dissenting.
Today the Court holds that the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (Former Spouses’ Protection Act or Act) denies state courts the power to order in a divorce decree the division of military retirement pay unilaterally waived by a retiree in order to receive veterans’ disability benefits. The harsh reality of this holding is that former spouses like Gaye Mansell can, without their consent, be denied a fair share of their ex-spouse’s military retirement pay simply because he elects to increase his after-tax income by converting a portion of that pay into disability benefits. On the Court’s reading of the Former Spouses’ Protection Act, Gaye Mansell will lose nearly 30 percent of the monthly retirement income she would otherwise have received as community property. I view the Court’s holding as inconsistent with both the language and the purposes of the Act, and I respectfully dissent.
The Court recognized in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U. S. 210, 235 (1981), that “the plight of an ex-spouse of a retired service member is often a serious one.” In holding that federal law precluded state courts from dividing nondisability military retired pay pursuant to state community property laws, McCarty concluded with an invitation to Congress to reexamine the issue. Congress promptly did so and enacted the Former Spouses’ Protection Act. Today, despite overwhelming evidence that Congress intended to overrule McCarty completely, to alter pre-existing federal military retirement law so as to eliminate the pre-emptive effect *596discovered in McCarty, and to restore to the States authority to issue divorce decrees affecting military retirement pay consistent with state law, the Court assumes that Congress only partially rejected McCarty and that the States can apply their community property laws to military retirement pay only to the extent that the Former Spouses’ Protection Act affirmatively grants them authority to do so. Ante, at 588. The McCarty decision, however, did not address retirement pay waived to receive disability benefits; nor did it identify any explicit statutory provision precluding the States from characterizing such waived retirement pay as community property. Thus, I reject the Court’s central premise that the States are precluded by McCarty from characterizing as community property any retirement pay waived to receive disability benefits absent an affirmative grant of authority in the Former Spouses’ Protection Act.
In my view, Congress intended, by enacting the Former Spouses’ Protection Act, to eliminate the effect of McCarty’s pre-emption holding altogether and to return to the States their authority “to treat military pensions in the same manner as they treat other retirement benefits.” S. Rep. No. 97-502, p. 10 (1982). See also id., at 1 (“The primary purpose of the bill is to remove the effect of the United States Supreme Court decision in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U. S. 210 (1981). The bill would accomplish this objective by permitting Federal, State, and certain other courts, consistent with the appropriate laws, to once again consider military retired pay when fixing the property rights between the parties to a divorce, dissolution, annulment or legal separation”); id., at 5 (“[T]he committee intends the legislation to restore the law to what it was when the courts were permitted to apply State divorce laws to military retired pay”); id., at 16 (“The provision is intended to remove the federal preemption found to exist by the United States Supreme Court and permit State and other courts of competent jurisdiction to apply pertinent State or other laws in determining *597whether military retired or retainer pay should be divisible”); 128 Cong. Rec. 18314 (1982) (“The amendment simply returns to State courts the authority to treat military retired pay as it does other public and private pensions”) (remarks of Rep. Schroeder, bill sponsor).
Family law is an area traditionally of state concern, Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U. S. 572, 581 (1979), and we have not found federal pre-emption of state authority in this area absent a determination that “Congress has ‘positively required by direct enactment’ that state law be pre-empted.” Ibid, (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U. S. 68, 77 (1904)). The Former Spouses’ Protection Act does not “positively require” States to abandon their own law concerning the divisibility upon divorce of military retirement pay waived in order to obtain veterans’ disability benefits. On the contrary, the whole thrust of the Act was to restore to the States their traditional authority in the area of domestic relations. Even beyond that restoration, Congress sought to provide greater federal assistance and protection to military spouses than existed before McCarty by creating a federal garnishment remedy in aid of state court community property awards. That, in fact, is the central purpose and preoccupation of the Act’s complex statutory framework. The Former Spouses’ Protection Act is primarily a remedial statute creating a mechanism whereby former spouses armed with state court orders may enlist the Federal Government to assist them in obtaining some of their property entitlements upon divorce. The federal garnishment remedy created by the Act is limited, but it serves as assistance and not, as the Court would have it, a hindrance to former spouses. Thus, the provision at 10 U. S. C. § 1408(a)(4)(B) (1982 ed. and Supp. V) of the Act defining “[disposable retired or retainer pay” to exclude “amounts waived in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38,” and its incorporation into § 1408(c)(l)’s community property provision, only limits the federal garnishment remedy created by the Act. It does not limit the authority *598of States to characterize such waived retirement pay as community property under state law.
