F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
July 18, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
No. 03-4201
TONY BUONOCORE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah
(D.C. No. 2:01-CR-488-TC)
Bradley P. Rich (Peter D. Goodall with him on the briefs), Yengich, Rich & Xaiz,
Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellant.
Diana Hagen, Assistant United States Attorney (Paul M. Warner, United States
Attorney, and Wayne T. Dance, Assistant United States Attorney, with her on the
briefs), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR, ANDERSON, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
Tony Buonocore (“Defendant”) was charged in a two-count indictment with
knowingly and intentionally distributing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine knowing
or having reasonable cause to believe that they would be used to manufacture
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). Defendant entered into
an agreement with the government to plead guilty to one count in exchange for
dismissal of the other count. At the change of plea hearing, the district court
characterized Defendant’s guilty plea as an Alford plea or a plea of nolo
contendere because Defendant refused to admit an element of the offense.
Pursuant to its general policy against such pleas, the district court rejected
Defendant’s plea. Defendant proceeded to trial and was convicted on both
counts. In this appeal, Defendant challenges the district court’s rejection of his
plea and its refusal to give the “innocent merchant” jury instruction requested by
Defendant. In addition, Defendant argues he is entitled to resentencing in light of
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). We exercise jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and we AFFIRM the judgment and
sentence of the district court.
BACKGROUND
Defendant owns a company that was a licensed distributor of ephedrine and
pseudoephedrine products. Terry Long, the owner of several tobacco and
convenience stores, was one of Buonocore’s customers. In May 2001, with
Long’s assistance as an informant, agents of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (“DEA”) arranged a controlled purchase of ephedrine and
pseudoephedrine products from Defendant. In the audio-recorded transaction of
2
the controlled purchase, Long said to Defendant that “the meth cooks must be
cookin like crazy,” and “I must have had a run, there’s a bunch of meth cooks in
town, that’s what their [sic] using them for so . . .”
Based on this controlled purchase, Defendant was charged in a two-count
indictment with knowingly and intentionally distributing ephedrine (Count I) and
pseudoephedrine (Count II) knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that
they would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(c)(2). 1 Before trial, Defendant agreed to plead guilty to Count I in
1
Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(c):
Any person who knowingly or intentionally–
(1) possesses a listed chemical with intent to manufacture a
controlled substance except as authorized by this subchapter;
(2) possesses or distributes a listed chemical knowing, or having
reasonable cause to believe, that the listed chemical will be used to
manufacture a controlled substance except as authorized by this
subchapter; or
(3) with the intent of causing the evasion of the recordkeeping or
reporting requirements of section 830 of this title, or the
regulations issued under that section, receives or distributes a
reportable amount of any listed chemical in units small enough so
that the making of records or filing of reports under that section is
not required;
shall be fined in accordance with Title 18 or imprisoned not more than 20
years in the case of a violation of paragraph (1) or (2) involving a list I
chemical or not more than 10 years in the case of a violation of this
subsection other than a violation of paragraph (1) or (2) involving a list I
chemical, or both.
3
exchange for the government’s agreement to dismiss Count II and recommend a
sentence of probation only.
At the outset of the change of plea hearing, the district court advised
Defendant that it would not accept the plea if Defendant would not admit guilt.
Defense counsel indicated that this would not be a problem. Later, the court went
through the elements of the offense with Defendant to determine the factual basis
of the plea. The court asked Defendant, “Did you know that that ephedrine was
going to be used in the manufacture by someone of methamphetamine?”
Defendant responded, “No, I didn’t, Your Honor.”
Defense counsel then objected, “I think if the court will allow, I think
under the Supreme Court decision–.” The court interrupted, “I do not accept
Alfred [sic] pleas. That’s what I told you at the beginning. I don’t accept them.
I don’t accept Alfreds [sic]. I don’t accept nolos. I cannot do this. You must
admit intent. I simply do not, nor will I. And I know the Supreme Court allows
me to do it. It’s disfavored, and I see no reason in this case to do that.” The
court rejected Defendant’s plea and set the case for trial.
Defendant filed a written objection, arguing that the court abused its
discretion by rejecting Defendant’s plea pursuant to its policy against Alford and
nolo pleas. The district court overruled Defendant’s objection, affirming its
denial of Defendant’s plea. Defendant was convicted on both counts and
4
sentenced to 97 months in prison followed by 36 months of supervised release.
Defendant timely filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Rejection of Defendant’s Plea
A district court’s decision to reject a plea is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405, 1414 (10th Cir. 1995).
Defendant argues that he was prepared to admit his guilt at the change of
plea hearing but that the district court, because of its misunderstanding of the
applicable statute, mis-characterized Defendant’s intended guilty plea either as an
Alford plea or as a plea of nolo contendere. 2 In the alternative, Defendant argues
that even if the district court properly characterized his plea as an Alford or nolo
plea, the court abused its discretion by rejecting that plea pursuant to its policy
against such pleas. We address each argument in turn.
A. Characterization of Defendant’s Plea as an Alford Plea or a Plea of
Nolo Contendere
2
A plea of nolo contendere is “a plea by which a defendant does not
expressly admit his guilt, but nonetheless waives his right to a trial and authorizes
the court for purposes of the case to treat him as if he were guilty.” North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 (1970). An “Alford” plea, named after the
Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina v. Alford, is a plea denominated as a
guilty plea but accompanied by protestations of innocence. See id. at 37. Courts
determining whether to accept Alford pleas are to treat them as pleas of nolo
contendere. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1974).
