions in favor of federal constitutional claims, but whether the amendment had effected an implied repeal of the doctrine that the Court could review only federal questions in eases subject to review — a question answered emphatically in the negative in Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875). (According to Professor Charles Warren, it is “highly probable” that Congress actually meant to provide that “every question passed on by the State Court should be open for reconsideration in the Supreme Court.” 2 C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 682 (rev. ed. 1926)).
The legislation was a response to the New York Court of Appeals’ Lochner-style substantive due process decision in Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431 (1911). See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 161, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1914); H. R. Rep. No. 1222, 63d Cong., 3d Sess., 2-3 (1914); 52 Cong. Rec. 276 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb). In the Ives case, the Court of Appeals held New York’s newly enacted workmen’s compensation statute unconstitutional because it imposed on the railroad the obligation to pay for injuries for which it was not at fault. 201 N. Y., at 292-317, 94 N. E., at 439-449. By the 1914 legislation Congress intended to redress a seeming discrimination in favor of railroads and other large economic interests which, under the virulent substantive due process doctrine of the day, could obtain review of challenges to state reform legislation in the Supreme Court if they lost in the highest state court, but whose judgment in state court was protected from review in the Supreme Court if it won. See, e. g., 52 Cong. Rec., supra, at 277 (remarks of Rep. Volstead) (“The cases that are taken to the courts for the purpose of having a statute declared unconstitutional are, I believe, in the great majority of eases, taken there by the large corporate interests. ... If they succeed in having those laws set aside in a State court, that ends it under the law as it now stands. The other side can not appeal. If they fail to have the statute declared void in a State court, they can appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States and have another chance there to effect their purpose.... We ought to allow equal treatment to all parties and not favor these large interests”). See also H. R. Rep. No. 1222, supra, at 2-3; 52 Cong. Rec., supra, at 276 (remarks of Rep. Webb); ibid, (quoting letter from Mr. Wheeler of New York); id., at 277 (remarks of Rep. Lewis).
Although Congress’ response to the Ives ease demonstrates that there are cases in which a state court’s judgment vindicating a federal claim merits review, that view is perfectly consistent with the traditional understanding that the primary function of this Court is to review decisions rejecting such claims. Indeed, the facts of Ives belie any suggestion that Congress intended searching review of state-court decisions upholding claims of federal right. The workmen’s compensation legislation was of exceptional importance to the State of New York, as attested to by the fact that it represented the labor of a 14-person commission chaired by a United States Senator, 201 N. Y., at 284, 94 N. E., at 435-436, and was “based upon a most voluminous array of statistical tables, extracts from the works of philosophical writers and the industrial laws of many countries, all of *697which are designed to show that our own system of dealing with industrial accidents is economically, morally and legally unsound,” id., at 287, 94 N. E., at 437. (In response to Ives the people of New York amended their Constitution to allow for legislation of this kind. S. Rep. No. 161, supra, at 2; H. R. Rep. No. 1222, swpra, at 3.) Not only was this particular statute of great concern to New York, but the constitutionality of legislation of this kind was unsettled: “Similar laws were held constitutional in New Jersey, the State of Washington, and some other States.” H. R. Rep. No. 1222, supra, at 2. See 52 Cong. Rec., supra, at 276 (remarks of Rep. Webb) (New Jersey).
There is strong scholarly support for this view. For example, Dean Choper “submits that the essential role of judicial review in our system is to prevent violations of that category of constitutional provisions that secure individual liberties.” J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 2 (1980). See id., at 64-65.
Professor Dworkin makes a similar point:
“The institution of rights against the Government is not a gift of God, or an ancient ritual, or a national sport. It is a complex and troublesome practice that makes the Government’s job of securing the general benefit more difficult and more expensive, and it would be a frivolous and wrongful practice unless it served some point. Anyone who professes to take rights seriously, and who praises our Government for respecting them, must have some sense of what that point is. He must accept, at the minimum, one or both of two important ideas. The first is the vague but powerful idea of human dignity. This idea, associated with Kant, but defended by philoso*698phers of different schools, supposes that there are ways of treating a man that are inconsistent with recognizing him as a full member of the human community, and holds that such treatment is profoundly unjust.
“The second is the more familiar idea of political equality. This supposes that the weaker members of a political community are entitled to the same concern and respect of their government as the more powerful members have secured for themselves, so that if some men have freedom of decision whatever the effect on the general good, then all men must have the same freedom. I do not want to defend or elaborate these ideas here, but only to insist that anyone who claims that citizens have rights must accept ideas very close to these.
“It makes sense to say that a man has a fundamental right against the Government, in the strong sense, like free speech, if that right is necessary to protect his dignity, or his standing as equally entitled to concern and respect, or some other personal value of like consequence. It does not make sense otherwise.
