concurring in part and concurring in the result:
For the reasons stated in the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 846-47 (4th Cir.1998), as well as those expressed in Part II of Chief Judge Edwards’ opinion and Part III of Judge Rogers’ opinion, we conclude that the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Curfew Act implicates the constitutional rights of children and their parents, and that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of review. For the reasons stated in Part III of the Opinion of the Court, we conclude that the Curfew Act passes that scrutiny, and for the reasons stated in Part IV agree that it is otherwise constitutional as well.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judge TATEL, joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and with whom Circuit Judge WALD joins in Parts II and III, and Circuit Judge GARLAND joins in Part III:
All members of the court agree that a test at least as rigorous as intermediate *553scrutiny would be proper for evaluating burdens on minors’ fundamental right to freedom of movement. To the extent that the court hedges on the breadth of the right to free movement, however, the court mistakenly concludes that the right, if it exists at all, does not protect minors here.1 Were the plurality to define the right without regard to age, inasmuch as the Constitution applies to people of all ages, and consider age only in determining that minors can less successfully resist the interests of the government in their welfare, then it could avoid departing from traditional analysis of fundamental rights and suggesting that adults may lack a right to freedom of movement.
Even when the court assumes that the curfew burdens a fundamental right to movement, it fails to conform its application of intermediate scrutiny to Supreme Court instruction and example demonstrating that the proper judicial role requires attention to the evidence on which the legislature relies in intruding upon a fundamental right. When properly applied, intermediate scrutiny reveals that key elements of the curfew — age and time — are insufficiently tailored to address the problem of juvenile crime and victimization that confronted the legislature. By ignoring evidence that almost half of juvenile crime is committed by persons not covered by the curfew, and that most of that crime occurs at hours not within the curfew, the legislature has failed to demonstrate, on this record, the requisite fit between the problem and the chosen solution.
Enticed by the apparent success of curfews in other cities, the District of Columbia transplanted a Dallas, Texas ordinance without apparent determination that circumstances here warranted exactly the same solution. The Council of the District of Columbia had an accurate understanding that juvenile crime and victimization are serious problems, but, so far as the record shows, no accurate basis for concluding that nocturnal crime in certain public areas by youths under 17 was a sufficiently serious part of this problem to warrant severely limiting the rights of thousands of minors who were neither criminals nor likely victims of crime. The rhetoric supporting the curfew therefore does not fit the reality of what the curfew does. Consequently, the court’s labored effort to construct a rationale for the curfew, attempting to avoid the inconveniences created by flawed and deficient information before the legislature, see, e.g., Op. at 543, eviscerates the distinction between intermediate scrutiny, which requires that justifications for complex, but burdensome, policy choices emanate from the legislature and that burdens be tailored to specific ends, and the less rigorous rational-basis scrutiny, where the court defers to legislative policy choices with far less concern for serious evidentiary defects or loose tailoring.
Accordingly, because the court accords less respect to minors than is constitutionally required, and more deference to the D.C. Council than is constitutionally warranted, I respectfully dissent from its holding that the curfew survives intermediate scrutiny.2
*554I.
A.
Claims invoking fundamental rights have been a source of institutional diffidence for Article III courts, which are reluctant to venture where “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking ... are scarce and open-ended.” Collins v. City of Barker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992). Yet though the terrain may be unchartered, the Constitution’s guarantees of “liberty” and “due process” are entrusted, along with countless others, to independent oversight by the judiciary. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-20, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). Courts must carefully define the contested right, employing sufficient specificity to ground the right in a concrete application and sufficient generality to connect the right to its animating principles. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, -, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2268, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-85, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965).
The parties differ as to how abstractly the court should define the right that plaintiffs invoke. Appellees-plaintiffs assert a broad right, regardless of age, to “freedom of movement,” while appellant-defendant denies that juveniles have a fundamental right “to wander in public places at night without adult supervision.” The United States, as amicus curiae, similarly opposes juveniles’ alleged right “to roam the streets unsupervised” during curfew hours.
