concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment that the Constitution does not require the suppression of Barrett’s statements to the police, but for reasons different from those set forth in the opinion of the Court. Barrett’s contemporaneous waiver of his right to silence and limited invocation of his right to counsel (for the *531purpose of making a written statement) suggested that he did not understand that anything he said could be used against him. However, the State eliminated this apparent ambiguity when it demonstrated that Barrett’s waiver of his right to silence was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Barrett testified at trial that he understood his Miranda rights, i. e., he knew that he need not talk to the police without a lawyer present and that anything he said could be used against him. Under these circumstances, the waiver of the right to silence and the limited invocation of the right to counsel were valid.
I
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), the Court held that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive and that a defendant must receive detailed warnings that he or she has the rights to remain silent and to receive assistance of counsel before and during questioning. A statement obtained from a defendant during custodial interrogation is admissible only if the State carries its “heavy burden” of establishing that a defendant has executed a valid waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. Id., at 475. To do so, the State must demonstrate “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938); see Miranda, supra, at 475-479. In making this determination, courts must examine “the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, at 464.
The language and tenor of the Miranda opinion suggested that the Court would require that a waiver of the rights at stake be “specifically made.” See 384 U. S., at 470. While the Court retreated from that position in North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 369, 373 (1979), I continue to believe that the Court should require the police to obtain an “ ‘affirmative waiver’ ” of Miranda rights before proceeding with interro*532gation. See id., at 377 (quoting Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 516 (1962)).
In this case, Barrett affirmatively waived his Miranda rights. Unlike the defendant in Butler, Barrett orally expressed his willingness to talk with the police and willingly signed a form indicating that he understood his rights. The police obtained an explicit oral waiver of the right to silence. Furthermore, the officer who administered the Miranda warnings to Barrett testified that the latter understood his rights “[completely”: “I asked [Barrett] several times during my administration of those rights, if, in fact, he understood them; if there were points he wanted me to clarify, and he indicated to me, no, he understood everything fairly well.” Tr. 452. At trial, one issue was whether Barrett voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, and Barrett himself testified that he understood his rights as they were read to him. Id., at 879-880.1
Had the State been without Barrett’s testimony at trial, where he was represented by counsel, I could not reach this conclusion. Barrett’s statement to police — that he would talk to them, but allow nothing in writing without counsel— created doubt about whether he actually understood that anything he said could be used against him. In other words, the statement is not, on its face, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to silence.2 As a general matter, I be*533lieve that this odd juxtaposition (a willingness to talk and an unwillingness to have anything preserved) militates against finding á knowing or intelligent waiver of the right to silence. See Butler, supra, at 378 (“[TJhere is no reason to believe that [the defendant’s] oral statements, which followed a refusal to sign a written waiver form, were intended to signify relinquishment of his rights”).3 But Barrett’s testimony revealed that he understood that he had rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present, and that anything he said could be used against him; nevertheless he chose to speak.
In sum, the State has carried its “heavy burden” of demonstrating waiver. It has shown that Barrett received the Miranda warnings, that he had the capacity to understand them4 and in fact understood them, and that he expressly *534waived his right to silence, saying that he “had no problem in talking about the incident. ” Tr. 452; see also id., at 461-462, 490-491, 674. In my view, each of these findings was essential to the conclusion that a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the Miranda rights occurred.
r-H hH
Barrett argues that his refusal to make a written statement without an attorney present constituted an invocation of the right to counsel for all purposes and that any further interrogation after this mention of his desire for an attorney was impermissible under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981). It is settled that any plain reference, however glancing, to a need or a desire for representation must result in the cessation of questioning. See Miranda, 384 U. S., at 444-445 (questioning must cease when the accused “indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking”); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S. 91 (1984) (per curiam).
I believe that a partial invocation of the right to counsel, without more, invariably will be ambiguous. It gives rise to doubts about the defendant’s precise wishes regarding representation and about his or her understanding of the nature and scope of the right to counsel. Thus, the police may not infer from a partial invocation of the right to counsel alone that the defendant has waived any of his or her rights not specifically invoked.
