Rivera v. Minnich

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

I cannot agree with the Court that a determination of paternity is no more significant than the resolution of “ ‘a monetary dispute between private parties.’” Ante, at 577-578, n. 5, quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 423 (1979). What is at stake for a defendant in such a proceeding is not merely the prospect of a discrete payment in satisfaction of a limited obligation. Rather, it is the imposition of a lifelong relationship with significant financial, legal, and moral dimensions.

Financially, a paternity determination results in ongoing, open-ended support responsibility. A parent is responsible for supporting a child at least until the child is 18, see, e. g., 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4321(2) (1985), and perhaps longer. § 4321(3). The father cannot be certain of the amount of support that will be necessary, for this will depend on the needs of the particular child over the years. §4322. See also Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A U. L. A. § 309 (1979 and Supp. 1987). If his child receives any form of public assistance, all the father’s real and personal property are deemed available to the State for reimbursement. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 62, § 1974 (1968 and Supp. 1987). The financial commitment imposed upon a losing defendant in a pater*584nity suit is thus far more onerous and unpredictable than the liability borne by the loser in a typical civil suit.

The obligation created by a determination of paternity is enforced by significant legal sanctions. Failure to comply with a support obligation may result in the attachment of income, 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4348 (1985), and a 10% penalty may be imposed for any amount in arrears for more than 30 days if the failure to pay is deemed willful. § 4348(c). In addition, a father’s state and federal income tax refunds may be confiscated to pay alleged arrearages. 42 U. S. C. § 664 (1982 ed., Supp. III); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4307 (1985). Furthermore, failure to satisfy the support obligation may result in incarceration. A delinquent father may be declared in contempt of court and imprisoned for up to six months, § 4345, and may also be found guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to two years. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 4304, 1104 (1982). A paternity determination therefore establishes a legal duty whose assumption exposes the father to the potential loss of both property and liberty.

“Apart from the putative father’s pecuniary interest in avoiding a substantial support obligation and liberty interest threatened by the possible sanctions for noncompliance, at issue is the creation of a parent-child relationship.” Little v. Streater, 452 U. S. 1, 13 (1981). The judgment that a defendant is the father of a particular child is the pronouncement of more than mere financial responsibility. It is also a declaration that a defendant assumes a cultural role with distinct moral expectations. Most of us see parenthood as a lifelong status whose responsibilities flow from a wellspring far more profound than legal decree. Some men may find no emotional resonance in fatherhood. Many, however, will come to see themselves far differently, and will necessarily expand the boundaries of their moral sensibility to encompass the child that has been found to be their own. The establishment of a parental relationship may at the outset have fewer emotional consequences than the termination of one. It has, *585however, the potential to set in motion a process of engagement that is powerful and cumulative, and whose duration spans a lifetime. In this respect, a paternity determination is far more akin to the proceeding involved in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745 (1982), than to a suit for breach of contract.1

Finally, the losing defendant in a paternity suit is subject to characterization by others as a father who sought to shirk responsibility for his actions. See, e. g., County of Hennepin v. Brinkman, 378 N. W. 2d 790, 794, (Minn. 1985) (“ ‘[T]he social stigma resulting from an adjudication of paternity cannot be ignored’ ”) (citation omitted); Tennessee Dept. of Human Services v. Vaughn, 595 S. W. 2d 62, 67 (Tenn. 1980) (losing defendant in paternity proceeding “branded as the bearer of a bastard child”); Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 220 Pa. Super. 31, 37, 279 A. 2d 251, 254 (1971) (“Inevitably, paternity proceedings, whether labeled civil or criminal, result in a certain community stigma following a judicial acknowledgment of the parents’ impropriety”). He is seen as a parent apparently impervious to the moral demands of that role, who must instead be coerced by law to fulfill his obligation. Regardless of whether a satisfying parent-child relationship ultimately develops, the father will be seen as a person whose initial participation in it was involuntary. By contrast, the losing party in a civil suit is rarely the target of such social opprobrium.2

*586A paternity proceeding thus implicates significant property and liberty interests of the defendant. These can be protected without significantly burdening the interests of the mother, the child, or the State. Modern blood-grouping tests, such as the human leukocyte antigen (HLA) test used in this case, provide an extremely reliable means of determining paternity in most cases. See generally L. Sussman, Paternity Testing By Blood Grouping (2d ed. 1976). The probability of paternity in this case, for instance, was calculated at 94.6%, Brief for Appellee 2, a level of certainty achieved quite frequently through the use of such tests. See, e. g., Jones v. Robinson, 229 Va. 276, 282, 329 S. E. 2d 794, 798 (1985) (probability of paternity calculated at 99.97% and “at least” 99% in two consolidated appeals).

It is likely that the requirement that paternity be proved by clear and convincing evidence would make a practical difference only in cases in which blood test results were not introduced as evidence. In such cases, what I wrote over 35 years ago is still true: “in the field of contested paternity . . . the truth is so often obscured because social pressures create a conspiracy of silence or, worse, induce deliberate falsity.” Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N. J. Super. 152, 156, 76 A. 2d 717, 719 (1950). Recognition of this fact, as well as of the gravity of imposing a parental relationship upon a defendant, should lead us to require a more demanding standard of proof than a mere preponderance of the evidence.

I respectfully dissent.

Its consequences are also at least as serious as those resulting from other proceedings in which Pennsylvania demands proof by clear and convincing evidence, such as proof of a change of domicile, McKenna v. McKenna, 282 Pa. Super. 45, 422 A. 2d 668 (1980); reformation of contract on grounds of mistake, Boyertown National Bank v. Hartman, 147 Pa. 558, 23 A. 842 (1892); proof of adverse possession, Stevenson v. Stein, 412 Pa. 478, 195 A. 2d 268 (1963); and a claim for wages for personal services rendered to a decedent, Mooney’s Estate, 328 Pa. 273, 194 A. 893 (1937).

Of course, a child also has an interest in not being stigmatized as illegitimate. As we have stressed, however, an illegitimate child cannot be held responsible for his or her status. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. *586762 (1977). By contrast, the stigma that attaches to the father of such a child reflects a judgment regarding moral culpability. In addition, as I discuss in text this page, I believe that the child’s interest in legitimation would not be significantly burdened by the employment of a “clear and convincing” standard.