“So if rights make sense at all, then the invasion of a relatively important right must be a very serious matter. It means treating a man as less than a man, or as less worthy of concern than other men. The institution of rights rests on the conviction that this is a grave injustice, and that it is worth paying the incremental cost in social policy or efficiency that is necessary to prevent it. But then it must be wrong to say that inflating rights is as serious as invading them. If the Government errs on the side of the individual, then it simply pays a little more in social efficiency than it has to pay; it pays a little more, that is, of the same coin that it has already decided must be spent. But if it errs against the individual it inflicts an insult upon him that, on its own reckoning, it is worth a great deal of that coin to avoid.” R. Dworkin, Takings Rights Seriously 198-199 (1977).
«[T]he basis for th[e] claim in the state constitution should be examined first, before any issue under the federal fourteenth amendment. To begin with the federal claim, as is customarily done, implicitly admits that the guarantees of the state’s constitution are ineffective to protect the asserted right and that only the intervention of the federal constitution stands between the claimant and the state. . . . [I]nsofar as the federal fourteenth amendment is invoked to apply the federal Bill of Rights against state action, particularly in the fields of freedom of ideas, criminal proce*702dure, and compensation for the taking of property, there is no reason to accept such an assumption that the values enshrined in a state’s constitution, in, say, 1859, must today fall short of those in the federal Bill of Rights of 1789. And to add a reference to the corresponding state provision as an afterthought to a holding under the federal guarantee is worse than merely backwards: A holding that a state constitutional provision protects the asserted claim in fact destroys the premise for a holding that the state is denying what the federal Constitution would assure.” Linde, Without “Due Process”, 49 Ore. L. Rev. 125, 182 (1970).
Accord, Linde, E Pluribus — Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 165, 178 (1984) (“My own view has long been that a state court always is responsible for the law of its state before deciding whether the state falls short of a national standard, so that no federal issue is properly reached when the state’s law protects the claimed right” (footnote omitted)); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379, 383 (1980) (“Just as rights under the state constitutions were first in time, they are first also in the logic of constitutional law”). For thoughtful discussion of other views, see Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal Constitutional Issues when Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 Texas L. Rev. 1025 (1985) (advocating that state courts comment on federal issues even in eases decided on state constitutional grounds); Developments in the Law — The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324, 1356-1367 (1982) (contending that state constitutions should be used only to supplement individual rights in the event that protection under the Federal Constitution is unavailable).
See, e. g., Large v. Superior Court, 148 Ariz. 229, 235, 714 P. 2d 399, 405 (1986) (“Because petitioner did not articulate whether he was proceeding under the federal or state due process clause, and because the provisions of our state constitution settle the matter, we address only the state constitutional issue. In construing the Arizona Constitution we refer to federal constitutional law only as the benchmark of minimum constitutional protection” (citations omitted)); City of Portland v. Jacobsky, 496 A. 2d 646, 648 (Me.1985) (“Just as we avoid expressing opinions on constitutional questions when the issue before us on appeal may be otherwise resolved, a similar policy of judicial restraint impels us to forbear from ruling on federal constitutional questions when the provisions of our state constitution may settle the matter” (citations omitted)); State v. Chaisson, *703125 N. H. 810, 814-815, 486 A. 2d 297, 301 (1984) (“Next, the defendant contends that his warrantless arrest violated both the Federal and the State Constitutions and that the fruits of that arrest, therefore, should have been suppressed at trial. We, of course, address the State constitutional issues first. In construing the State constitution, we refer to Federal constitutional law as only the benchmark minimum constitutional protection” (citations omitted)); State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 373-374, 679 P. 2d 353, 359 (1984) (“Whether the prior restraint was constitutionally valid or invalid should be treated first under our state constitution, for a number of reasons. First, state courts have a duty to independently interpret and apply their state constitutions that stems from the very nature of our federal system and the vast differences between the federal and state constitutions and courts. Second, the histories of the United States and Washington Constitutions clearly demonstrate that the protection of the fundamental rights of Washington citizens was intended to be and remains a separate and important function of our state constitution and courts that is closely associated with our sovereignty. By turning to our own constitution first we grant the proper respect to our own legal foundations and fulfill our sovereign duties. Third, by turning first to our own constitution we can develop a body of independent jurisprudence that will assist this court and the bar of our state in understanding how that constitution will be applied. Fourth, we will be able to assist other states that have similar constitutional provisions develop a principled, responsible body of law that will not appear to have been constructed to meet the whim of the moment. Finally, to apply the federal constitution before the Washington Constitution would be as improper and premature as deciding a ease on state constitutional grounds when statutory grounds would have sufficed, and for essentially the same reasons”). See also Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions: Some Random Thoughts, 54 Miss. L. J. 371, 389-394, and nn. 56-58, 69-72 (1984) (citing cases). See generally Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 Texas L. Rev. 1141,1157-1158, n. 54 (1985) (discussing practice in state courts generally).
To implement this practice of considering state constitutional issues in advance of federal ones, state high courts have directed parties to file supplemental briefs illuminating possible state constitutional bases of decision *704when the initial briefings have neglected such issues. See State v. Kennedy, 295 Ore. 260, 268, 666 P. 2d 1316, 1321 (1983). Cf. State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 222, 500 A. 2d 233, 234 (1985).