The plurality initially vacillates between reviewing a broad and narrow right, but ultimately views this case as raising only a narrow question. The opinion first suggests that plaintiffs invoke a right to “liberty,” Op. at 536, but then proceeds as if this case has nothing to do with whether “Americans” in general have a right to “free movement” because it relates only to juveniles’ claimed right to be free from adult supervision at night. See Op. at 538-39. The plurality seems to assume that the general right to free movement is entirely distinct from a right of (1) minors to (2) unsupervised movement (3) at night. This distinction between the right and a particular manifestation of it is an unhelpful means of weighing a state burden on an asserted liberty interest. Rather, by confronting the broader claim the court can develop meaningful standards to guide its review of the subsidiary claim that is directly at issue.
At first glance, the plurality’s narrow construction of the contested right seems sensible. This country lacks a tradition of tolerance for the nocturnal wanderlust of minors, and the plurality’s recognition of this uncontested fact avoids the more searching analysis that fundamental rights review entails.3 But, on closer inspection, the plurality’s narrow statement of what is at issue relies on a suspect methodology.
First, defining a right as the mirror-image of a particular burden (i.e., the right to do the specific thing that a challenged rule prevents) tips the scales against recognizing the right. Safeguarding the abstract ideals of the Constitution fre*555quently entails protecting conduct that many citizens find deeply offensive. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) (flag burning); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) (wearing jacket with “Fuck the Draft” in courthouse corridor); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) (Ku Klux Klan rally). Hence, rights must be defined in a manner that will protect disfavored conduct while not needlessly constraining legislative and executive discretion. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). By defining minors’ rights in the narrowest sense possible, the plurality separates conduct that is discomforting to many adults from principles that animate due process doctrine. Disfavored conduct will rarely resist state regulation of its own force absent intervention of a more abstract guiding principle. By using the ostensibly neutral process of defining a right to transform a case about freedom of movement into one about nocturnal rambling, the plurality in effect ignores the role that abstract rights play in shaping constitutional discourse.
Second, the plurality’s decision to define the asserted right narrowly confuses the ultimate question of balancing state interests against individual interests with the question of how to define an individual’s interest with sufficient care to ensure that judicial review is not a hollow exercise of deference to conventional wisdom. The plurality has relied on the District of Columbia’s strong defense of the curfew to hold that there is nothing to defend against — that there is no principle against which the curfew need be tested. See Op. at 538-39. The difficult issue in this case involves reconciling two conflicting interests: individual freedom to walk on public streets without fear of police intervention, see, e.g., Gomez v. Turner, 672 F.2d 134, 143 n. 18 (D.C.Cir.1982), and the authority of the state to act in the best interest of minors, see, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-34, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979) (plurality opinion). This issue arises only if one recognizes a right at a sufficient degree of abstraction to connect with precedent in analogous areas. The plurality avoids this question by citing clear governmental interests — controlling the aimless wandering of minors in areas where harm can befall them — to eliminate any possibility that a contrary right may exist. Yet the fact that a state may have good reasons to treat the movement of minors differently from that of adults does not therefore mean that minors lack a right to movement; it means only that the right may in some circumstances be insufficient to overcome a particular burden. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982). Consequently, age should not be an element of the right at issue because the state interests that are relevant at the balancing stage of analysis do not aid the distinct inquiry at the definitional stage.