5
Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), it is unlawful knowingly or intentionally to
“possess[] or distribute[] a listed chemical knowing, or having reasonable cause
to believe, that the listed chemical will be used to manufacture a controlled
substance . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) (emphasis added). At the change of plea
hearing, the district court asked Defendant only whether he “knew” that the
products he was selling would be used to manufacture methamphetamine and did
not ask him whether he “had reasonable cause to believe” that the products would
be used to manufacture methamphetamine. When Defendant denied that he
“knew” that the products would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, the
district court immediately rejected his plea, characterizing it as an Alford or nolo
plea.
Defendant now argues that he was prepared to admit that he “had
reasonable cause to believe” that the products he sold would be used to
manufacture methamphetamine but that the district court, by prematurely
terminating the plea colloquy, did not allow him to admit his guilt and thus mis-
characterized his plea as an Alford or nolo plea.
In general, this court will not consider a theory on appeal not raised or
ruled on below. See Tele-Communications, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue,
104 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 1997). Defendant failed to object to the
district court’s rejection of his plea on the basis that the court, due to its
6
premature termination of the plea colloquy, mis-characterized Defendant’s plea as
an Alford or nolo plea. To the contrary, Defendant expressly admitted that he
intended to offer an Alford or nolo plea and objected only on the ground that the
district court’s general policy against such pleas was an abuse of the court’s
discretion. Specifically, in his written objection following the change of plea
hearing Defendant said, “Because the Defendant would not ‘admit’ guilt but
rather was only willing to accept punishment for the alleged crime, the court
required him to try the matter.” Accordingly, the district court had no notice of
Defendant’s current objection and was therefore unable to make a ruling or take
corrective action based on that objection.
Attempting to avoid a finding of waiver, Defendant points out that at the
beginning of the change of plea hearing he put the court on notice that he
intended to admit guilt and that this notice should serve as an objection that
preserves his argument for appeal. However, at the beginning of the change of
plea hearing, the court instructed the parties that it would not accept a plea of
nolo contendere, that Defendant would be required to admit guilt. Defense
counsel responded that this would not be a problem. Thus Defendant’s placing
the court on notice that he intended to admit guilt does not remedy Defendant’s
failure to object to the district court’s alleged misunderstanding of the later plea
colloquy, which is the basis of Defendant’s current objection.
7
Because Defendant failed to raise this issue below, we review the district
court’s action for plain error only. See United States v. Brown, 316 F.3d 1151,
1155 (10th Cir. 2003). Under the plain error standard of review, we may exercise
our discretion to reverse (1) error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial
rights; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings. See id. (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732
(1993)).
Defendant has not demonstrated that the district court plainly erred in
characterizing his plea as an Alford or nolo plea. Defendant acknowledged in his
written objection that “Defendant would not ‘admit’ guilt but rather was only
willing to accept punishment for the alleged crime,” and then argued that the
district court abused its discretion by refusing to accept any plea accompanied by
a protestation of innocence. Defendant’s objection demonstrates that he did not
intend to admit his guilt regardless of the questions the district court asked him,
but instead planned to offer an Alford or nolo plea. Accordingly, the district
court did not plainly err in characterizing Defendant’s plea as an Alford or nolo
plea.
8
B. Rejection of Defendant’s Alford Plea or Plea of Nolo Contendere
Defendant argues in the alternative that, even if the district court properly
characterized Defendant’s plea as an Alford or nolo plea, the district court abused
its discretion by rejecting the plea pursuant to the court’s general policy against
such pleas.
The Supreme Court has held that a district court may accept a plea of guilty
even if that plea is accompanied by protestations of innocence. In North Carolina
v. Alford, the trial court accepted the defendant’s guilty plea even though the
defendant maintained his innocence as he offered the plea. See 400 U.S. 25, 28-
29 (1970). The defendant then sought post-conviction relief on the basis that his
plea was involuntary because he pled guilty only to avoid the death penalty. See
id. at 29-30. The Supreme Court equated the plea offered by the defendant to a
plea of nolo contendere, see id. at 37, and held that when there is a strong factual
basis for the plea, it is not unconstitutional for a court to accept a guilty plea
despite the defendant’s professed belief in his innocence, see id. at 38.
The Court noted that “[o]ur holding does not mean that a trial judge must
accept every constitutionally valid guilty plea merely because a defendant wishes
so to plead.” Id. at 38 n.11. The Court then stated that
[a] criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under the
Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the court, although
the States may by statute or otherwise confer such a right. Likewise,
the States may bar their courts from accepting guilty pleas from any
9
defendants who assert their innocence.
Id. (internal citation omitted). The Court further noted that Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure gives federal district judges discretion to
refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and stated that “[w]e need not now delineate the
scope of that discretion.” Id. Accordingly, the question left open by Alford is
whether the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure limit a district court’s discretion
to reject Alford or nolo pleas.
When a defendant offers an Alford plea (i.e., a guilty plea accompanied by
protestations of innocence), the proper procedure is to treat the plea as a plea of
nolo contendere. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1974).
Rule 11 provides that a defendant may plead nolo contendere only “with the
court’s consent.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(1). “Before accepting a plea of nolo
contendere, the court must consider the parties’ views and the public interest in
the effective administration of justice.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(3).
Rule 11 is silent with respect to what, if anything, the court must consider
before rejecting a plea of nolo contendere. See id. According to the Advisory
Committee:
The defendant who asserts his innocence while pleading guilty or
nolo contendere is often difficult to deal with in a correctional
setting, and it may therefore be preferable to resolve the issue of
guilt or innocence at the trial stage rather than leaving that issue
unresolved, thus complicating subsequent correctional decisions.
