dissenting.
In my opinion, it is not necessary to find that the Board of Education has been guilty of racial discrimination in the past to support the conclusion that it has a legitimate interest in employing more black teachers in the future. Rather than analyzing a case of this kind by asking whether minority teachers have some sort of special entitlement to jobs as a remedy for sins that were committed in the past, I believe that we should first ask whether the Board’s action advances the public interest in educating children for the future. If so, I believe we should consider whether that public interest, and the manner in which it is pursued, justifies any adverse effects on the disadvantaged group.1
I
The Equal Protection Clause absolutely prohibits the use of race in many governmental contexts. To cite only a few: the government may not use race to decide who may serve on juries,2 who may use public services,3 who may marry,4 and who may be fit parents.5 The use of race in these situations is “utterly irrational” because it is completely unrelated *314to any valid public purpose;6 moreover, it is particularly pernicious because it constitutes a badge of oppression that is unfaithful to the central promise of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nevertheless, in our present society, race is not always irrelevant to sound governmental decisionmaking.7 To take the most obvious example, in law enforcement, if an undercover agent is needed to infiltrate a group suspected of ongoing criminal behavior — and if the members of the group are all of the same race — it would seem perfectly rational to employ an agent of that race rather than a member of a different racial class. Similarly, in a city with a recent history of racial unrest, the superintendent of police might reasonably conclude that an integrated police force could develop a better relationship with the community and thereby do a more effective job of maintaining law and order than a force composed only of white officers.
*315In the context of public education,8 it is quite obvious that a school board may reasonably conclude that an integrated faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student body that could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly all-white, faculty. For one of the most important lessons that the American public schools teach is that the diverse ethnic, cultural, and national backgrounds that have been brought together in our famous “melting pot” do not identify essential differences among the human beings that inhabit our land. It is one thing for a white child to be taught by a white teacher that color, like beauty, is only “skin deep”; it is far more convincing to experience that truth on a day-to-day basis during the routine, ongoing learning process.
In this case, the collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and the Board of Education succinctly stated a valid public purpose — “recognition of the desirability of multi-ethnic representation on the teaching faculty,” and thus “a policy of actively seeking minority group personnel.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a. Nothing in the record — not a shred of evidence — contradicts the view that the Board’s attempt to employ, and to retain, more minority teachers in the Jackson public school system served this completely sound educational purpose. Thus, there was a rational and unques*316tionably legitimate basis for the Board’s decision to enter into the collective-bargaining agreement that petitioners have challenged, even though the agreement required special efforts to recruit and retain minority teachers.
II
It is argued, nonetheless, that the purpose should be deemed invalid because, even if the Board of Education’s judgment in this case furthered a laudable goal, some other boards might claim that their experience demonstrates that segregated classes, or segregated faculties, lead to better academic achievement. There is, however, a critical difference between a decision to exclude a member of a minority race because of his or her skin color and a decision to include more members of the minority in a school faculty for that reason.
The exclusionary decision rests on the false premise that differences in race, or in the color of a person’s skin, reflect real differences that are relevant to a person’s right to share in the blessings of a free society. As noted, that premise is “utterly irrational,” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U. S. 432, 452 (1985), and repugnant to the principles of a free and democratic society. Nevertheless, the fact that persons of different races do, indeed, have differently colored skin, may give rise to a belief that there is some significant difference between such persons. The inclusion of minority teachers in the educational process inevitably tends to dispel that illusion whereas their exclusion could only tend to foster it. The inclusionary decision is consistent with the principle that all men are created equal; the exclusionary decision is at war with that principle. One decision accords with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the other does not. Thus, consideration of whether the consciousness of race is exclusionary or inclusionary plainly distinguishes the Board’s valid purpose in this case from *317a race-conscious decision that would reinforce assumptions of inequality.9
Ill
Even if there is a valid purpose to the race consciousness, however, the question that remains is whether that public purpose transcends the harm to the white teachers who are disadvantaged by the special preference the Board has given to its most recently hired minority teachers. In my view, there are two important inquiries in assessing the harm to the disadvantaged teacher. The first is an assessment of the procedures that were used to adopt, and implement, the race-conscious action.10 The second is an evaluation of the nature of the harm itself.
In this case, there can be no question about either the fairness of the procedures used to adopt the race-conscious pro*318vision, or the propriety of its breadth. As Justice Marshall has demonstrated, the procedures for adopting this provision were scrupulously fair. The Union that represents petitioners negotiated the provision and agreed to it; the agreement was put to a vote of the membership, and overwhelmingly approved. Again, not a shred of evidence in the record suggests any procedural unfairness in the adoption of the agreement. Similarly, the provision is specifically designed to achieve its objective — retaining the minority teachers that have been specially recruited to give the Jackson schools, after a period of racial unrest, an integrated faculty.11 Thus, in striking contrast to the procedural inadequacy and unjustified breadth of the race-based classification in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980),12 the race-conscious layoff policy here was adopted with full participation of the disadvantaged individuals and with a narrowly circumscribed berth for the policy’s operation.
