with whom The Chief Justice and Justice White join, dissenting.
Certain principles are undisputed. If petitioners had filed their suits alleging that Fortune magazine libeled them on precisely the same date; had added the magic words “also known as Time, Incorporated” to the word “Fortune”; and had done everthing else exactly the same, petitioners would be entitled to proceed with their legal actions. Because petitioners committed the “fatal” error, ante, at 30, of identifying the defendant by its name of publication rather than its name of incorporation, however, the Court finds that they fell through a trapdoor — despite the fact that the magazine publisher’s agent contemporaneously noted his understanding that the suits were directed against the magazine publisher (Time, Incorporated) fully as much as if petitioners had included the magic words.
In my view, the Court’s decision represents an aberrational — and, let us hope, isolated — return to the “sporting *33theory of justice” condemned by Roscoe Pound 80 years ago.1 The Court’s result is supported neither by the language nor purposes of the Federal Rules, or of Rule 15(c) in particular.
I
Before examining the language and the history of Rule 15(c), a preliminary comment on the facts is appropriate. In its May 31, 1982, issue, Fortune published the article in dispute. On May 9, 1983, petitioners filed their complaints. Since the New Jersey 1-year statute of limitations made it necessary to have the complaints filed by May 19, 1983, it is clear that the original complaints were filed 10 days ahead of that deadline.
Rule 4(j) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also required that service of the summons and complaints be made within 120 days of the original filing — in other words, by September 6, 1983.2 The summons and the original complaints were mailed to Time, Incorporated’s registered agent on May 20, 1983, and received on May 23, 1983 — well within the 120-day deadline imposed by the Rule.
The caption of the original complaints identified the defendant only as “Fortune.” The description of the defendant in paragraph 2 of those complaints further explained that petitioners intended to sue “a foreign corporation having its principal offices at Time and Life Building, Sixth Avenue and 50th Street, New York, New York 10020 engaged in the publication of a magazine called ‘Fortune’ which is distributed *34throughout the world.” App. 9a. There is no, and has never been any, suggestion that the caption confused or misled any agent of the defendant. Indeed, on the day that he received the summons and complaints, Time, Incorporated’s agent forwarded them to Time, Incorporated’s law department with a cover letter that stated:
“Remarks: Discrepancy in corporate title noted. Letter from atty. indicates papers are for Time, Incorporated as publisher of Fortune. Service was made by mail pursuant to Rule 4(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id., at 35a.
On July 18, 1983 — well in advance of the September 6 deadline for service of process — petitioners filed an amendment to the complaints and redesignated “Fortune” as “Fortune, also known as Time, Incorporated.” Id., at 25a-26a. Again, there is no suggestion that this redesignation did cause, or could have caused, Time, Incorporated, any prejudice in maintaining its defense on the merits of the case. Nor is there any suggestion that Time, Incorporated, would have received better notice, or earlier notice, of the institution of the action if the magic words had been added to the initial complaints. The only question is whether Rule 15(c) should be construed to render petitioners’ complaints untimely even though they were filed within the statute of limitations and even though Time, Incorporated, clearly had adequate notice of the timely filed complaints.
¡ — I I — I
The majority relies exclusively on the plain language” of Rule 15(c).3 Far from compelling the majority’s anomalous *35result, the plain language of Rule 15(c) requires recognizing that there was no material difference between the notice given to Time, Incorporated, in the original complaints —from which Time, Incorporated, and its agent clearly understood that Time, Incorporated, was the intended defendant — and the notice that the Court concludes would have been adequate — in which petitioners would have appended “also known as Time, Incorporated” to the word “Fortune.”
According to the majority, petitioners’ complaints are barred because they did not satisfy a four-pronged test articulated in Rule 15(c). Ante, at 29-30. The majority ignores, however, a rather critical antecedent point. The four-pronged test is utterly irrelevant unless the amendment is one “changing the party against whom a claim is asserted.” In this case, the technical correction filed in July added absolutely nothing to any party’s understanding of “the party against whom” the claims were asserted — not to the plaintiffs’ understanding, of course, and certainly not to Time, Incorporated’s understanding, as its agent’s letter in May made clear.