The rule is intended to make clear that a judge may reject a plea of
10
nolo contendere and require the defendant either to plead not guilty
or to plead guilty under circumstances in which the judge is able to
determine that the defendant is in fact guilty of the crime to which he
is pleading guilty.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1974). As this note demonstrates,
the Advisory Committee recognized the difficulties inherent in the acceptance of
nolo pleas 3 and appears to vest discretion in the district court to adopt a policy
requiring a defendant either to admit guilt or to plead not guilty. See id. In short,
Rule 11 appears to sanction, and perhaps even encourage, the policy employed by
the district court in this case.
We have not yet taken a position on the issue presented in this case, but we
have recognized the district court’s broad discretion in determining whether to
accept a plea of nolo contendere. In United States v. Soltow, 444 F.2d 59 (10th
3
Learned Hand referred to the idea of accepting nolo pleas as “a foolish
concept.” See 1A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure, § 177, at 285-86 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that use of the nolo plea has
been criticized as “one of the factors which has tended to breed contempt for
federal law enforcement” because “the public regards consent to such a plea by
the Government as an admission that it has only a technical case at most and that
the whole proceeding was just a fiasco”) (quotations omitted); see also United
States v. Bearden, 274 F.3d 1031, 1043 (6th Cir. 2001) (Rosen, J., concurring)
(urging court to hold that it is within judge’s discretion to adopt general policy
against nolo pleas and recognizing view that “by accepting a nolo plea, the court
is placing its imprimatur upon a fiction in order to assist a criminal defendant in
avoiding civil liability”); United States v. Bednarski, 445 F.2d 364, 366 (1st Cir.
1971) (“However legally sound the Alford principle, which of course we do not
dispute, the public might well not understand or accept the fact that a defendant
who denied his guilt was nonetheless placed in a position of pleading guilty and
going to jail.”).
11
Cir. 1971), the defendant wished to plead nolo contendere, but the district court
said, “If Mr. Soltow wants to change his plea, he may do so, but I’ll not accept a
nolo contendere plea. I see nothing unusual in this case from the hundreds of
others that come through the Court all the time.” Id. at 60-61 & n.1 (quotations
omitted). We held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
accept that plea and requiring the defendant either to plead guilty or go to trial.
See id. at 61. We noted that “‘[i]t is not necessary to decide whether a refusal to
accept a plea of nolo contendere under certain circumstances may constitute an
abuse of discretion. All the cases hold that the trial court is vested with a broad
discretion in determining whether a plea of nolo contendere shall be accepted.’”
Id. (quoting Mason v. United States, 250 F.2d 704, 706 (10th Cir. 1957)).
In United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir. 1995), we held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting a guilty plea when the
defendant refused to admit the intent element of the crime. See id. at 1413-14.
We noted that “[a]lthough a defendant may in some circumstances plead guilty
without admitting all the elements of the offense, see Alford, those circumstances
are not presented here.” Id. at 1414. Presumably, the “circumstances” to which
we referred in Young included the existence of a strong factual basis for the plea.
Nevertheless, we did not indicate in Young that a district court would abuse its
discretion in rejecting an Alford plea even under such circumstances. See id.
12
Other courts of appeals have held that a district court may reject a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere solely on the basis that the defendant refused to
acknowledge his guilt. See United States v. Gomez-Gomez, 822 F.2d 1008, 1011
(11th Cir. 1987); United States v. O’Brien, 601 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Dorman, 496 F.2d 438, 440 (4th Cir. 1974). In addition,
although it did not decide the issue, the Seventh Circuit noted that “it seems at
least arguable that the acceptance of a nolo plea is so broadly a matter of
discretion that a judge’s adoption of a policy against such a plea is itself within
his discretion . . . .” United States v. Gratton, 525 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th Cir.
1975). Cf. United States v. Cepeda Penes, 577 F.2d 754, 756 (1st Cir. 1978)
(“[A]cceptance of a nolo plea is solely a matter of grace . . . .”).
Secondary sources also provide support for the proposition that a district
court has discretion to reject Alford or nolo pleas based on a general policy
against such pleas. According to Wright and Miller, “the court is not required to
accept a guilty plea from one who asserts he is innocent.” 1A Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 174, at 201-02 (3d
ed. 1999). “It is discretionary with the court whether to accept the plea and it is
wholly unlikely that refusal to accept the plea would be regarded as error on
appeal.” Id. § 177, at 294. According to the American Law Reports:
One of the most important characteristics of the plea of nolo
contendere, which distinguishes it fundamentally from the plea of
13
guilty to which it is so frequently linked by the courts, is that its
acceptance by the court is not a matter of right of the defendant but
is entirely within the discretion of the court.
All the later cases support the proposition that the plea of nolo
contendere cannot be entered by the defendant as a matter of right
but is pleadable only by leave of court, its acceptance by the court
being entirely a matter of grace.
89 A.L.R. 2d 540, § 14 (emphasis added).
Relying on the broad discretion that Rule 11 affords district courts in
rejecting Alford and nolo pleas, we hold that a district court’s adoption of a
general policy against Alford or nolo pleas is permissible. In this case, then, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Defendant’s plea pursuant to
such a policy.
II. “Innocent Merchant” Jury Instruction
We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether, as a whole, the
instructions correctly state the governing law and provide the jury with an ample
understanding of the issues and applicable standards. See United States v.
Fredette, 315 F.3d 1235, 1240 (10th Cir. 2003). “The instructions as a whole
need not be flawless, but we must be satisfied that, upon hearing the instructions,
the jury understood the issues to be resolved and its duty to resolve them.” Id.
(quotations omitted). While we review the instructions as a whole de novo, the
district court’s decision to give a particular jury instruction is reviewed for abuse
14
of discretion. See id. at 1241.