This reading is reinforced by the legislative history, which indicates that “[t]he specific deductions that are to be made from the total monthly retired and retainer pay generally parallel those existing deductions which may be made from the pay of Federal employees and military personnel before such pay is subject to garnishment, for alimony or child support payments under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U. S. C. 659).” S. Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 14 (emphasis added). The Court finds that this statement “is not helpful in determining why Congress chose to use the defined term — ‘disposable retired or retainer pay’ — to limit state-court authority in § 1408(c)(1).” Ante, at 592, n. 14. True, it is singularly unhelpful in supporting the Court’s view that § 1408(c)(1) denies state courts authority to characterize retirement pay waived in lieu of disability benefits as community property. By contrast, it is helpful in determining why Congress chose to use “disposable retired or retainer pay” as the term limiting state court authority to garnish military retirement pay. In light of the fact that disability benefits are exempt from garnishment in most cases, 38 U. S. C. §3101(a) (1982 ed., Supp. V), had Congress not excluded “amounts waived” in order to receive veterans’ disability benefits from the federal garnishment remedy created by the Former Spouses’ Protection Act it would have eviscerated the force of the anti-attachment provisions of § 3101(a).
To take advantage of the federal garnishment remedy, which provides for direct payment by the Government to former spouses in specified circumstances, former spouses must serve on the appropriate service Secretary court orders meeting certain requirements. In the case of a division of property, the court order must “specifically provid[e] for the payment of an amount, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable retired or retainer pay, from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member.” 10 U. S. C. § 1408(a) *599(2)(C) (1982 ed., Supp. V). It must contain certain information and be regular on its face. §§ 1408(b)(1)(B), 1408(b) (1)(C), 1408(b)(1)(D), 1408(b)(2) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). The Act sets forth the procedures to be followed by the Secretary in making payments directly to former spouses. § 1408(d) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). Finally, the Act places limits on the total amount of disposable retirement pay that may be paid by the Secretary to former spouses, §§ 1408(e)(1), 1408(e)(4) (B) (1982 ed. and Supp. V), and it clarifies the procedures to be followed in the event of multiple or conflicting court orders. §§ 1408(e)(2), 1408(e)(3)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. V).
Subsection 1408(c)(1) authorizes the application of this federal garnishment remedy to community property awards by providing that “a court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member . . . either as property solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court.” (Emphasis added.) This provision should not be read to preclude States from characterizing retirement pay waived to receive disability benefits as community property but only to preclude the use of the federal direct payments mechanism to attach that waived pay. Nor do §§1408 (c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4) compel the conclusion that Congress intended to preempt States from characterizing gross military retirement pay as community property divisible upon divorce. Those three provisions indicate what States may “not” do. That Congress explicitly restricted the authority of courts in certain specific respects, however, does not support the inference that § 1408(c)(1) — an affirmative grant of power — should be interpreted as precluding everything it does not grant. On the contrary, it supports the inference that Congress explicitly and directly precluded those matters it wished to preempt entirely, leaving the balance of responsibility in the area of domestic relations to the States. In this respect, the Court mischaracterizes Gaye Mansell’s argument as insisting that “the Act contemplates no federal pre-emption. . . .” *600Ante, at 592. Subsection 1408(c) has substantive effects on the power of state courts — its first paragraph expands those powers (“a court may treat”); its remaining paragraphs restrict those powers (“this section does not create”; “[t]his section does not authorize”; “[a] court may not treat”).
That States remain free to characterize waived portions of retirement pay as community property is unambiguously underscored by the broad language of the saving clause contained in the Act, § 1408(e)(6). That clause provides:
“Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member of liability for the payment of alimony, child support, or other payments required by a court order on the grounds that payments made out of disposable retired or retainer pay under this section have been made in the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). Any such unsatisfied obligation of a member may be enforced by any means available under law other than the means provided under this section in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) has been paid and under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U. S. C. 659) in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4) has been paid.” (Emphasis added.)
The Court explains that the saving clause “serves the limited purpose of defeating any inference that the federal direct payments mechanism displaced the authority of state courts to divide and garnish property not covered by the mechanism.” Ante, at 590 (emphasis added). I agree. What I do not understand is how the Court can read the Act’s saving clause in this manner and yet conclude, without contradiction, that California may not characterize retirement pay waived for disability benefits as community property. All California seeks to do is “divide and garnish property not covered by the [federal direct payments] mechanism.” Ibid. Specifically, California wishes to exercise its traditional fam*601ily law powers to divide as community property that portion of Major Mansell’s retirement pay which he unilaterally converted into disability benefits, and use state-law garnishment remedies to attach the value of Gaye Mansell’s portion of this community property. That is precisely what § 1408(e)(6) saves to the States by “defeating” any contrary inference, ante, at 590, that the Act has displaced the State’s authority to enforce its divorce decrees “by any means available under law other than the means provided under this section. ...” § 1408(e)(6). As the California Supreme Court so aptly put it, in the saving clause Congress emphasized that “the limitations on the service secretary’s ability to reach the retiree’s gross pay [are] not to be deemed a limitation on the state court’s ability to define the community property interests at the time of dissolution.” Casas v. Thompson, 42 Cal. 3d 131, 150, 720 P. 2d 921, 933, cert. denied, 479 U. S. 1012 (1986). In other words, while a former spouse may not receive community property payments that exceed 50 percent of a retiree’s disposable retirement pay through the direct federal garnishment mechanism, § 1408(e)(1), a state court is free to characterize gross retirement pay as community property depending on the law of its jurisdiction, and former spouses may pursue any other remedy “available under law” to satisfy that interest. “Nothing” in the Former Spouses’ Protection Act relieves military retirees of liability under such law if they possess other assets equal to the value of the former spouse’s share of the gross retirement pay.
