delivered the opinion of the Court.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279-280 (1964), we held that, in a libel suit brought by a public official, the First Amendment requires the plaintiff to show that in publishing the defamatory statement the defendant acted with actual malice — “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” We held further that such actual malice must be shown with “convincing clarity.” Id., at 285-286. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 342 (1974). These New York Times requirements we have since extended to libel suits brought by public figures as well. See, e. g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967).
This case presents the question whether the clear-and-convincing-evidence requirement must be considered by a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a case to which New York Times applies. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that that requirement need not be considered at the summary judgment stage. 241 U. S. App. D. C. 246, 746 F. 2d 1563 (1984). We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. 1134 (1985), because that holding was in conflict with decisions of several other Courts of Appeals, which had held that the New York Times requirement of clear and convincing evidence must be considered on a motion for summary judgment.1 We now reverse.
I-H
Respondent Liberty Lobby, Inc., is a not-for-profit corporation and self-described “citizens’ lobby.” Respondent Willis Carto is its founder and treasurer. In October 1981, *245The Investigator magazine published two articles: “The Private World of Willis Carto” and “Yockey: Profile of an American Hitler.” These articles were introduced by a third, shorter article entitled “America’s Neo-Nazi Underground: Did Mein Kampf Spawn Yockey’s Imperium, a Book Revived by Carto’s Liberty Lobby?” These articles portrayed respondents as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Fascist.
Respondents filed this diversity libel action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that some 28 statements and 2 illustrations in the 3 articles were false and derogatory. Named as defendants in the action were petitioner Jack Anderson, the publisher of The Investigator, petitioner Bill Adkins, president and chief executive officer of the Investigator Publishing Co., and petitioner Investigator Publishing Co. itself.
Following discovery, petitioners moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. In their motion, petitioners asserted that because respondents are public figures they were required to prove their case under the standards set forth in New York Times. Petitioners also asserted that summary judgment was proper because actual malice was absent as a matter of law. In support of this latter assertion, petitioners submitted the affidavit of Charles Bermant, an employee of petitioners and the author of the two longer articles.2 In this affidavit, Bermant stated that he had spent a substantial amount of time researching and writing the articles and that his facts were obtained from a wide variety of sources. He also stated that he had at all times believed and still believed that the facts contained in the articles were truthful and accurate. Attached to this affidavit was an appendix in which Bermant detailed the sources for each of the statements alleged by respondents to be libelous.
*246Respondents opposed the motion for summary judgment, asserting that there were numerous inaccuracies in the articles and claiming that an issue of actual malice was presented by virtue of the fact that in preparing the articles Bermant had relied on several sources that respondents asserted were patently unreliable. Generally, respondents charged that petitioners had failed adequately to verify their information before publishing. Respondents also presented evidence that William McGaw, an editor of The Investigator, had told petitioner Adkins before publication that the articles were “terrible” and “ridiculous.”
In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the District Court first held that respondents were limited-purpose public figures and that New York Times therefore applied.3 The District Court then held that Bermant’s thorough investigation and research and his reliance on numerous sources precluded a finding of actual malice. Thus, the District Court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of petitioners.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed as to 21 and reversed as to 9 of the allegedly defamatory statements. Although it noted that respondents did not challenge the District Court’s ruling that they were limited-purpose public *247figures and that they were thus required to prove their case under New York Times, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that for the purposes of summary judgment the requirement that actual malice be proved by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a preponderance of the evidence, was irrelevant: To defeat summary judgment respondents did not have to show that a jury could find actual malice with “convincing clarity.” The court based this conclusion on a perception that to impose the greater evidentiary burden at summary judgment “would change the threshold summary judgment inquiry from a search for a minimum of facts supporting the plaintiff’s case to an evaluation of the weight of those facts and (it would seem) of the weight of at least the defendant’s uncontroverted facts as well.” 241 U. S. App. D. C., at 253, 746 F. 2d, at 1570. The court then held, with respect to nine of the statements, that summary judgment had been improperly granted because “a jury could reasonably conclude that the . .. allegations were defamatory, false, and made with actual malice.” Id., at 260, 746 F. 2d, at 1577.