Defendant in this case requested the following jury instruction:
A legitimate merchant who sells innocuous items need make no
judgment about the purpose of the buyer based upon the surrounding
circumstances. The dealer, on the other hand, who sells innocuous
items with the intent that they be used [unlawfully], is, in effect, put
on notice by the illicit nature of his activity that he must be careful to
conform his conduct to the law. Even an illicit dealer, however, is
not to be held legally responsible for guessing what is in the mind of
the buyer. The seller is safe as long as he does not actually know the
buyer’s purpose and as long as the objective facts that are there for
him to observe do not give fair notice that illegal use will ensue.
The proposed instruction is a passage extracted from Delaware Accessories Trade
Ass’n v. Gebelein, 497 F. Supp. 289, 294 (D. Del. 1980). In Gebelein, the district
court considered the constitutionality of a Delaware statute, patterned after the
DEA’s Model Drug Paraphernalia Act, that made it unlawful to “deliver, possess
with intent to deliver, or manufacture with the intent to deliver, drug
paraphernalia, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should
know, that it will be used to violate drug laws.” Id. at 290, 293 (quotations
omitted). The plaintiffs challenged the act on the basis that the inclusion of a
constructive knowledge standard (“reasonably should know”) rendered the act
unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 293-94.
In rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument, the district court in Gebelein stated
that the statute includes two mens rea prongs that must both be satisfied: “(1) that
the defendant intended that an item would be used for the production or
15
consumption of controlled substances and also (2) that he either knew, or that he
acted in a set of circumstances from which a reasonable person would know, that
the buyer of the item would thereafter use it for those purposes.” Id. at 294. The
first mens rea prong is derived from the definition of “drug paraphernalia,” which
is defined as products or materials “used, intended for use, or designed for use” in
producing or consuming controlled substances. Id. at 291 (quotations omitted);
see also New England Accessories Trade Ass’n v. Tierney, 691 F.2d 35, 36-37
(1st Cir. 1982) (interpreting Maine Drug Paraphernalia Act, also patterned after
DEA’s Model Drug Paraphernalia Act). In the passage of the Gebelein opinion
extracted by Defendant, the court was explaining the interplay between these two
mens rea prongs. See 497 F. Supp. at 294.
For two reasons, application of this passage from Gebelein to this case in
the form of a jury instruction would have been inappropriate. First, it would have
thrown wholly undefined terms at the jury. The jury would have needed to know
what is a “legitimate merchant” and what is an “innocuous item.” Having failed
to define these terms, the instruction would have done little more than generate
confusion.
Second, and more importantly, the mens rea element of § 841(c)(2), the
statute under which Defendant in this case was convicted, differs in relevant part
from the mens rea element of the act at issue in Gebelein. Thus, the Gebelein
16
court’s discussion of the interplay between the two mens rea requirements is not
an accurate statement of the law of § 841(c)(2). See United States v. Saffo, 227
F.3d 1260, 1269 n.7 (10th Cir. 2000) (contrasting what is now § 841(c)(2) with a
law based on the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act at issue in Kansas Retail Trade
Coop. v. Stephan, 695 F.2d 1343, 1344-45 (10th Cir. 1982)). Accordingly, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the requested
instruction to the jury.
The instructions provided by the district court with respect to the disputed
mens rea element “correctly state[d] the governing law and provide[d] the jury
with an ample understanding of the issues and applicable standards.” Fredette,
315 F.3d at 1240 (quotations omitted). The court instructed the jury that
Defendant must have known or had reasonable cause to believe that the ephedrine
and pseudoephedrine he sold would be used to manufacture methamphetamine.
The court further instructed the jury that this inquiry is entirely subjective, the
inquiry is not to be viewed from the perspective of a hypothetical reasonable
person, and the mens rea element is not satisfied if Defendant acted through
mistake, negligence, carelessness, or belief in an inaccurate proposition. The
instructions, viewed as a whole, provided the jury with an ample understanding of
the disputed mens rea element, and no additional instructions were required.
17
III. Sentencing Error
For the first time on appeal, Defendant argues he is entitled to resentencing
under Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 738. 4
In Booker, the Court “reaffirm[ed that] [a]ny fact (other than a
prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding
the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty
or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756. As a
result, the Court held that mandatory application of the Guidelines
violates the Sixth Amendment when judge-found facts, other than
those of prior convictions, are employed to enhance a sentence.
United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 731 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
“To remedy this constitutional infirmity created by applying judge-found facts to
mandatory sentencing guidelines, the [Booker] Court severed the provision of the
Sentencing Reform Act making application of the Guidelines mandatory,” 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1). United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1174 (10th Cir.
2005). There are, then, “two distinct types of [Booker] error.” Gonzalez-Huerta,
403 F.3d at 731. First, the sentencing court can violate the Sixth Amendment “by
relying upon judge-found facts, other than those of prior convictions, to enhance a
defendant’s sentence mandatorily.” Id. Second, a sentencing court can commit
non-constitutional Booker error “by applying the Guidelines in a mandatory
fashion, as opposed to a discretionary fashion, even though the resulting sentence
This court permitted the parties to file supplemental briefs after the
4
Supreme Court decided Booker.
18
was calculated solely upon facts that were admitted by the defendant, found by
the jury, or based upon the fact of a prior conviction.” Id. at 731-32.
Booker applies “to all cases on direct review.” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769.
Nonetheless, because Defendant did not raise this issue at sentencing, we review
only for plain error. See Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 732.