Third, construing rights narrowly displaces delicate value judgments, but does not avoid them. The admirable aim of narrowly defining a right is to “rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due-process judicial review.” Glucksberg, at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2268. Broadly defined rights are prone to manipulation, and afford courts ample discretion when applying general principles to concrete fact patterns. Rights defined too narrowly, however, suffer from the opposite problem: the more specific the definition of a right, the more its vitality can become a question of judicial preference or unwarranted deference to legislative discretion because the court lacks external standards to guide its analysis. By asking a broader question, such as ‘does a curfew impermissibly interfere with a generally applicable right of movement,’ the court can gain access to standards and precedents to structure and guide its analysis. There may never be an objective answer to a claim involving the balance between individual rights and state interests, cf. Moore *556v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502-03, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plurality opinion), but some ways of framing the claim make the ensuing analysis more principled than others. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541-45, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The plurality’s methodology also obscures another, still deeper, value judgment. Here, the plurality defines the asserted right narrowly; in another case, the court might define a right more broadly, because the plurality does not articulate a standard to guide the process of defining rights. The court’s choice about how abstractly to define a right may easily become influenced by its view of the underlying conduct at issue. Favored conduct will be integrated with similar cases that have protected analogous rights, while disfavored conduct will be relegated to unprotected isolation. Compare Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 595 (D.C.Cir.1983) (recognizing “freedom of a parent and child to maintain, cultivate, and mold their ongoing relationship”) with Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1395 (D.C.Cir.1984) (rejecting right to “homosexual conduct in the Navy”). Although this subjectivity plagues any attempt to find an appropriate level of generality at which to define a right, it is more disconcerting where the court professes to act out of concern for judicial restraint. See Op. at 538.
Fourth, narrowly focusing on the movement rights of minors — as opposed to a right of movement generally — needlessly entangles equal protection and due process analysis by defining a fundamental right with reference to the class of people asserting it. Usually, due process challenges involve generally applicable rights, while equal protection challenges involve burdens that fall disproportionally on classes that share a disfavored trait. Here, appel-lees-plaintiffs have raised both types of claim under the Fifth Amendment. However, because they do not allege that youth is a suspect classification,4 their Fifth Amendment claims turn on the same question: whether the rights at issue are fundamental, such that burdens on minors’ movement warrant heightened judicial scrutiny. Cf. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666-67, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983). The plurality recognizes this overlap, see Op. at 535-36 n.l, but blurs the tests: by incorporating a class component (youth) into the definition of the right, the plurality avoids answering the difficult question of whether youth is an acceptable criteria for narrowing the scope of an otherwise applicable right (i.e., a right that would shield adults from a similar curfew), and instead assumes no rights are applicable.5
*557Finally, the plurality’s reductionist reasoning relies on a methodology that the Supreme Court has repudiated. See Op. at 538. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989), Justice Scalia foreshadowed the court’s approach by suggesting that fundamental rights must be defined at “the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.” Id. at 127 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 2333. Higher “level[s] of generality” were to be avoided. Id. However, only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined this portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion; Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, who joined the remainder of Justice Scalia’s opinion, pointedly refused to concur in his discussion of how to define fundamental rights. See id. at 132, 109 S.Ct. 2333 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, joined by Kennedy, J.). Likewise, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun rejected Justice Scalia’s analysis, noting that it relied on a vision of the Constitution as a “stagnant, archaic, hidebound document steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time long past.” See id. at 141-42, 109 S.Ct. 2333 (Brennan, J., dissenting).6 In the ten years since Michael H. was decided, Justice Scalia’s approach to defining fundamental rights has never garnered a majority on the Supreme Court;7 yet a plurality of this court now embraces it, inviting the subjectivity that the plurality seeks to avoid.
B.
From this analysis it follows that the contested right should be defined more abstractly in two ways: first without regard to age, and second without regard to the manner in which it is exercised. This section discusses the former issue, the next section discusses the latter. In neither section is it necessary to define a “right to liberty,” Op. at 536, but neither is it necessary to disconnect the rights of minors at night from those of citizens in general, see Op. at 539.
The plurality defines a right that is coherent only in cases involving minors, as the age of the claimant is an element of the definition. Apparently, the plurality views freedom of movement as a privilege earned — if at all — by ritual passage into adulthood. Yet “[cjonstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.” Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74, 96 S.Ct. 2831. The question here is whether “fundamental” rights, like “constitutional” rights more generally, apply to minors.8
*558There is no doubt that minors possess rights that are “fundamental,”9 including First Amendment10 and due process rights,11 as well as the right of equal protection to similarly situated children.12 Likewise, minors bear some of the burdens that accompany rights.13 The more difficult question is how to define the scope of these fundamental rights in view of the fact that “[t]he state’s authority over children’s activities is broader than over like actions of adults.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944); see also id. at 169, 64 S.Ct. 438. The Supreme Court has confronted this dilemma in various circumstances, in each case attempting to tailor concepts from adult jurisprudence to fit claims by juveniles. For example, minors “are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection,” Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975), but the “First Amendment rights of minors are not ‘co-extensive with those of adults.’ ” Id. at 214 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 2268 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515, 89 S.Ct. 733 (Stewart, J., concurring)). Similarly, in the due process context, “certain basic constitutional protections enjoyed by adults accused of crimes also apply to juveniles .... But the Constitution does not mandate elimination of all differences in the treatment of juveniles.” Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984); see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971).
