concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
To the extent that the Court’s opinion relies on the proposition that “‘government has no power to restrict expression *235because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content,’ ” see ante, at 229 (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95 (1972)), I am unable to join it.* I do, however, agree that the State has the burden of justifying its content-based discrimination and has plainly failed to do so. Accordingly, I join Parts I, II, III-B, IV, and V of the Court’s opinion and concur in its judgment.
See my separate opinions in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 530, 544 (1980); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 277 (1981); and Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U. S. 641, 692 (1984); see also FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U. S. 364, 408 (1984).