Although Defendant argues that the district court violated the Sixth
Amendment by imposing a sentence based upon the quantity of ephedrine and
pseudoephedrine the court found that Defendant unlawfully distributed, there is
no constitutional error in this case because Defendant admitted unlawfully
distributing those specific amounts during his sentencing. The presentence report
calculated Defendant’s sentence based upon the “39.35 grams of Ephedrine and
43.2 grams of Pseudoephedrine” Defendant sold to the government’s confidential
informant on May 11, 2001. The government objected to those amounts, arguing
instead that Defendant’s sentence calculation should also include the 2,625 grams
of ephedrine that federal authorities later seized from Defendant on May 23,
2001. 5 In response to the government’s argument, defense counsel affirmatively
asserted at sentencing that the district court should only base Defendant’s
sentence on the amount of controlled substances already included in the
5
At sentencing, the government alternatively argued that the district court
should, instead, include Defendant’s sales of controlled substances to a particular
convenience store between January and May 2001.
19
presentence report’s calculations, stating, “I still believe that the calculations in
the guidelines provided by the probation department are in fact correct, and we
object to any attempt to include [other] amounts.” Defense counsel further
asserted that “the presentence preparers are exactly correct. [Defendant] ought to
be punished for what he did. He’s been convicted of it.” Thus Defendant, acting
through his counsel, admitted unlawfully distributing the amount of controlled
substances included in the presentence report. The district court agreed,
calculating Defendant’s sentence only on the amount of controlled substances
included in the presentence report. Because Defendant admitted unlawfully
distributing those amounts, the district court did not violate the Sixth Amendment
when the court used those amounts to calculate Defendant’s sentence. See United
States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005). 6
The district court did commit non-constitutional Booker error, however,
when the court treated the Guidelines as mandatory, rather than discretionary.
See United States v. Sierra-Castillo, 405 F.3d 932, 941 (10th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 818-19 (10th Cir. 2005). That error
satisfies the first two prongs of the plain-error analysis. See Gonzalez-Huerta,
6
In United States v. Bass, No. 04-6049, 2005 WL 1525469, at*4 n.7
(10th Cir. June 29, 2005), we held that a defendant’s failure to object to facts in a
presentence report did not amount to an admission of those facts. Here, however,
as in Shelton, there is more. There is an affirmative adoption of the facts in the
presentence report.
20
403 F.3d at 732. The government concedes as much in its brief.
Turning to the plain-error test’s prejudice inquiry, we consider whether
Defendant has met his burden of establishing that this plain error affected his
substantial rights. See Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d at 819. “To demonstrate that
the mandatory application of the Guidelines affected substantial rights, a
defendant must show a reasonable probability that the defects in his sentencing
altered the result of the proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted). Defendant “can
make this showing by demonstrating a reasonable probability that had the district
court applied the post-Booker sentencing framework, he would have received a
lesser sentence.” Id.
We do not need to address the prejudice prong under Olano because, in any
event, Defendant cannot meet his burden under the fourth prong. See
Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 737. “Under the fourth prong of plain-error review,
a court may exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error only if it seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at
736. “In an instance of non-constitutional error the standard for satisfying the
fourth prong of the plain error test is demanding.” Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1178.
“[F]ailing to correct non-Sixth Amendment Booker error when the defendant has
failed to preserve the error in the district court will rarely be found to [have]
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
21
proceedings.” Sierra-Castillo, 405 F.3d at 941-42; see also Trujillo-Terrazas, 405
F.3d at 820 (calling this a “formidable” standard).
Evidence that would tend to support an exercise of our
discretion under this standard might include, for example: (a) a
sentence increased substantially based on a Booker error; (b) a
showing that the district court would likely impose a significantly
lighter sentence on remand; (c) a substantial lack of evidence to
support the entire sentence the Guidelines required the district court
to impose; (d) a showing that objective consideration of the [18
U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors warrants a departure from the sentence
suggested by the Guidelines; or (e) other evidence peculiar to the
defendant that demonstrates a complete breakdown in the sentencing
process.
United States v. Dowlin, 408 F.3d 647, 669, 671 (10th Cir. 2005) (addressing
both constitutional and non-constitutional Booker error) (internal citations
omitted). Defendant has failed to show that any such circumstances exist in his
case.
Addressing the first, second and fourth circumstances, there is no
indication that the district court’s treating the guidelines as mandatory rather than
advisory substantially increased Defendant’s sentence. Nor is there any
indication that the district court would impose a significantly lighter sentence
were we to remand now for resentencing. Rather, Defendant’s sentence fell
within the applicable guideline range. There “is nothing remarkable about
[Defendant’s] criminal history.” Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d at 820. Nor does
Defendant suggest any “unique circumstances” that might provide the district
22
court with a reason to impose a sentence outside the now advisory guideline
range. United States v. Williams, 403 F.3d 1188, 1200 (10th Cir. 2005). There
is, then, no indication that Defendant’s sentence “is anything but fair and
reasonable.” Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d at 820; see also Gonzalez-Huerta, 403
F.3d at 738-39. He “received a sentence similar to the sentence most similarly
historied defendants in the United States would have received for the crime for
which he was convicted.” Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 743 (Ebel, J.,
concurring).
Addressing the third situation Dowlin mentions, there was no substantial
lack of evidence supporting the “entire sentence the Guidelines required.”
Dowlin, 408 F.3d at 671. In fact, as we previously discussed, Defendant admitted
the quantity of drugs upon which the district court based his Guideline sentence.
Finally, there is no “other evidence peculiar to the defendant that demonstrates a
complete breakdown in the sentencing process.” Id.
For these reasons, therefore, “[c]ore notions of justice would not be
offended if this court declined to notice a sentencing error that had no
[significant] effect on [Defendant’s] sentence.” United States v. Lawrence, 405
F.3d 888, 908 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 739. We
therefore decline to notice the district court’s sentencing error and instead
AFFIRM Defendant’s sentence.
23
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in rejecting Defendant’s plea, did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to give the requested “innocent merchant” jury instruction, provided jury
instructions that adequately covered the issues presented in this case, and did not
commit plain error requiring correction in imposing sentence. Accordingly, we
AFFIRM the judgment and sentence of the district court.
