delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-l, exempts religious organizations from Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination in employment on the basis of religion.1 The question pre*330sented is whether applying the § 702 exemption to the secular nonprofit activities of religious organizations violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court held that it does, and these cases are here on direct appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1252.2 We reverse.
I
The Deseret Gymnasium (Gymnasium) in Salt Lake City, Utah, is a nonprofit facility, open to the public, run by the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (CPB), and the Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (COP). The CPB and the COP are religious entities associated with The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church), an unincorporated religious association sometimes called the Mormon or LDS Church.3
Appellee Mayson worked at the Gymnasium for some 16 years as an assistant building engineer and then as building engineer. He was discharged in 1981 because he failed to qualify for a temple recommend, that is, a .certificate that he is a member of the Church and eligible to attend its temples.4
*331Mayson and others purporting to represent a class of plaintiffs brought an action against the CPB and the COP alleging, among other things, discrimination on the basis of religion in violation of §703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2.5 The defendants moved to dismiss this claim on the ground that § 702 shields them from liability. The plaintiffs contended that if construed to allow religious employers to discriminate on religious grounds in hiring for nonreligious jobs, §702 violates the Establishment Clause.
The District Court first considered whether the facts of these cases require a decision on the plaintiffs’ constitutional argument. Starting from the premise that the religious activities of religious employers can permissibly be exempted under § 702, the court developed a three-part test to determine whether an activity is religious.6 Applying this test to *332Mayson’s situation, the court found: first, that the Gymnasium is intimately connected to the Church financially and in matter's of management; second, that there is no clear connection between the primary function which the Gymnasium performs and the religious beliefs and tenets of the Mormon Church or church administration;7 and third, that none of Mayson’s duties at the Gymnasium are “even tangentially related to any conceivable religious belief or ritual of the Mormon Church or church administration,” 594 F. Supp. 791, 802 (Utah 1984). The court concluded that Mayson’s case involves nonreligious activity.8
The court next considered the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to § 702. Applying the three-part test set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), the court first held that § 702 has the permissible secular purpose of “assuring that the government remains neutral and does not meddle in religious affairs by interfering with the decision-making process in religions . . . .” 594 F. Supp, at 812.9 *333The court concluded, however, that § 702 fails the second part of the Lemon test because the provision has the primary effect of advancing religion.10 Among the considerations mentioned by the court were: that § 702 singles out religious enti-ties for a benefit, rather than benefiting a broad grouping of which religious organizations are only a part;11 that §702 is not supported by long historical tradition;12 and that §702 burdens the free exercise rights of employees of religious institutions who work in nonreligious jobs. Finding that § 702 impermissibly sponsors religious organizations by granting them “an exclusive authorization to engage in conduct which can directly and immediately advance religious tenets and practices,” id., at 825, the court declared the statute unconstitutional as applied to secular activity. The court entered summary judgment in favor of Mayson pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and ordered him reinstated with backpay.13 Subsequently, the court vacated its judg*334ment so that the United States could intervene to defend the constitutionality of § 702. After further briefing and argument the court affirmed its prior determination and reentered a final judgment for Mayson.
II
“This Court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause.” Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U. S. 136, 144-145 (1987) (footnote omitted). It is well established, too, that “[t]he limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S. 664, 673 (1970). There is ample room under the Establishment Clause for “benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.” Id., at 669. At some point, accommodation may devolve into “an unlawful *335fostering of religion,” Hobbie, supra, at 145, but these are not such cases, in our view.
The private appellants contend that we should not apply the three-part Lemon approach, which is assertedly unsuited to judging the constitutionality of exemption statutes such as §702. Brief for Appellants in No. 86-179, pp. 24-26. The argument is that an exemption statute will always have the effect of advancing religion and hence be invalid under the second (effects) part of the Lemon test, a result claimed to be inconsistent with cases such as Walz v. Tax Comm’n, supra, which upheld property tax exemptions for religious organizations. The first two of the three Lemon factors, however, were directly taken from pre-Walz decisions, 403 U. S., at 612-613, and Walz did not purport to depart from prior Establishment Clause cases, except by adding a consideration that became the third element of the Lemon test. 403 U. S., at 613. In any event, we need not reexamine Lemon as applied in this context, for the exemption involved here is in no way questionable under the Lemon analysis.