II
A
Our inquiry is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the heightened evidentiary requirements that apply to proof of actual malice in this New York Times case need not be considered for the purposes of a motion for summary judgment. Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly sup*248ported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted. See generally 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2725, pp. 93-95 (1983). This materiality inquiry is independent of and separate from the question of the incorporation of the evidentiary standard into the summary judgment determination. That is, while the materiality determination rests on the substantive law, it is the substantive law’s identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs. Any proof or evidentiary requirements imposed by the substantive law are not germane to this inquiry, since materiality is only a criterion for categorizing factual disputes in their relation to the legal elements of the claim and not a criterion for evaluating the evidentiary underpinnings of those disputes.
More important for present purposes, summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is “genuine,” that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. In First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U. S. 253 (1968), we affirmed a grant of summary judgment for an antitrust defendant where the issue was whether there was a genuine factual dispute as to the existence of a conspiracy. We noted Rule 56(e)’s provision that a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment “ ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but. . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” We observed further that
“[i]t is true that the issue of material fact required by Rule 56(c) to be present to entitle a party to proceed to *249trial is not required to be resolved conclusively in favor of the party asserting its existence; rather, all that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 391 U. S., at 288-289.
We went on to hold that, in the face of the defendant’s properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff could not rest on his allegations of a conspiracy to get to a jury without “any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Id., at 290.
Again, in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144 (1970), the Court emphasized that the availability of summary judgment turned on whether a proper jury question was presented. There, one of the issues was whether there was a conspiracy between private persons and law enforcement officers. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, stating that there was no evidence from which reasonably minded jurors might draw an inference of conspiracy. We reversed, pointing out that the moving parties’ submissions had not foreclosed the possibility of the existence of certain facts from which “it would be open to a jury ... to infer from the circumstances” that there had been a meeting of the minds. Id., at 158-159.
Our prior decisions may not have uniformly recited the same language in describing genuine factual issues under Rule 56, but it is clear enough from our recent cases that at the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. As Adickes, swpra, and Cities Service, supra, indicate, there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Cities Service, supra, at 288-289. If the evidence is merely colorable, Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 (1967) (per curiam), or is not significantly pro*250bative, Cities Service, swpra, at 290, summary judgment maybe granted.
That this is the proper focus of the inquiry is strongly suggested by the Rule itself. Rule 56(e) provides that, when a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made,4 the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”5 And, as we noted above, Rule 56(c) provides that the trial judge shall then grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. There is no requirement that the trial judge make findings of fact.6 The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.
Petitioners suggest, and we agree, that this standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320 U. S. 476, 479-480 (1943). If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence, how*251ever, a verdict should not be directed. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53, 62 (1949). As the Court long ago said in Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448 (1872), and has several times repeated:
“Nor are judges any longer required to submit a question to a jury merely because some evidence has been introduced by the party having the burden of proof, unless the evidence be of such a character that it would warrant the jury in finding a verdict in favor of that party. Formerly it was held that if there was what is called a scintilla of evidence in support of a case the judge was bound to leave it to the jury, but recent decisions of high authority have established a more reasonable rule, that in every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” (Footnotes omitted.)
See also Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 116, 120-121 (1875); Coughran v. Bigelow, 164 U. S. 301, 307 (1896); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U. S. 333, 343 (1933).
The Court has said that summary judgment should be granted where the evidence is such that it “would require a directed verdict for the moving party.” Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 321 U. S. 620, 624 (1944). And we have noted that the “genuine issue” summary judgment standard is “very close” to the “reasonable jury” directed verdict standard: “The primary difference between the two motions is procedural; summary judgment motions are usually made before trial and decided on documentary evidence, while directed verdict motions are made at trial and decided on the evidence that has been admitted.” Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U. S. 731, 745, n. 11 (1983). In essence, though, the inquiry under each is the same: whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submis*252sion to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.