The plain language of Rule 15(c) discloses an obvious purpose to protect parties who are not named in the original complaint from prejudice that may arise when they are subsequently “brought in by amendment.” If an original complaint names Smith as the tort-feasor and the plaintiff does not decide to sue Jones until after the statute of limitations has run, there would be obvious prejudice in allowing “an *36amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted” unless Jones had actual notice of the claim before the statute ran. There is also a risk of prejudice whenever the identification of the defendant is so inaccurate or ambiguous that a reading of the complaint itself would not enable the defendant himself to realize that he was the party being sued.
The misdescription in this case, however, is not remotely of the kind that the Rule’s “plain language” addresses. By any standard of fair notice, the difference between the description of the publisher of Fortune in the original complaints and the description of the publisher of Fortune in the amended complaints is no more significant than a misspelling, or perhaps a reference to “Time, Inc.” instead of “Time, Incorporated.”
In short, I would not construe this amendment as one “changing the party” against whom petitioners’ claims are asserted. Although the words “Time, Incorporated” were first added to the complaints by the amendment, that entity cannot, in my judgment, fairly be described as a party “brought in by amendment” within the meaning of Rule 15(c).
I — I HH l-H
Even if I agreed that the change m designation from “Fortune” to “Fortune also known as Time, Incorporated” brought in a new party, and even if I were willing to disregard the undisputed evidence of the Time, Incorporated agent’s contemporaneous understanding of the unadorned “Fortune” designation, I would still find the majority’s “plain language” analysis unpersuasive.
The heart of the majority’s analysis is that petitioners failed to satisfy the fourth factor of the test it discerns in Rule 15(c) — that “the second and third requirements must have been fulfilled within the prescribed limitations period.” Ante, at 29. The majority thus finds petitioners’ “fatal” mistake in the failure to amend within the statute of limitations period.
*37The language in the Rule imposing the deadline for amendments that relate back does not, however, refer to the statute of limitations. Rather, it describes “the period provided by law for commencing the action against him” (emphasis added). As I have noted, that period includes two components, the time for commencing the action by the filing of a complaint and the time in which the action “against him” must be implemented by the service of process. If the party is sufficiently described in the original complaint to avoid any possibility of prejudice to the defendant, I see no reason for not construing the Rule to embrace both components of the period provided by law for bringing a timely action against a particular defendant.4
*38This construction is confirmed by a reference to the content of the notice requirement — what the majority labels the second prong of the four-part test. Ante, at 29. The Rule requires that the party affected by the amendment must have “received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits.” This language surely indicates that if the notice that the defendant actually receives is just as timely and just as informative as that which would have been received if no mistake had occurred, the purpose of the requirement has been satisfied. In this case, Time, Incorporated would have known nothing different on May 23, 1983, if the complaints sent to its agent referred to “Fortune, also known as Time, Incorporated” than it knew from the complaints as sent, with their reference to “Fortune.” Respondent has not even contended otherwise. Yet, for the Court, the first complaints would have been completely timely, and the second are completely barred.
IV
That the majority’s reading of the “plain language” leads to bizarre results is not altogether surprising. For the majority, relying so heavily on what it views as the clarity of the language before it, ignores the mission and history of Rule 15(c).
The principal purpose of Rule 15(c) is to enable a plaintiff to correct a pleading error after the statute of limitations has run if the correction will not prejudice his adversary in any way. That purpose is defeated — and the Rule becomes largely superfluous — if it is construed to require the correction to be made before the statute has run. Moreover, *39the specific liberalizing purpose of the 1966 amendment to the Rule is frustrated if the added language is construed to cut back on the number of cases in which relation back is permitted.