The most reasonable reading of these cases is that minors and adults share many fundamental rights, but that the protective force of some of these rights is contracted or diluted when applied to minors. To the extent that a right defines a boundary to state authority, age is generally not a meaningful credential for access to the protected zone, “magically” conferring admission on a given birthday. There may be good reasons for making the boundaries of a right more malleable for minors than adults — states have stronger countervailing interests and minority status renders minors less competent to resist state intervention14 — but not for denying the existence of the right altogether, at least not where minors are capable of exercising the right. Of course, where the rationale for a right raises questions about its suitability *559for minors, minors might not possess the right at all, as opposed to having a less robust version of it. For example, although there is a fundamental right to marriage, see, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), it might not apply below a certain relatively mature age. (The age of consent for marriage in the District of Columbia is 16. See D.C.Code § 80-103.) The developmental prerequisites for walking down a public street, however, are substantially lower than for the bundle of rights and responsibilities that attend marriage.
In a relative sense, a right that is “fundamental” for adults in their relationship with the state is equally fundamental, if not equally forceful, for minors because it defines the few areas of activity warranting especially careful tailoring of intrusive state means to worthy state ends. Minors, like adults, are able to enjoy the fruits of free movement and to chafe under its restriction, and thus there is little reason to link the fundamentality of the right to the age of the claimant. The cases on which the court relies to contract the scope of minors’ rights are inapposite to curfews because they arise in unique contexts, such as challenges to school regulations and disciplinary procedures, involving state interests associated with the educational environment warranting enhanced control over minors’ behavior. See, e.g., Vemonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656, 115 S.Ct. 2886, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995); Hazehvood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266-67, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 681, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977). Just as adults may have more freedom as civilians than as prison inmates or members of the armed forces,15 minors’ rights vary depending on whether they are at home, on the streets, or in school.
The plurality assumes that minors cannot claim a right to be “unsupervised” because they are always in “some form of custody.” Op. at 539. This characterization misses the point. Minors subject to the curfew are by definition unaccompanied by a responsible adult. To say that they are in some metaphysical bond of “custody” begs the question of whose custody they are in, and the extent to which certain personal prerogatives are immune from custodial restraint, at least by a government custodian. At a minimum, unaccompanied minors are not under direct government control, and thus theories of custody announced in a case dealing with incarcerated juvenile delinquents are unhelpful in assessing the burdens imposed by a curfew. See Op. at 539, citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984). The Supreme Court appeared to recognize as much in Prince, which relied on a balancing of state and parental interests rather than an undifferentiated notion of custody to regulate the activities of minors in public streets. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 164-71, 64 S.Ct. 438.16
C.
For the reasons discussed, the conduct at issue should be more generally defined *560to encompass the activity of movement rather than how particular minors engage in it. The plurality’s limited definition of the contested right appears to flow from an unarticulated perception of what minors might be doing while “freely wanderfing] ... at night.” Op. at 539. How minors exercise, and whether they abuse, their right to movement is relevant in weighing the constitutionality of a contrary state burden, but should not be part of the definition of the right itself. Plaintiffs in this case contend that the curfew prevents them from using public streets as a means of conveyance from one place to another. See Complaint ¶ ¶ 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. They do not seek to linger in any one location, or. to access any particular area, such as a park, that the District of Columbia might have a special reason to close. Rather, they protest a blanket restriction on their movement. Whether they plan to “wander” Op. at 539,' — or amble, stroll, sashay, or saunter — is irrelevant; the only question under the Constitution is whether the District’s action burdens a fundamental right to be on and to use public streets. When one chooses to walk, how one does so, where one goes, and what one does once there are factors relevant to reviewing burdens on the right, but not to defining the right itself. Therefore, the question before the court should be defined as whether there is a fundamental right to walk in public without thereby subjecting oneself to police custody; in short, a right to free movement.