Lemon requires first that the law at issue serve a “secular legislative purpose.” Id., at 612. This does not mean that the law’s purpose must be unrelated to religion — that would amount to a requirement “that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups,” Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 314 (1952), and the Establishment Clause has never been so interpreted. Rather, Lemon’s “purpose” requirement aims at preventing the relevant governmental decisionmaker — in this case, Congress — from abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters.
Under the Lemon analysis, it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions. Appellees argue that there is no such purpose here because §702 provided adequate protection for religious employers prior to the 1972 amendment, *336when it exempted only the religious activities of such employers from the statutory ban on religious discrimination. We may assume for the sake of argument that the pre-1972 exemption was adequate in the sense that the Free Exercise Clause required no more. Nonetheless, it is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court will consider religious. The line is hardly a bright one, and an organization might understandably be concerned that a judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission.14 Fear of potential liability might affect the way an organization carried out what it understood to be its religious mission.
After a detailed examination of the legislative history of the 1972 amendment, the District Court concluded that Congress’ purpose was to minimize governmental “interference] with the decision-making process in religions. ” 594 F. Supp., at 812. We agree with the District Court that this purpose does not violate the Establishment Clause.
The second requirement under Lemon is that the law in question have “a principal or primary effect. . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion.” 403 U. S., at 612. Undoubtedly, religious organizations are better able now to advance their purposes than they were prior to the 1972 amendment to § 702. But religious groups have been better able to advance their purposes on account of many laws that have passed constitutional muster: for example, the property tax exemption at issue in Walz v. Tax Comm’n, supra, or the loans of schoolbooks to schoolchildren, including parochial school students, upheld in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 *337U. S. 236 (1968). A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to have forbidden “effects” under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence. As the Court observed in Walz, “for the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment the ‘establishment’ of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.” 397 U. S., at 668. Accord, Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612.
The District Court appeared to fear that sustaining the exemption would permit churches with financial resources impermissibly to extend their influence and propagate their faith by entering the commercial, profit-making world. 594 F. Supp., at 825. The cases before us, however, involve a nonprofit activity instituted over 75 years ago in the hope that “all who assemble here, and who come for the benefit of their health, and for physical blessings, [may] feel that they are in a house dedicated to the Lord.” Dedicatory Prayer for the Gymnasium, quoted, 594 F. Supp., at 800-801, n. 15. These cases therefore do not implicate the apparent concerns of the District Court. Moreover, we find no persuasive evidence in the record before us that the Church’s ability to propagate its religious doctrine through the Gymnasium is any greater now than it was prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964. In such circumstances, we do not see how any advancement of religion achieved by the Gymnasium can be fairly attributed to the Government, as opposed to the Church.15
*338We find unpersuasive the District Court’s reliance on the fact that §702 singles out religious entities for a benefit. Although the Court has given weight to this consideration in its past decisions, see n. 11, supra, it has never indicated that statutes that give special consideration to religious groups are per se invalid. That would run contrary to the teaching of our cases that there is ample room for accommodation of religion under the Establishment Clause. See supra, at 334-335. Where, as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities.
We are also unpersuaded by the District Court’s reliance on the argument that § 702 is unsupported by long historical tradition. There was simply no need to consider the scope of the § 702 exemption until the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed, and the fact that Congress concluded after eight years that the original exemption was unnecessarily narrow is a decision entitled to deference, not suspicion.