However, circumstances may clarify an otherwise ambiguous situation. If the partial invocation is accompanied by an explicit waiver of the right to silence that is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, it may lose its ambiguity.5 It may be*535come clear that the portion of the right to counsel that was not invoked was in fact waived, when, for example, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to silence necessarily includes a waiver of the right to have counsel present at questioning. This is such a case.6 Here Barrett’s limited invocation was not ambiguous: It was accompanied by an express waiver of his right to silence, the validity of which was plainly established by his subsequent trial testimony. The accompaniment of Barrett’s reference to his limited desire for counsel with an explicit waiver of his right to silence rendered permissible the authorities’ use of his statements.7
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
The trial judge denied Barrett’s motion to suppress the statements made following administration of the Miranda warnings, holding:
“[T]he Court concludes from the evidence it heard that [Barrett] indicated he understood perfectly what was being read to him. Not only did he indicate that he understood, he offered the statements that he did not need anything explained to him because he understood. So it was not merely a passive acquiescence and his agreement that he understood, he did go on to explain that he did not need anything explained to him because he perfectly understood.” App. 70A.
The Court states that ‘“a defendant’s ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions’” would not “‘vitiat[e] their voluntariness.’” Ante, at 530 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 316 (1985)). I do not accept that a defendant could voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently *533waive a right that he or she does not understand to exist. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 277 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court holds today that an individual can effectively waive this right [to be secure against an unreasonable search] even though he is totally ignorant of the fact that, in the absence of his consent, such invasions of privacy would be constitutionally prohibited. It wholly escapes me how our citizens can meaningfully be said to have waived something as precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever being aware of its existence”); ibid. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I would have thought that the capacity to choose necessarily depends upon knowledge that there is a choice to be made. But today the Court reaches the curious result that one can choose to relinquish a constitutional right — the right to be free of unreasonable searches — without knowing that he has the alternative of refusing to accede to a police request to search”).
See also 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.9(f), pp. 534-535 (1984 ed.) (“[T]he Butler facts certainly suggest that the defendant misperceived the effect of a waiver which was oral rather than written. Under such circumstances, there is much to be said for the view that the police are under an obligation to clear up misunderstandings of this nature which are apparent to any reasonable observer. Short of this, it certainly makes sense to conclude that the defendant’s conduct should significantly increase the prosecution’s burden to overcome the presumption against waiver of the Miranda rights”).
It is undisputed that the defendant here, unlike the defendant in Butler, had the capacity to understand his rights: the police ascertained that Barrett had a 12th-grade education, Tr. 458, while in Butler there was a *534dispute over whether the defendant could read. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 369, 378 (1979).
In order for a valid waiver and partial invocation of the right to counsel to occur, the accused must effect them contemporaneously. In Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S. 91 (1984) (per curiam), the Court considered a defendant’s plain request for counsel that had been closely followed by statements *535rendering equivocal or ambiguous his first request. The State Supreme Court determined that the defendant’s statements, considered as a totality, were ambiguous and therefore did not invoke his right to counsel. We held that “an accused’s postrequest responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request itself.” Id,., at 100. Thus, if the initial request for counsel is clear, as it was here, the police may not create ambiguity in a defendant’s desire by continuing to question him or her about it.
See also United States v. Jardina, 747 F. 2d 945, 949 (CA5 1984) (The defendant stated “without the slightest ambiguity that he would then and there answer some questions but not others” and “clearly indicated that he wished his attorney to work out a cooperative deal with the government in the future.” The Court of Appeals found that these combined statements “did not invoke any present right to counsel”).
It is undisputed that “[h]ad the police obtained [a written] statement without meeting the waiver standards of Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981)], it would clearly be inadmissible.” Ante, at 529. Barrett’s invocation of his rights demonstrates that he opposed any immediate preservation of statements made without counsel. If the attempt to tape Barrett’s statements had succeeded, the recording would have been inadmissible.
In addition, the police attempted to persuade Barrett to waive the right he had asserted not to make a written statement without the assistance of counsel, not once, but twice, absent any indication from Barrett that he had changed his mind on this point. Tr. 689 (“Sergeant Genovese at the first [questioning] and Lieutenant Howard at the second inquired whether or not he had changed his mind [about reducing his statements to writing]”); see also id., at 521. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S., at 484-485, *536we held that once an accused invokes the right to counsel, he or she is not subject to further custodial interrogation “until counsel has been made available to him [or her], unless the accused . . . initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Here the police failed to respect Barrett’s limited assertion of his right to counsel. Had a written statement been obtained as a result of these persistent efforts to change Barrett’s mind, it would have been inadmissible.