II.
A.
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the right to “move” encompasses several distinct concepts. The discrete components include the right to relocate from state to state, the right to cross state borders for purposes other than relocation, the right to cross national borders, and the right to intrastate or localized movement. These rights are “fundamental” under established doctrine.17 As early as the Articles of Confederation, state citizens “possessed the fundamental right, inherent in. citizens of all free governments, peacefully to dwell within the limits of their respective states, to move at will from place to place therein, and to have free ingress thereto and egress therefrom.” United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293, 41 S.Ct. 133, 65 L.Ed. 270 (1920) (emphasis added).
*561To date, however, the Court has not expressly held that there is a fundamental right to intrastate movement, possibly because it has not been seriously contested.18 While most of the cases discussing the “right to travel” or “right to free movement” have involved an interstate or international component, language in the decisions suggests that the right extends to purely local movement, see, e.g., Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855; Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164, 92 S.Ct. 839; Kent, 357 U.S. at 126, 78 S.Ct. 1113; Wheeler, 254 U.S. at 293, 41 S.Ct. 133; Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 255, 84 S.Ct. 1814, 12 L.Ed.2d 822 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring), and at least two circuits have expressly agreed. See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 268 (3d Cir.1990);19 King v. New Rochelle Mun. Housing Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.1971).20 This circuit has also recognized the value of free movement, noting that the ability to “walk the streets, without explanations or formal papers, is surely among the cherished liberties that distinguish this nation from so many others.” Gomez v. Turner, 672 F.2d 134, 143 n. 18 (D.C.Cir.1982); see also Waters v. Barry, 711 F.Supp. 1125, 1134 (D.D.C.1989). Thus, simply being on a public street, without some further incidence of misfeasance, is usually not a crime. Cf. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 96, 86 S.Ct. 211, 15 L.Ed.2d 176 (1965) (Douglas J., concurring).
The importance of intrastate mobility is apparent from its utility and the implications of its denial. As Justice Douglas explained:
Freedom of movement, at home and abroad, is important for job and business opportunities — for cultural, political, and social activities — for all the commingling which gregarious man enjoys. Those with the right of free movement use it at times for mischievous purposes. But that is true of many liberties we enjoy. We nevertheless place our faith in them, and against restraint, knowing that the risk of abusing liberty so as to give rise to punishable conduct is part of the price we pay for this free society.
Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 519-20, 84 S.Ct. 1659 (Douglas, J., concurring). Plaintiffs have asked for nothing more than the “cultural, political, and social ... commingling” that free movement permits. For example, one would like to go to swimming practice, Complaint at ¶ 4, another to ballet performances, id. at ¶ 11, and another to dances and late-night movies, id. at ¶ 16. Viewed in isolation, these activities are of no great constitutional moment; viewed together, they constitute the rhythm of daily life for our city’s youth, and the fruits of a stable pluralist society tolerant of individual liberty. Thus, even if this case raises a purely intrastate question — which is not at all clear21 — precedents recognize a funda*562mental right to walk through public streets without thereby subjecting oneself to police custody.22
B.
The plurality apparently fears that “lightly extend[ing]” the right to movement will require searching review of trivial or incidental impediments to movement that do not bear any relation to the “basic notions” that animate the right. Op. at 538. These concerns are misplaced. As with any right, the right to free movement is not unlimited; reasonable burdens, including those that are “incidental! ] and remote! ]” — are acceptable. Williams, 179 U.S. at 274, 21 S.Ct. 128; see also Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322; Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 177, 99 S.Ct. 471, 58 L.Ed.2d 435 (1978); Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269. Cf. Glucksberg, at - n. 8, 117 S.Ct. at 2282 n. 8 (Souter, J., concurring); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992). For example, the Supreme Court has noted that the government might bar travel to certain regions in emergencies and may constrain the travel options of certain classes of citizens, such as felons. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965); Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. at 420, 101 S.Ct. 2434. Likewise, regulating conduct in public spaces and legitimate law enforcement objectives, see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), may also justify burdens on free movement. These limits should vitiate the plurality’s concern that recognizing a right to free movement would impair a state’s authority to operate traffic lights. See Op. at 538. The right to free movement does not shield all conduct of which movement is a component, but simply protects an individual from police interference for mere presence, without more, on a public street.