Under the Court’s reading of the Act as precluding the States from characterizing gross retirement pay as community property, a military retiree has the power unilaterally to convert community property into separate property and increase his after-tax income, at the expense of his ex-spouse’s financial security and property entitlements. To read the statute as permitting a military retiree to pocket 30 percent, 50 percent, even 80 percent of gross retirement pay by converting it into disability benefits and thereby to avoid his ob*602ligations under state community property law, however, is to distort beyond recognition and to thwart the main purpose of the statute, which is to recognize the sacrifices made by military spouses and to protect their economic security in the face of a divorce. Women generally suffer a decline in their standard of living following a divorce. See Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1181, 1251 (1981). Military wives face special difficulties because “frequent change-of-station moves and the special pressures placed on the military spouse as a homemaker make it extremely difficult to pursue a career affording economic security, job skills and pension protection.” S. Rep. No. 97-502, at 6. The average military couple married for 20 years moves about 12 times, and military wives experience an unemployment rate more than double that of their civilian counterparts. Brief for Women’s Equity Action League et al. as Amici Curiae 10-11. Retirement pay, moreover, is often the single most valuable asset acquired by military couples. Id., at 18. Indeed, the one clear theme that emerges from the legislative history of the Act is that Congress recognized the dire plight of many military wives after divorce and sought to protect their access to their ex-husbands’ military retirement pay. See S. Rep. No. 97-502, at 6; 128 Cong. Rec. 18318 (1982) (“[FJrequent military moves often preclude spouses from pursuing their own careers and establishing economic independence. As a result, military spouses are frequently unable to vest in their own retirement plans or obtain health insurance coverage from a private employer. Military spouses who become divorced often lose all access to retirement and health benefits — despite a ‘career’ devoted to the military”) (remarks of Rep. Schumer). See also id., at 18315, 18316, 18317, 18320, 18323, 18328. Reading the Act as not precluding States from characterizing retirement pay waived to receive disability benefits as property divisible upon divorce is faithful to *603the clear remedial purposes of the statute in a way that the Court’s interpretation is not.
The conclusion that States may treat gross military retirement pay as property divisible upon divorce is not inconsistent with 38 U. S. C. § 3101(a) (1982 ed., Supp. V). This anti-attachment provision provides that veterans’ disability benefits “shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary.” Gaye Mansell acknowledges, as she must, that § 3101(a) precludes her from garnishing under state law Major Mansell’s veterans’ disability benefits in satisfaction of her claim to a share of his gross military retirement pay, just as § 1408(c)(1) precludes her from invoking the federal direct payments mechanism in satisfaction of that claim. To recognize that § 3101(a) protects the funds from a specific source, however, does not mean that § 3101(a) prevents Gaye Mansell from recovering her 50 percent interest in Major Mansell’s gross retirement pay out of any income or assets he may have other than his veterans’ disability benefits. So long as those benefits themselves are protected, calculation of Gaye Mansell’s entitlement on the basis of Major Mansell’s gross retirement pay does not constitute an “attachment” of his veterans’ disability benefits. Section 3101(a) is designed to ensure that the needs of disabled veterans and their families are met, see Rose v. Rose, 481 U. S. 619, 634 (1987), without interference from creditors. That purpose is fulfilled so long as the benefits themselves are protected by the anti-attachment provision.
In sum, under the Court’s interpretation of the Former Spouses’ Protection Act, the former spouses Congress sought to protect risk having their economic security severely undermined by a unilateral decision of their ex-spouses to waive retirement pay in lieu of disability benefits. It is inconceivable that Congress intended the broad remedial purposes of the statute to be thwarted in such a way. To be sure, as the Court notes, Congress sought to be “fair and equitable” to re*604tired service members as well as to protect divorced spouses. Ante, at 593-594, and n. 19. Congress explicitly protected military members by limiting the percentage of disposable retirement pay subject to the federal garnishment remedy and by expressly providing that military members could not be forced to retire. See 10 U. S. C. §§ 1408(e)(1), 1408(e)(4)(B), 1408(c)(3). Moreover, a retiree is still advantaged by waiving retirement pay in lieu of disability benefits: the pay that is waived is not subject to the federal direct payments mechanism, and the former spouse must resort instead to the more cumbersome and costly process of seeking a state garnishment order against the value of that waived pay. See H. R. Rep. No. 98-700, pp. 4-5 (1984) (discussing difficulties faced by ex-spouses in obtaining state garnishment orders). Even these state processes cannot directly attach the military retiree’s disability benefits for purposes of satisfying a community property division given the strictures of the anti-attachment provision of 38 U. S. C. § 3101(a). There is no basis for concluding, however, that Congress sought to protect the interests of service members by allowing them unilaterally to deny their former spouses any opportunity to obtain a fair share of the couple’s military retirement pay.
It is now once again up to Congress to address the inequity created by the Court in situations such as this one. But because I believe that Congress has already expressed its intention that the States have the authority to characterize waived retirement pay as property divisible upon divorce, I dissent.