Prior to 1966, Rule 15(c) had included only the first sentence of the present Rule. In that form, the Rule had frequently been construed to allow relation back when there was a minor change in the designation of a party. See Shapiro v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 274 F. 2d 743 (CA3 1960); 3 J. Moore, Federal Practice § 15 — 15[4.—1], p. 15-211 (2d ed. 1985). A group of contrary cases in which the plaintiffs had mistakenly sued the wrong Government official and not been allowed to amend their complaints after the statute had run gave rise to criticism of the Rule and the addition of the second and third sentences of its present text.5 Ironically, it is the language added by the amendment in 1966 to broaden the category of harmless pleading errors which the Court construes today to narrow that category.6
V
The Court does not tell us whether it would enforce an equally harsh construction of the Rule if the scrivener’s error *40had been a mere misspelling, or perhaps a reference to Time, Inc., instead of Time, Incorporated. More importantly, the Court does not provide a satisfactory explanation of why this case is, in fact, any different from such a case.7 Most importantly, the decision is the product of an unnecessary and unjust construction of the language of the Rule.
The Court recognizes that “there is an element of arbitrariness here,” ante, at 31, but finds solace in the fact that arbitrariness is no stranger to the law. Ibid. The Court is, of course, correct that arbitrariness sometimes arises from the application of rules and laws to the complexity of human experience. Far less understandable is the Court’s willingness to aggravate, rather than alleviate, that arbitrariness, particularly when the decision to do so is demonstrably at odds with the language, purpose, and history of the Rule.
I respectfully dissent.
See Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 American Bar Assn. Reports 395, 404-405 (1906).
Rule 4(j) states in its entirety:
“If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice upon the court’s own initiative with notice to such party or upon motion. This subdivision shall not apply to service in a foreign country pursuant to subdivision (i) of this rule.”
Rule 15(c) provides:
“Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, *35the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.
“The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or his designee, or the Attorney General of the United States, or an agency or officer who would have been a proper defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses (1) and (2) hereof with respect to the United States or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the action as a defendant.”
The majority seeks to bolster its “plain language” analysis with the Advisory Committee’s reference to “the applicable limitations period.” Ante, at 31. In my view, this statement begs, rather than settles, the question. I also agree with Judge Feinberg’s analysis:
“Although on its face the phrase, ‘within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him,’ seems to mean the applicable statute of limitations period, such a literal interpretation is unjustified in jurisdictions where timely service of process can be effected after the statute of limitations has run. In those jurisdictions, even an accurately named defendant may not receive actual notice of the action against him prior to the running of the statute of limitations. Yet there is no doubt that the action against him is timely commenced. There is no reason why a misnamed defendant is entitled to earlier notice than he would have received had the complaint named him correctly. Calling the problem raised here a ‘curious but minor difficulty of interpretation . . . over the language of the rule referring to the limitations period,’ Professor (now Justice) Benjamin Kaplan, reporter for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, implicitly criticized a district court decision refusing relation back on facts somewhat similar to these. Kaplan, [Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 410, and n. 204 (1967)]. Professor Kaplan noted the anomaly of dismissing an action, which ‘against the original defendant . . . would be considered timely brought despite the delayed service.’. . .
“. . .We hold that under Rule 15(c) the period within which ‘the party to be brought in’ must receive notice of the action includes the reasonable *38time allowed under the federal rules for service of process.” Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F. 2d 566, 571-572 (CA2 1978), cert. denied, 440 U. S. 940 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
It is curious that the majority, in relying on the Advisory Committee interpretation, ignores the reporter’s almost contemporaneous understanding.
See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 407-410 (1967).
There is also irony in the way the Court gives lipservice to its duty to construe the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a way that will facilitate a proper decision on the merits. Ante, at 27. How different was the approach the Court considered appropriate in 1962:
“It is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such mere technicalities. ‘The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.’ Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 48. The Rules themselves provide that they are to be construed ‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’ Rule 1.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, 181-182.
Indeed, if the misspelling of a name is sufficient to change the status of a legal document, then I assume that many of our much-discussed precedents had no legal force. See generally C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 54, pp. 347-348, n. 5 (4th ed. 1983) (noting that the Court, and the official Reports, have continuously misspelled the parties’ names in such cases as Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940) (parties’ name was “Gobitas”); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857) (party’s name was “Sanford”); Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842) (party’s name was “Tysen”); and McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819) (party’s name was “MeCulloh”)).