B
Progressing to the specific issue in this case, we are convinced that the inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits. If the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary judgment or for a directed verdict based on the lack of proof of a material fact, the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. The judge’s inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict — “whether there is [evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Munson, supra, at 448.
In terms of the nature of the inquiry, this is no different from the consideration of a motion for acquittal in a criminal case, where the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies and where the trial judge asks whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 318-319 (1979). Similarly, where the First Amendment mandates a “clear and convincing” standard, the trial judge in disposing of a directed verdict motion should consider whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude, for example, that the plaintiff had shown actual malice with convincing clarity.
*253The case for the proposition that a higher burden of proof should have a corresponding effect on the judge when deciding whether to send the case to the jury was well made by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Taylor, 464 F. 2d 240 (1972), which overruled United States v. Feinberg, 140 F. 2d 592 (1944), a case holding that the standard of evidence necessary for a judge to send a case to the jury is the same in both civil and criminal cases even though the standard that the jury must apply in a criminal case is more demanding than in civil proceedings. Speaking through Judge Friendly, the Second Circuit said: “It would seem at first blush — and we think also at second — that more Tacts in evidence’ are needed for the judge to allow [reasonable jurors to pass on a claim] when the proponent is required to establish [the claim] not merely by a preponderance of the evidence but. . . beyond a reasonable doubt.” 464 F. 2d, at 242. The court could not find a “satisfying explanation in the Feinberg opinion why the judge should not place this higher burden on the prosecution in criminal proceedings before sending the case to the jury.” Ibid. The Taylor court also pointed out that almost all the Circuits had adopted something like Judge Prettyman’s formulation in Curley v. United States, 160 F. 2d 229, 232-233 (1947):
“The true rule, therefore, is that a trial judge, in passing upon a motion for directed verdict of acquittal, must determine whether upon the evidence, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If he concludes that upon the evidence there must be such a doubt in a reasonable mind, he must grant the motion; or, to state it another way, if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the motion must be granted. If he concludes that either of the *254two results, a reasonable doubt or no reasonable doubt, is fairly possible, he must let the jury decide the matter.”
This view is equally applicable to a civil case to which the “clear and convincing” standard applies. Indeed, the Taylor court thought that it was implicit in this Court’s adoption of the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for certain kinds of cases that there was a “concomitant duty on the judge to consider the applicable burden when deciding whether to send a case to the jury.” 464 F. 2d, at 243. Although the court thought that this higher standard would not produce different results in many cases, it could not say that it would never do so.
Just as the “convincing clarity” requirement is relevant in ruling on a motion for directed verdict, it is relevant in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. When determining if a genuine factual issue as to actual malice exists in a libel suit brought by a public figure, a trial judge must bear in mind the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability under New York Times. For example, there is no genuine issue if the evidence presented in the opposing affidavits is of insufficient caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of fact to find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.
Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden. This conclusion is mandated by the nature of this determination. The question here is whether a jury could reasonably find either that the plaintiff proved his case by the quality and quantity of evidence required by the governing law or that he did not. Whether a jury could reasonably find for either party, however, cannot be defined except by the criteria governing what evidence would enable the jury to find for either the plaintiff or the defendant: It makes no sense to say that a jury could reasonably find for either party without some *255benchmark as to what standards govern its deliberations and within what boundaries its ultimate decision must fall, and these standards and boundaries are in fact provided by the applicable evidentiary standards.
Our holding that the clear-and-convincing standard of proof should be taken into account in ruling on summary judgment motions does not denigrate the role of the jury. It by no means authorizes trial on affidavits. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Adickes, 398 U. S., at 158-159. Neither do we suggest that the trial courts should act other than with caution in granting summary judgment or that the trial court may not deny summary judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial. Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U. S. 249 (1948).