Appellees argue that § 702 offends equal protection principles by giving less protection to the employees of religious employers than to the employees of secular employers.16 Appellees rely on Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 246 *339(1982), for the proposition that a law drawing distinctions on religious grounds must be strictly scrutinized. But Larson indicates that laws discriminating among religions are subject to strict scrutiny, ibid., and that laws “affording a uniform benefit to all religions” should be analyzed under Lemon, 456 U. S., at 252. In cases such as these, where a statute is neutral on its face and motivated by a permissible purpose of limiting governmental interference with the exercise of religion, we see no justification for applying strict scrutiny to a statute that passes the Lemon test. The proper inquiry is whether Congress has chosen a rational classification to further a legitimate end. We have already indicated that «Congress acted with a legitimate purpose in expanding the § 702 exemption to cover all activities of religious employers. Supra, at 336. To dispose of appellees’ equal protection argument, it suffices to hold — as we now do — that as applied to the nonprofit activities of religious employers, § 702 is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of alleviating significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions.
It cannot be seriously contended that §702 impermissibly entangles church and state; the statute effectuates a more complete separation of the two and avoids the kind of intrusive inquiry into religious belief that the District Court engaged in in this case. The statute easily passes muster under the third part of the Lemon test.17
*340The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Section 702 provides in relevant part:
“This subchapter [i. e., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq.l shall not apply... to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment *330of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1252 permits any party to appeal to this Court from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order of any court of the United States holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action to which the United States is a party.
The CPB and the COP are “corporations sole” organized under Utah law to perform various activities on behalf of the Church. Both corporations are tax-exempt, nonprofit religious entities under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Appellees do not contest that the CPB and the COP are religious organizations for purposes of § 702.
Temple recommends are issued only to individuals who observe the Church’s standards in such matters as regular church attendance, tithing, and abstinence from coffee, tea, alcohol, and tobacco.
The District Court did not certify a class. The other plaintiffs below, whose claims are not at issue in this appeal, initially included former employees of Beehive Clothing Mills, which manufactures garments with religious significance for Church members. The complaint was amended to add as plaintiff a former employee of Deseret Industries, a division of the Church’s Welfare Services Department. The District Court’s rulings on the other plaintiffs’ claims are described at n. 13, infra.
The District Court described the test as follows:
“First, the court must look at the tie between the religious organization and the activity at issue with regard to such areas as financial affairs, day-to-day operations and management. Second, whether or not there is a close and substantial tie between the two, the court next must examine the nexus between the primary function of the activity in question and the religious rituals or tenets of the religious organization or matters of church administration. If there is substantial connection between the activity in question and the religious organization’s religious tenets or matters of church administration and the tie under the first part of the test is close, the court does not need to proceed any further and may declare the activity religious. . . . However, where the tie between the religious entity and activity in question is either close or remote under the first prong of the test and the nexus between the primary function of the activity in question and the religious tenets or rituals of the religious organization or matters of church administration is tenuous or non-existent, the court must engage in a third inquiry. It must consider the relationship between the nature of *332the job the employee is performing and the religious rituals or tenets of the religious organization or matters of church administration. If there is a substantial relationship between the employee’s job and church administration or the religious organization’s rituals or tenets, the court must find that the activity in question is religious. If the relationship is not substantial, the activity is not religious.” 594 F. Supp. 791, 799 (Utah 1984).
The court found that “nothing in the running or purpose of [the Gymnasium] . . . suggests that it was intended to spread or teach the religious beliefs and doctrine and practices of sacred ritual of the Mormon Church or that it was intended to be an integral part of church administration.” Id., at 800. The court emphasized that no contention was made that the religious doctrines of the Mormon Church either require religious discrimination in employment or treat physical exercise as a religious ritual. Id., at 801.
The court also considered and rejected the possibility that §702 could be construed to exempt a religious organization only with respect to employment involving religious activities. Id., at 803-804.
The court examined in considerable detail the legislative history of the 1972 amendment of § 702. Id., at 805-812. Prior to that time, § 702 exempted only the religious activities of religious employers from the statutory proscription against religious discrimination in employment. The *3331972 amendment extending the exemption to all activities of religious organizations was sponsored by Senators Allen and Ervin. Senator Ervin explained that the purpose of the amendment was to “take the political hands of Caesar off of the institutions of God, where they have no place to be.” 118 Cong. Rec. 4503 (1972).