24
No. 03-4201, United States v. Buonocore
Seymour, J., concurring.
I agree with the majority that we must affirm the judgment of the district
court. I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that
there was no Sixth Amendment violation with respect to Mr. Buonocore’s
sentencing. In my view, the district court violated Mr. Buonocore’s Sixth
Amendment rights by mandatorily imposing a sentence based upon the quantity of
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine it found by a preponderance of the evidence. See
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 749 (2005) (noting that defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to have a jury find any fact essential to punishment “is
implicated whenever a judge seeks to impose a sentence that is not solely based
on facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant”) (internal
quotations omitted).
Mr. Buonocore was convicted by a jury of one count of selling ephedrine
and one count of selling pseudoephedrine having reasonable cause to believe that
those chemicals would be used to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). Because the indictment did not allege the weight or purity
of the precursor chemicals, those factual questions were neither presented to the
jury nor found beyond a reasonable doubt.
The presentence report (PSR) calculated Mr. Buonocore’s offense level at
30, reflecting a drug quantity of 36.5 grams of ephedrine and 43.2 grams of
pseudoephedrine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11. Due to a total offense level of 30 and
a criminal history category of I, Mr. Buonocore’s applicable guideline range was
97 to 121 months. See id. at Ch. 5 Pt. A. The government objected to the PSR on
the basis that “2625 grams of Ephedrine seized from [Buonocore’s] home
business during a search warrant after the charged offense” was not included in
the drug quantity calculation as relevant conduct. Aple. Supp. App. at 3. Mr.
Buonocore did not object to the PSR. At sentencing, the district court rejected
the government’s drug quantity argument because Mr. Buonocore legally sold a
large quantity of ephedrine and there was no evidence of unlawful intent with
respect to the 2625 grams. The court then sentenced Mr. Buonocore at the low
end of the guidelines range, to 97 months imprisonment. Aple. Supp. App. at 19.
Mr. Buonocore contends the district court violated his Sixth Amendment
rights by imposing a mandatory sentence based upon the judge-found quantity of
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine involved in his offense. The majority holds that
the district court did not commit constitutional error because the “Defendant
admitted unlawfully distributing those specific amounts during his sentencing.”
Slip op. at 19. In relevant part, the opinion states:
[D]efense counsel, at sentencing, affirmatively asserted that the district
court should only base Defendant’s sentence on the amount of controlled
substances already included in the presentence report’s calculations: “I still
believe that the calculations in the guidelines provided by the probation
2
department are in fact correct, and we object to any attempt to include
[other] amounts.” (Aple. Supp. App. at 6.) Defense counsel further
asserted that “the presentence report preparers are exactly correct.
[Defendant] ought to be punished for what he did. He’s been convicted of
it.” (Id. at 12.) . . . . Because Defendant admitted unlawfully distributing
those amounts, the district court did not violate the Sixth Amendment when
the court used those amounts to calculate Defendant’s sentence. See United
States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 20. Thus, according to the majority, comments made by defense counsel in
the course of a sentencing hearing constitute admissions by the defendant
resulting in a waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights. Because the constitutional
requirements for a valid waiver, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and this
court’s precedent weigh against allowing defense counsel’s admission of facts for
sentencing purposes to constitute an adequate waiver of a defendant’s
constitutional rights, I cannot agree.
A factual admission by a defendant that the government can prove drug
quantity by a preponderance of the evidence, without more, simply does not fulfill
the requirements of a voluntary and knowing waiver of the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment Apprendi rights. 1 Cf. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618
1
It is clear, of course, that a defendant can waive constitutional rights,
including the bundle of Sixth Amendment rights referred to as Apprendi rights.
United States v. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2541 (2004) (“nothing prevents a
defendant from waiving his Apprendi rights . . . [i]f appropriate waivers are
procured”). Accordingly, a valid waiver of Apprendi rights would allow a
sentencing court to make a factual determination that may result in a defendant
(continued...)
3
(1998) (“A plea of guilty is constitutionally valid only to the extent it is
‘voluntary’ and ‘intelligent.’”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938).
For nearly 70 years Johnson has provided that “‘courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and that we ‘do
not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ A waiver is
ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege.” Id. at 464 (citations omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently
reiterated this point and distinguished waiver from mere forfeiture:
Waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to
make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the “intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right” . . . . Although in theory
it could be argued that “[i]f the question was not presented to the trial court
no error was committed by the trial court, hence there is nothing to
review”. . . this is not the theory that Rule 52(b) adopts. If a legal rule was
violated during the district court proceedings, and if the defendant did not
waive the rule, then there has been an “error” within the meaning of Rule
52(b) despite the absence of a timely objection.
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-34 (1993) (internal citations omitted).
The Court’s example of a valid “waiver” was “a defendant who knowingly and
voluntarily pleads guilty in conformity with the requirements of Rule 11.” Id. at
733. Thus, it is difficult to understand how the majority can hold that a
defendant’s simple admission of facts not included in his guilty plea can serve as
1
(...continued)
receiving a sentence beyond the relevant statutory maximum sentence that the
guilty plea itself supports. Cf. United States v. Green, 405 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir.
2005); United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004).
4
a knowing and voluntary waiver of the constitutional right to trial by jury and a
finding of those facts beyond a reasonable doubt, which then allows a court to
increase the relevant statutory maximum sentence pursuant to Booker.