See Hopps v. State Bd. of Parole, 127 N. H. 133, 135, 500 A. 2d 355, 356 (1985); State v. Cooper, 127 N. H. 119, 122, 498 A. 2d 1209, 1212 (1985); State v. Dayutis, 127 N. H. 101, 105, 498 A. 2d 325, 328 (1985); State ex rel. *705McLellan v. Cavanaugh, 127 N. H. 33, 37, 498 A. 2d 735, 738 (1985); State v. Langone, 127 N. H. 49, 51-52, 498 A. 2d 731, 733 (1985); State v. Corey, 127 N. H. 56, 57, 497 A. 2d 1196, 1197 (1985); State v. Faragi, 127 N. H. 1, 4-5, 498 A. 2d 723, 726 (1985); State v. Camargo, 126 N. H. 766, 769, 498 A. 2d 292, 295 (1985); State v. Barham, 126 N. H. 631, 636, 495 A. 2d 1269, 1273 (1985); State v. Farnsworth, 126 N. H. 656, 659, 497 A. 2d 835, 836 (1985); State v. Cimino, 126 N. H. 570, 572, 493 A. 2d 1197, 1200 (1985); State v. Cote, 126 N. H. 514, 521-522; 493 A. 2d 1170, 1175 (1985); State v. Chaisson, 125 N. H. 810, 815, 486 A. 2d 297, 301 (1984).
To quote the Vermont Supreme Court:
“One longs to hear once again of legal concepts, their meaning and their origin. All too often legal argument consists of a litany of federal buzz words memorized like baseball cards. As Justice Linde has noted: ‘People do not claim rights against self-incrimination, they “take the fifth” and expect “Miranda warnings.” Unlawful searches are equated with fourth amendment violations. Journalists do not invoke freedom of the press, they demand their first amendment rights. All claims of unequal treatment are phrased as denials of equal protection of the laws.”’ State v. Jewett, 146 Vt., at 223, 500 A. 2d, at 235 (footnote omitted).
The early state Bills of Rights were, in fact, specifically motivated by the interest in protecting the individual against overreaching by the majority:
“In the period following independence, the state legislatures became increasingly active, enacting a great variety of laws. To many Americans much of this legislation appeared to serve the special interests of some groups at the expense of others. Moreover, much of it was thought to violate the natural rights of individuals. For example, the Pennsylvania Council of Censors issued a report in 1784 that listed many examples of legislative violations of the state constitution and bill of rights. The report showed that ‘fines had been remitted, judicially established claims disal*707lowed, verdicts of juries set aside, the property of one given to another, defective titles secured, marriages dissolved,’ and so forth. Similar abuses were also taking place in New Hampshire and other states. The injustice of these laws, as James Madison said, brought ‘into question the fundamental principle of republican Government, that the majority who rule in such governments are the safest Guardians both of public Good and private rights.’ By the end of the 1780’s, ‘the Americans’ inveterate suspicion and jealousy of political power, once concentrated almost exclusively on the Crown and its agents, was transferred to the various state legislatures.’
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“As Americans became more distrustful of democracy, Whig political theory gradually declined and Federalist theory became predominant. Americans began to impose greater restrictions on their legislatures in order to safeguard individual rights. In the 1770’s and 1780’s more and more rights were added to bills of rights. Moreover, the power of the legislatures to limit or alienate rights was steadily reduced. Increasingly, bills of rights became binding on legislatures. Instead of saying merely that the legislature ‘ought’ not abridge certain rights, bills of rights began to provide that it ‘shall’ not do so. The prevailing view among the Federalists was that the authority of the legislature and of government generally should extend only to a relatively narrow range of issues.
“In summary, during the revolutionary period a ‘tidal-wave of democracy . . . swept over the colonies.’ Thereafter, during the 1780’s, those waters receded and another wave swept in: a wave of concern about protecting ‘private rights against uncontrolled legislative power.’” Elfen-bein, The Myth of Conservatism as a Constitutional Philosophy, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 401, 472-474 (1986).
This would facilitate the work of federal courts, which under this Court’s precedents must address issues of state constitutional law before considering claims under the Federal Constitution. See City of Mesquite *708v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U. S. 283, 294-295 (1982) (“[T]here is no need for decision of the federal [constitutional] issue” if the state constitution provides “independent support”); cf. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U. S. 476, 478 (1971) (abstention under Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941)); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U. S. 82, 85 (1970) (same). There exists a growing recognition among Federal Courts of Appeals that it is incumbent upon them to resolve issues of state constitutional law before reaching issues arising under the Federal Constitution. See, e. g., Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F. 2d 1039, 1042-1043 (CA9 1985); Seals v. Quarterly County Court of Madison County, Tenn., 562 F. 2d 390, 392 (CA6 1977).