concurring.
As this case was originally presented to us, the dispute centered on whether Knights’s agreement to the search, condition included in his terms of probation covered only those searches with a probation-related purpose, or rather extended to searches with an investigatory or law-enforcement purpose. At that time, the Government argued that Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (1996), precluded any en-quiry into the motives of the individual officers conducting the search. We now hold that law-enforcement searches of probationers who have been informed of a search condition are permissible upon individualized suspicion of criminal behavior committed during the probationary period, thus removing any issue of the subjective intention of the investí-*123gating officers from the case. I would therefore reserve the question whether Whren’s holding, that “Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis,” id., at 813, should extend to searches based only upon reasonable suspicion.