Finally, we must consider the harm to petitioners. Every layoff, like every refusal to employ a qualified applicant, is a grave loss to the affected individual. However, the undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that this serious consequence to petitioners is not based on any lack of respect for their race, or on blind habit and stereotype.13 Rather, petitioners have been laid off for a combination of *319two reasons: the economic conditions that have led Jackson to lay off some teachers, and the special contractual protections intended to preserve the newly integrated character of the faculty in the Jackson schools. Thus, the same harm might occur if a number of gifted young teachers had been given special contractual protection because their specialties were in short supply and if the Jackson Board of Education faced a fiscal need for layoffs. A Board decision to grant immediate tenure to a group of experts in computer technology, an athletic coach, and a language teacher, for example, might reduce the pool of teachers eligible for layoffs during a depression and therefore have precisely the same impact as the racial preference at issue here. In either case, the harm would be generated by the combination of economic conditions and the special contractual protection given a different group of teachers — a protection that, as discussed above, was justified by a valid and extremely strong public interest.14
IV
We should not lightly approve the government’s use of a race-based distinction. History teaches the obvious dangers *320of such classifications.15 Our ultimate goal must, of course, be “to eliminate entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being’s race.”16 In this case, however, I am persuaded that the decision to include more minority teachers in the Jackson, Michigan, school system served a valid public purpose, that it was adopted with fair procedures and given a narrow breadth, that it transcends the harm to petitioners, and that it is a step toward that ultimate goal of eliminating entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being’s race. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
“In every equal protection case, we have to ask certain basic questions. What class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a ‘tradition of disfavor’ by our laws? What is the public purpose that is being served by the law? What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate treatment?” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U. S. 432, 453 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Batson v. Kentucky, ante, p. 79; Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254 (1985); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880).
Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U. S. 350 (1962) (per curiam); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967).
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429 (1984).
Cleburne, 473 U. S., at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (“It would be utterly irrational to limit the franchise on the basis of height or weight; it is equally invalid to limit it on the basis of skin color”). See also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S., at 432 (“Classifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns; the race, not the person, dictates the category”).
As Justice Marshall explains, although the Court’s path in University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978), and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980), is tortuous, the path at least reveals that race consciousness does not automatically violate the Equal Protection Clause. In those opinions, only two Justices of the Court suggested that race-conscious governmental efforts were inherently unconstitutional. See id., at 522 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.). Cf. id., at 548 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Unlike Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, ... I am not convinced that the Clause contains an absolute prohibition against any statutory classification based on race”). Notably, in this Court, petitioners have presented solely a constitutional theory, and have not pursued any statutory claims. Cf. Bakke, 438 U. S. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that constitutional issue need not be reached because statutory issue was dispositive).
The Court has frequently emphasized the role of public schools in our national life. See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 864 (1982) (plurality opinion) (“[P]ublic schools are vitally important... as vehicles for ‘inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system’”); Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U. S. 68, 76 (1979) (“The importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions”); San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 30 (1973) (“‘[T]he grave significance of education both to the individual and to our society’ cannot be doubted”); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[Education... is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment”).
Cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S., at 434 (“The effects of racial prejudice, however real, cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the custody of its natural mother found to be an appropriate person to have such custody”); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 81 (1917) (rejecting legitimacy of argument that the “proposed segregation will promote the public peace by preventing race conflicts”).
Cf. Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 548-549 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (A race-based classification “does impose a special obligation to scrutinize any governmental decisionmaking process that draws nationwide distinctions between citizens on the basis of their race and incidentally also discriminates against noncitizens in the preferred racial classes. For just as procedural safeguards are necessary to guarantee impartial decisionmaking in the judicial process, so can they play a vital part in preserving the impartial character of the legislative process”). That observation is, of course, equally applicable to a context in which the governmental decision is reached through a nonlegislative process. Significantly, a reason given for what this Court frequently calls “strict scrutiny” of certain classifications is the notion that the disadvantaged class is one that has been unable to enjoy full procedural participation. See United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938) (“[Prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”); J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 75-77 (1980).
The layoff provision states:
“In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers through layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a.
The layoff provision follows the agreement’s statement of the goal of an increased minority presence on the faculty and of the commitment to active minority recruiting and hiring efforts. Id., at 22a-23a.
See 448 U. S., at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 520-521 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The fact that the issue arises in a layoff context, rather than a hiring context, has no bearing on the equal protection question. For if the Board’s interest in employing more minority teachers is sufficient to justify providing them with an extra incentive to accept jobs in Jackson, Michigan, it is also sufficient to justify their retention when the number of available jobs is reduced. Justice Powell’s suggestion, ante, at 282-284, that there is a distinction of constitutional significance under the Equal Protection Clause between a racial preference at the time of hiring and an identical preference at the time of discharge is thus wholly unpersuasive. He seems to assume that a teacher who has been working for a few years suffers a greater harm when he is laid off than the harm suffered by an unemployed teacher who is refused a job for which he is qualified. In either event, the adverse decision forecloses “only one of several opportunities” that may be available, ante, at 283, to the disappointed teacher. Moreover, the distinction is artificial, for the layoff provision at issue in this case was included as part of the terms of the hiring of minority and other teachers under the collective-bargaining agreement.
See, e. g., Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 534, n. 5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id., at 547.