The court rejected the defendants’ arguments that §702 is required both by the need to avoid excessive governmental entanglement with religion and by the Free Exercise Clause. 594 F. Supp., at 814-820.
Cf., e. g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 397 (1983) (provision of benefits to a broad spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect); Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 794 (1973) (narrowness of benefited class is an important factor in evaluating whether effect of a law violates the Establishment Clause).
Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S. 664, 676-679 (1970) (relying in part, in upholding property tax exemption for religious groups, on long historical tradition for such exemptions).
The court declared that its determination regarding § 702 “applies with equal force to the [similar] state exemption as it relates to the facts of this case.” 594 F. Supp., at 798. It deferred ruling on the plaintiffs’ claim that § 702 violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution, id., at 828, and rejected the plaintiffs’ state-*334law claims of wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress, id., at 828-830.
Subsequently, the court concluded that disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment for the Beehive employees (see n. 5, supra). 618 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (Utah 1985).
A plaintiff added by amendment of the complaint, Ralph Whitaker, claimed impermissible religious discrimination in his discharge from the position of truckdriver by Deseret Industries (Industries) based on his failure to qualify for a temple recommend. Industries, a division of the Church’s Welfare Services Department, runs a workshop program for the handicapped, retarded, and unemployed, who sort and assemble items and refurbish donated goods for sale in Industries’ thrift stores. Relying on the Church’s emphasis on charity and work, the court held that Industries is a religious activity because “there is an intimate connection between Industries and the defendants and the Mormon Church and between the primary function of Industries and the religious tenets of the Church. ” Id., at 1027. Finding no Establishment Clause violation in applying the § 702 exemption to Industries, the court granted summary judgment against Whitaker, who did not appeal.
The present cases are illustrative of the difficulties: the distinction between Deseret Industries, see n. 13, supra, and the Gymnasium is rather fine. Both activities are run on a nonprofit basis, and the CPB and the COP argue that the District Court failed to appreciate that the Gymnasium as well as Deseret Industries is expressive of the Church’s religious values. Brief for Appellants in No. 86-179, pp. 6-8, 19.
Undoubtedly, Mayson’s freedom of choice in religious matters was impinged upon, but it was the Church (through the COP and the CPB), and not the Government, who put him to the choice of changing his religious practices or losing his job. This is a very different case than Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U. S. 703 (1985). In Caldor, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute prohibiting an employer from requiring an employee to work on a day designated by the employee as his Sabbath. In effect, Connecticut had given the force of law to the employee’s designa*338tion of a Sabbath day and required accommodation by the employer regardless of the burden which that constituted for the employer or other employees. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U. S. 136, 145, n. 11 (1987). In the present cases, appellee Mayson was not legally obligated to take the steps necessary to qualify for a temple recommend, and his discharge was not required by statute. We find no merit in appellees’ contention that § 702 “impermissibly delegates governmental power to religious employees and conveys a message of governmental endorsement of religious discrimination.” Brief for Appellees 31.
Appellees also argue that § 702 violates equal protection principles by giving religious employers greater leeway to discriminate than secular employers. It is not clear why appellees should have standing to represent the interests of secular employers, but in any event this argument is, practically speaking, merely a restatement of the first point.
We have no occasion to pass on the argument of the COP and the CPB that the exemption to which they are entitled under § 702 is required by the Free Exercise Clause.
Appellees argue that § 702 creates danger of political divisiveness along political lines. As the Court stated in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 684 (1984):
“[T]his Court has not held that political divisiveness alone can serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct. And we decline to so hold today. This case does not involve a direct subsidy to church-sponsored schools or colleges, or other, religious institutions, and hence no inquiry into political *340divisiveness is even called for, Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 403-404, n. 11 (1983).”