The Supreme Court has clearly held that “‘[p]resuming waiver from a silent
record is impermissible.’” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (quoting
Carnely v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962)). A simple admission does not
“speak” to whether the person has knowingly and voluntarily waived his
constitutional rights. Cf. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43. This is all the more true
when the admission was by defense counsel, was arguably made strategically to
avoid the government’s assertion of a larger drug quantity, and was made before
defendant or counsel was aware of the Sixth Amendment rights established in
Booker.
“[B]ecause a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal
criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an
understanding of the law in relation to the facts.” McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459, 466 (1969); see also United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989).
The trial “judge must determine ‘that the conduct which the defendant admits
constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an offense
included therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty.’” McCarthy, 394 U.S.
at 467 (quoting F ED . R. C RIM . P. 11, Notes of Advisory Committee on Criminal
5
Rules (1966)); see Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 38 (1995); Boykin, 395
U.S. at 242-43. A “plea of guilty is more than an admission of conduct; it is a
conviction.” Id. at 242 (emphasis added) (citing Woodward v. State, 171 So. 2d
462, 469 (Ala. 1965)).
Accordingly, absent a sufficient waiver, we should not treat a defendant’s
(and particularly defense counsel’s) admission of facts at sentencing like the
“admission” of facts required to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt referred to
in Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756. Cf. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43; McCarthy, 394 U.S.
at 466. In the circumstances here, defendant was not aware of his rights to a jury
trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to the facts that increased
the relevant statutory maximum sentence attributable to his conduct. Cf. Johnson,
304 U.S. at 465-67. Nor, unlike the defendants in United States v. Hahn, 359
F.3d 1315, 1317 (10th Cir. 2004), and United States v. Green, 405 F.3d 1180,
1189 (10th Cir. 2005), was he intending a general waiver of constitutional rights.
See United States v. Bass, 04-6049, slip op. at 11 n.7 (10th Cir. 2005).
Rule 11(b) clearly outlines the proper method for receiving a defendant’s
waiver of rights during a guilty plea. F ED . R. C RIM . P. 11(b). The rule includes a
plethora of constitutional and statutory rights that a sentencing court must
address. Id. As a matter of practice, no federal judge would take a guilty plea
based solely on a defendant’s factual admissions, McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 463-64,
6
because a mere admission of facts is insufficient. See F ED . R. C RIM . P. 11(b); cf.
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465. Before taking a plea, and by conducting a colloquy
pursuant to Rule 11(b), sentencing judges ensure that a defendant knows and
understands his constitutional and statutory rights, and knowingly and voluntarily
waives such rights. See F ED . R. C RIM . P. 11(b). The fact that Rule 11(b) requires
a sentencing court to personally address the defendant and ensure he knows what
rights are being waived and that the waiver is voluntary underscores that an
admission of facts by defense counsel cannot be used against a defendant to
increase the relevant statutory maximum sentence.
One more point is worthy of discussion. The majority cites only one case
to support its position that defense counsel commentary at sentencing constitutes
an admission and, thus, a waiver of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. See
slip op. at 20 (citing United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir.
2005)). In Shelton, the defendant contended the district court erred when it
enhanced his sentence based on a judicial fact-finding of drug quantity. Id. at
1329. The Eleventh Circuit held that Shelton suffered no Sixth Amendment error
because he “admitted to part of [his] drug quantity in his plea colloquy and to the
rest . . . at sentencing.” Id. at 1330. He also failed to object to the factual
statements about his relevant conduct in the PSR. Id.
Shelton’s holding addressing factual admissions made by a defendant under
7
oath at a plea colloquy is inapposite. For reasons detailed above, admissions
provided during a plea colloquy conducted pursuant to constitutional and Rule 11
safeguards are easily distinguishable from simple admissions made by a defendant
or his defense counsel at sentencing. With respect to Shelton’s holding that the
failure to object to facts asserted in the PSR constitutes waiver, this court has
rejected that rule. Indeed, the panel’s reliance on Shelton’s failure to object rule
is completely contrary to our decisions in United States v. Dowlin, 408 F.3d 647,
670 & n.10 (10th Cir. 2005) (failure to object to relevant loss amount as stated in
PSR and failure to object to district court’s fact findings as to loss amount does
not waive constitutional Booker error), and Bass, 04-6049, slip op. at 11 n.7,
which expressly holds that failure to object to the PSR does not constitute waiver
of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights:
Prior to Booker, we regularly held that the “[f]ailure to object to a fact in a
presentence report, or failure to object at the [sentencing] hearing, acts as
an admission of fact.” United States v. Deninno, 29 F.3d 572, 580 (10th
Cir. 1994). Whatever the remaining validity of this precedent may be, we
are unwilling to conclude that Bass’ failure to object operated as an
“admission of fact” for purposes of the rights announced in Booker. In
other words, we are unwilling to say that Bass’ failure to object resulted in
a waiver of the Sixth Amendment requirement to “prove[] to a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt” that he was involved in trafficking of child
pornography. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756. See generally United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (noting that a waiver involves the
intentional relinquishment of a known right); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938) (noting that, in order for a waiver to be valid, the party
who “waives” must have some degree of personal awareness of what is
being relinquished, and the relinquishment must be a matter of personal
choice). In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that this case is
8
distinguishable from United States v. Green, 405 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir.
2005), and United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004), where
we held that the decisions in Booker and Blakely did not render unknowing
or involuntary the defendants’ prior voluntary waivers of their appellate
rights. More specifically, defendant Bass simply failed to object to a
factual allegation in a presentence report, whereas the defendants in Green
and Hahn, as part of their respective plea agreements, signaled their intent
generally to waive their constitutional rights, including the right to appeal
their sentences.
Id.