Moreover, the plurality’s preoccupation with incidental burdens is misplaced. Whatever else the curfew might be, it is not an incidental burden. The curfew does not cover a few specifically identified people, it covers a class of thousands; it does not apply to a few discrete areas, but to an entire city; it does not constrain specific types of movement, but with few exceptions bars all movement in public; it is not confined to a brief period, but extends for roughly 25% of the day. In short, the imagined consequences of recognizing the proposed right are inapposite, exaggerated, and can be addressed by settled doctrine.
III.
Having concluded in Part II that the curfew burdens a fundamental right, I join *563the court in holding, as has the Fourth Circuit, see Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir.1998), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 1252, 143 L.Ed.2d 349 (1999), that the appropriate standard of review is intermediate scrutiny. See Op. at 541; see also Hutchins, 144 F.3d at 809-10 (opinion of Rogers, J.).23
Fifth Amendment substantive due process and equal protection scrutiny is generally two-tiered: strict scrutiny applies to burdens on fundamental rights, while rational basis scrutiny applies to burdens on rights that do not qualify as fundamental. See, e.g., Glucksberg, at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2271; Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993). Under either standard, courts must determine whether the state’s interest in imposing a challenged burden is sufficiently weighty, and whether the state’s means are sufficiently tailored to its ends. Strict scrutiny demands narrow tailoring to a compelling interest, see Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993), while rational basis review demands a rational relationship to a legitimate interest. See Ohio Bureau of Employment Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 489, 97 S.Ct. 1898, 52 L.Ed.2d 513 (1977). Between these poles lies intermediate scrutiny, which allows more refined analysis than usually-fatal strict scrutiny and rarely-fatal rational basis review. To satisfy intermediate scrutiny, a burden must be substantially related to an important interest. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996). As explained in Part IV, this standard is flexible enough to respect state regulatory prerogatives while exacting enough to protect individual rights from unnecessary encroachment.
Nothing inherent in the definition of a fundamental right requires that “strict scrutiny” apply here. While burdens on fundamental rights trigger the most exacting review available, which as to adults is strict scrutiny, it is possible for a less stringent standard to be the most exacting available for minors. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977) (plurality opinion). Even though there is a formalistic allure to treating all fundamental rights alike, and therefore applying strict scrutiny to lawys regulating minors as well as adults, to do so would ignore the real, and legally accepted, differences between minors and adults. As noted in Part I, minors and adults share basic rights, but these rights have less force when used by minors as shields against regulation. Unduly intrusive judicial scrutiny of laws burdening minors would fail to respect the relative amenability of minors to regulation and would demand too much justification from government in an area in which it frequently must act. Cf. Burdick v. Takushy 504 U.S. 428, 433-34, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992). Given that the force of the right to movement varies with the status of the people asserting it, the standard of review must be sensitive to the context in which it is applied. As Justice Frankfurter cautioned, “[ljegal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a State’s duty towards children,” May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
When a minor’s fundamental right to movement is at issue, intermediate rather than strict scrutiny is most appropriate.24 *564The essence of intermediate scrutiny, as distinct from rational basis review, is that the government must tailor its burden to relatively specific and important ends and justify incidents of the law that exceed or depart from those ends. Tailoring is particularly important when the rights of minors are at stake, inasmuch as substantial discrepancies between the treatment of adults and minors have often turned on unsubstantiated assumptions rather than persuasive evidence. The Supreme Court’s opinion in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), which invalidated procedures in juvenile courts that vastly differed from procedures in adult courts, is instructive. In Gault, the Court recognized the state’s special interest in providing informal justice for juveniles, but was concerned by the magnitude of the ‘reforms’ that states adopted in pursuit of this interest, stating that “[s]o wide a gulf between the State’s treatment of the adult and of the child requires a bridge sturdier than mere verbiage, and reasons more persuasive than cliche can provide.” Id. at 29-30, 87 S.Ct. 1428; see also id. at 21-22, 87 S.Ct. 1428. The Gault holding reflects judicial concern for ensuring a reasonable “fit” between legitimate state ends and the means adopted to advance them in cases predicated on distinctions between juveniles and adults. Such scrutiny ensures that regulations that disproportionately burden juveniles are well-considered and not merely well-intentioned.