In sum, we conclude that the determination of whether a given factual dispute requires submission to a jury must be guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the case. This is true at both the directed verdict and summary judgment stages. Consequently, where the New York Times “clear and convincing” evidence requirement applies, the trial judge’s summary judgment inquiry as to whether a genuine issue exists will be whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant. Thus, where the factual dispute concerns actual malice, clearly a material issue in a New York Times case, the appropriate summary judgment question will be whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury find*256ing either that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and convincing evidence or that the plaintiff has not.7
I — I I — I h-H
Respondents argue, however, that whatever may be true of the applicability of the “clear and convincing” standard at the summary judgment or directed verdict stage, the defendant should seldom if ever be granted summary judgment where his state of mind is at issue and the jury might disbelieve him or his witnesses as to this issue. They rely on Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Co., 368 U. S. 464 (1962), for this proposition. We do not understand Poller, however, to hold that a plaintiff may defeat a defendant’s properly supported motion for summary judgment in a conspiracy or libel case, for example, without offering any concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor and by merely asserting that the jury might, and legally could, disbelieve the defendant’s denial of a conspiracy or of legal malice. The movant has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of fact, but the plaintiff is not thereby relieved of his own burden of producing in turn evidence that would support a jury verdict. Rule 56(e) itself provides that a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Based on that Rule, Cities Service, 391 U. S., at 290, held that the plaintiff could not defeat the properly supported summary judgment motion of a defendant charged with a conspiracy without offering “any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” As we have recently said, “discredited testi*257mony is not [normally] considered a sufficient basis for drawing a contrary conclusion.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 512 (1984). Instead, the plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. This is true even where the evidence is likely to be within the possession of the defendant, as long as the plaintiff has had a full opportunity to conduct discovery. We repeat, however, that the plaintiff, to survive the defendant’s motion, need only present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor. If he does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that requires a trial.
IV
In sum, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must be guided by the New York Times “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard in determining whether a genuine issue of actual malice exists — that is, whether the evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury might find that actual malice had been shown with convincing clarity. Because the Court of Appeals did not apply the correct standard in reviewing the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, we vacate its decision and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
See, e. g., Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 637 F. 2d 375, 381 (CA5), cert, denied, 454 U. S. 964 (1981); Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 619 F. 2d 932, 940 (CA2), cert, denied, 449 U. S. 839 (1980); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F. 2d 206, 210 (CA7 1976).
The short, introductory article was written by petitioner Anderson and relied exclusively on the information obtained by Bermant.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 351 (1974), this Court summarized who will be considered to be a public figure to whom the New York Times standards will apply:
“[The public figure] designation may rest on either of two alternative bases. In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions.”
The District Court found that respondents, as political lobbyists, are the second type of political figure described by the Gertz court — a limited-purpose public figure. See also Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 201 U. S. App. D. C. 301, 306, 627 F. 2d 1287, 1292, cert, denied, 449 U. S. 898 (1980).
Our analysis here does not address the question of the initial burden of production of evidence placed by Rule 56 on the party moving for summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, post, p. 317. Respondents have not raised this issue here, and for the purposes of our discussion we assume that the moving party has met initially the requisite evidentiary burden.
This requirement in turn is qualified by Rule 56(f)’s provision that summary judgment be refused where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition. In our analysis here, we assume that both parties have had ample opportunity for discovery.
In many cases, however, findings are extremely helpful to a reviewing court.
Our statement in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U. S. Ill, 120, n. 9 (1979), that proof of actual malice “does not readily lend itself to summary disposition” was simply an acknowledgment of our general reluctance “to grant special procedural protections to defendants in libel and defamation actions in addition to the constitutional protections embodied in the substantive laws.” Colder v. Jones, 465 U. S. 783, 790-791 (1984).