concurring.
I fully concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to express my belief that our Circuit’s mootness jurisprudence should be reexamined. In this case, we apply — as we must — two on-point Circuit cases in concluding the appeal is not moot. Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 878-79 (10th Cir.2001); Utah Animal Rights Coalition v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1257-58 (10th Cir.2004). But the conduct complained of here has long ceased: the statute has been removed; there is no threat of its return; no one is now being offended. Yet this appeal survives by virtue of a request for nominal *1233damages. In Utah Animal Rights Coalition, a panel of the Court debated this very question in two compelling concurring opinions. See 371 F.3d at 1262-1271 (McConnell, J., concurring); 371 F.3d at 1271-1275 (Henry, J., concurring,). I will not repeat those arguments here other than to suggest that federal court jurisdiction should not be exercised in a First Amendment case such as this one where the behavior of the litigants cannot be affected by our resolution of the appeal. I hope the United States Supreme Court or an en banc panel of this Court soon has the opportunity to address this important question.