IV.
Some juvenile curfews may survive intermediate scrutiny, but the present curfew does not. The curfew has legitimate ends, but the D.C. Council inadequately tailored its means to these ends in light of the severe burdens that the curfew imposes on minors’ fundamental rights.
To survive intermediate scrutiny, statutory burdens must be substantially related to an important government interest. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 100 L.Ed.2d 465 (1988); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724, 102 S.Ct. 3331. Review under this standard is far from “toothless,” Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976), and this court has given it meaningful bite. See Lamprecht v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 958 F.2d 382, 391-98 (D.C.Cir.1992) (per Thomas, Circuit Justice). The standard places duties on both legislatures and courts: legislative analysis must be “reasoned,” and judicial analysis must be “searching.” Hogan, 458 U.S. at 726, 728, 102 S.Ct. 3331. Only burdens that demonstrate a reasonable fit — or “congruen[cej” — with their benefits may withstand scrutiny. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Commnications Com’n, 520 U.S. 180, 215, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997); Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989). A legislature seeking to protect minors need not produce “scientifically certain criteria of legislation,” Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 643, 88 S.Ct. 1274 (citation omitted), but neither can it rest on unsubstantiated speculation. See, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S.. at 29-30, 87 S.Ct. 1428. Or as this circuit has put it, “[a]ny ‘predictive judgments’ concerning group behavior and the differences in behavior among different groups must at the very least be sustained by meaningful evidence.” Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 393.
The curfew clearly satisfies the “important interest” requirement of intermediate scrutiny. The curfew seeks to reduce crime by and against minors, and to assist parents and guardians “in carrying out their responsibility to exercise reasonable *565supervision of minors.” D.C.Code § 6-2181(e)(l)(3). Each is a laudable goal. See, e.g., Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 444, 110 S.Ct. 2926; Schall, 467 U.S. at 264, 104 S.Ct. 2403; Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (plurality opinion). As the court notes, the D.C. Council was presented with a wealth of evidence of the seriousness of the juvenile crime problem in the District of Columbia. See Op. at 542. The difficulty, however, lies in the D.C. Council’s conclusion that these ends warrant the particular burdens that the curfew imposes on minors. There are many ways to reduce juvenile crime and victimization and to strengthen family units, some of which are more extreme than others. The question here is whether the curfew is too extreme given the evidence considered by the D.C. Council before adopting it. Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229 n. 25, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982).
The curfew has three essential elements: it operates on a defined class in defined places at defined times. The District government defends each definition with statistical evidence cataloging a severe epidemic of juvenile crime and victimization. While juveniles are the source of and victims of an intolerably large volume of crime in the District, examination of the record reveals that the evidence does not fit the definitions that the D.C. Council crafted. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976).
First, the evidence upon which the D.C. Council relied is too broad because it documents a problem that the curfew does not address. The curfew applies only to persons under 17, but the statistics include crimes by youths as old as 17 and victimization of youths as old as 19.25 See 942 F.Supp. at 675; Annie E. Casey Foundation, Kids Count Data Book: State Profiles of Child Well-Being at 49 (1995). This statistical anomaly is more than technical because approximately 42% of all juvenile referrals in the District of Columbia courts from 1990-1994 involved youths over age 16.26 Relying on data that includes youths aged 17 therefore significantly overstates the problem that a curfew limited to those under 17 can solve. The District government is of course free to limit a curfew to whatever ages it deems appropriate, but it may justify the curfew only with data that is relevant to the targeted ages. Here the District has not explained why the curfew targets substantially less crime and victimization than outlined in the data offered to support it, and the court accordingly has no basis for deferring to the legislature’s decision to impose a curfew that excludes minors seventeen and older while burdening minors under seventeen.
