Circuit Judge, concurring:
I agree with the majority that the district court’s decision to transfer the cross-motions to quash and to compel compliance with the subpoena is reviewable on petition for mandamus. See Hicks v. Duckworth, 856 F.2d 934, 935 (7th Cir.1988) (“The use of mandamus (28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)) to correct an erroneous transfer out of circuit has been approved. It is difficult to see how such an error could be corrected otherwise.”). I also agree that the district erred in transferring the motions to the Eastern District of Arkansas. I stop short, however, of deciding, as does the majority, that a district court lacks authority to order a transfer. Assuming such authority exists, it should be reserved for the extraordinary, complex ease in which the transferee court is plainly better situated to resolve the discovery dispute. This is not that ease. The respondent has made no showing that the reasons cited for quashing the subpoena—that it is overbroad and covers information that is privileged, not relevant to the underlying lawsuit and sought “for improper purposes”—cannot be readily assessed by the district court here as such arguments routinely are. See, e.g., Linder v. Department of Defense, 133 F.3d 17, 24 (D.C.Cir.1998); Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1013-14 (D.C.Cir.1997). In any event, I believe the court abused its discretion in attempting to transfer the motions here without inquiring into the personal jurisdiction of the transferee court over the petitioner, a sine qua non for deciding the discovery motions. See In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268, 1270 (D.C.Cir.1987) (reversing district court order compelling production of companies’ records where Independent Counsel failed to make “the requisite showing” that district court “has personal jurisdic*344tion over each of the companies whose records it seeks”); but cf. EEOC v. National Children’s Center, 98 F.3d 1406, 1410-11 (D.C.Cir.1996) (reversing as “abuse of discretion” district court decision to seal portion of record because court did not “articulate its reasons for electing to seal” and remanding “so that the court can further explain its decision”). I therefore agree with the majority that the district court’s order should be vacated.