For the aforementioned reasons, it is my view that other than the fact of a
prior conviction, a defendant’s (and surely a defense counsel’s) admission of facts
outside the guilty plea context or outside the context of a formal stipulation
cannot function as a waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights and does not permit an
increase in the relevant statutory maximum sentence within the meaning of
Booker. The Supreme Court said as much in both Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004):
. . . nothing prevents a defendant from waiving his Apprendi rights. When
a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial sentence
enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts
or consents to judicial factfinding. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488; Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968). If appropriate waivers are
procured, States may continue to offer judicial factfinding as a matter of
course to all defendants who plead guilty. Even a defendant who stands
trial may consent to judicial factfinding as to sentence enhancements.
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2541. Indeed, in explaining its decision in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), which excepts prior
convictions from the rule of Apprendi, the Court stated:
9
Because Almendarez-Torres had admitted the three earlier convictions for
aggravated felonies – all of which had been entered pursuant to
proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards of their own – no
question concerning the right to a jury trial or the standard of proof that
would apply to a contested issue of fact was before the Court.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488 (emphasis in original).
The Court has made it clear that a defendant’s simple admissions proffered
in the absence of “proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards” may
constitute evidence, even overwhelming evidence, in support of a sentencing
enhancement, but they do not constitute an “admission” for Booker purposes.
Where a defendant suffers a Sixth Amendment error but he has admitted facts that
overwhelmingly support a particular enhancement, he will surely lose under the
fourth prong of our traditional plain error analysis. United States v. Cotton, 535
U.S. 625, 634 (2002) (suggesting that correcting plain error when confronted with
overwhelming evidence of guilt would harm rather than further fairness and
integrity of judicial system); see also Dowlin, 408 F.3d at 672 (declining to
correct Sixth Amendment Booker error under fourth prong of plain error analysis
where defendant did not object to facts on which her sentence was enhanced,
record contained ample evidence supporting sentence imposed, and she did not
identify mitigating evidence district court did not consider at sentencing which
might justify lower sentence). In my judgment, however, there is no reason to
hold a defendant has waived his constitutional rights by admitting, outside the
10
context of a formal guilty plea, sentencing facts that were required only to be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence, facts we now know constitute
elements of the crime which will increase the relevant statutory maximum
sentence and must therefore be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This is even
more the case where, as here, it was defense counsel’s admissions that triggered
the enhancement.
As previously noted, because Mr. Buonocore did not raise his Sixth
Amendment argument in the district court, I would review his claim for plain
error. F ED . R. C RIM . P. 52(b); see also United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147,
1174 (10th Cir. 2005). To establish plain error, Mr. Buonocore must demonstrate
there was (1) error (2) that is plain and (3) that affected his substantial rights.
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002); United States v. Gonzalez-
Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 2005). If he satisfies his burden of
establishing the first three prongs of the plain error test, we may exercise our
discretion to correct the error if it “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S.
461, 469-70 (1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993));
Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 732. We conduct plain error analysis “less rigidly
when reviewing a potential constitutional error.” Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1174
(quoting United States v. James, 257 F.3d 1173, 1182 (10th Cir. 2001)).
11
It is well established that constitutional Booker error satisfies the first two
criteria for plain error review. I turn, then, to the third and fourth. An error that
violates a defendant’s substantial rights “must have been prejudicial: It must have
affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). Mr. Buonocore bears the burden of establishing
prejudice because he failed to raise the issue below. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d
at 733. He must show “a reasonable probability that, but for [the error], the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Dominguez
Benitez, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2339 (2004).
In a case involving constitutional Booker error, we have held that a
defendant may satisfy his burden under the third prong in at least two ways:
First, if the defendant shows a reasonable probability that a jury applying a
reasonable doubt standard would not have found the same material facts
that a judge found by a preponderance of the evidence, then the defendant
successfully demonstrates that the error below affected his substantial
rights . . . . Second, a defendant may show that the district court’s error
affected his substantial rights by demonstrating a reasonable probability
that, under the specific facts of his case as analyzed under the sentencing
factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court judge would reasonably
impose a sentence outside the Guideline range.
Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1175 (footnote omitted). Before the district court, Mr.
Buonocore did not introduce any affirmative evidence which would have
supported either of these contentions. Indeed, at sentencing, his predominant
argument was that the district court should only base his sentence on the amount
12
of controlled substances already included in the presentence report’s calculations.
Defense counsel stated, “I still believe that the calculations in the guidelines
provided by the probation department are in fact correct, and we object to any
attempt to include [other] amounts . . . .” Aple. Supp. App. at 6. He further
conceded that “the presentence preparers are exactly correct. [Defendant] ought
to be punished for that which he did. He’s been convicted of it.” Id. at 12. I see
nothing to indicate a jury would not have found the drug quantity beyond a
reasonable doubt. In addition, Mr. Buonocore points to nothing in the record
indicating that the district court would reasonably impose a sentence outside the
guideline range. I therefore conclude that judicial fact-finding of the precursor
quantities did not affect Mr. Buonocore’s substantial rights under the third prong
of the plain error test.
Even assuming Mr. Buonocore could show the sentencing error affected his
substantial rights, he has not met his “burden of persuading us that the error
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings,” United States v. Mozee, 405 F.3d 1082, 1091 (10th Cir. 2005), thus
failing to satisfy the fourth prong of plain error review. In the context of a
constitutional Booker error, “the question before us is whether a reversal and
remand for resentencing by the district court under a discretionary guidelines
regime would advance the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the courts.”
13
Id. It cannot be said that sentencing a defendant in accordance with a guideline
range he conceded was based on a properly calculated amount of pseudoephedrine
and ephedrine would undermine the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the
courts. Therefore, while I disagree with the majority’s Sixth Amendment
analysis, I would nevertheless affirm.
14
United States v. Buonocore
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2005-07-18
Citations: 416 F.3d 1124
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