Second, the evidence on which the D.C. Council relied is also too narrow because it does not indicate when juvenile crime and victimization occur.27 Such information is *566critical to assessing a curfew, which does not directly affect crime outside of curfew hours.28 Again, this evidentiary defect is more than merely technical because uncontested evidence indicates that, nationwide, juvenile victimization is most prevalent during after-school hours at around 3-4 p.m.,29 and FBI statistics show that violent juvenile crime peaks in the mid- to late-afternoon.30 The D.C. Council has discretion to address only part of a larger problem, and therefore may enact a curfew even if it will not solve all juvenile crime. Cf. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). However, before burdening a fundamental right, the legislature must have a clear picture of the problem it is addressing. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 200-04, 97 S.Ct. 451.31 Intermediate scrutiny, by contrast with rational basis review, requires that a legislature pay more attention to detail than the record indicates was expended in the instant case; otherwise, a court cannot determine if an ordinance is appropriately tailored to the details it addresses. See Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164, 174 (3d Cir.1997) (in banc). Here, the D.C. Council had ample evidence of a general juvenile crime problem, but far too little evidence describing the specific problem that it chose to address in an extraordinarily burdensome way.
The weakness of the evidence that the D.C. Council did consider is particularly troubling in light of evidence it did not consider. As the district court noted, the D.C. Council ignored evidence showing that more than 90% of all juveniles do not commit any crimes, at night or otherwise. See 942 F.Supp. at 676. The curfew thus burdens a far larger class of minors than are responsible for crime or at risk because of it. If the D.C. Council had decided that the benefits of the curfew for a subset of the affected class (or the public in general) were worth the costs to the entire class, the court might properly defer to legislative discretion. But because there is virtually no record to indicate that the D.C. Council assessed the extent to which the affected class was responsible for or at risk from the targeted activities, and whether the targeted ages and hours were a significant component of the perceived problem, the foundation for deference evaporates. This view is consistent with the purpose of intermediate scrutiny, which does not require the least restrictive means necessary to satisfy important governmental interests, but does result in judicial invalidation of laws that burden “substantially” more rights than necessary. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989); cf. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 17-18, 103 S.Ct. 2199, 76 L.Ed.2d 372 (1983); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228-29, 102 S.Ct. 2382.
If the curfew did not burden fundamental rights, these evidentiary defects would not warrant judicial intervention under rational basis scrutiny. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124, 98 S.Ct. 2207, 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978) (citations omitted). Unlike an administrative agency, which generally must explain the basis for the rules it promulgates, see 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); Securities & Exch. *567Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943), legislatures need not offer express rationales for statutes, and courts rarely scrutinize the legislative process to determine if adequate evidence justifies its work product. Cf. Turner Broad. Sys., 520 U.S. at 195—96, 117 S.Ct. 1174. But when legislation substantially burdens a fundamental right or relies on a disfavored class distinction, judicial scrutiny intensifies to examine the need for and scope of challenged statutes. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 101 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 1549, 71 L.Ed.2d 770 (1982); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771-72, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 52 L.Ed.2d 31 (1977); Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 391-92 (per Thomas, Circuit Justice). In such cases, the state cannot rely on its lawyers to sift through the record and cobble evi-dentiary shards into a posthoc rationalization. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 200 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 451; cf. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 149, 106 S.Ct. 2440, 91 L.Ed.2d 110 (1986); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 338 n. 20, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979). Rather, for a legislative judgment to warrant judicial deference, there must be a contemporaneous factual foundation from which the court can conclude that there is a close nexus between the burden on fundamental rights and the important state interest. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 666, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (plurality opinion). The importance of the District of Columbia’s interest is evident, but the congruence between the particular curfew it enacted and that interest is only minimally developed.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly demonstrated that, under intermediate scrutiny, it will not tolerate a severe burden on a fundamental right simply because a legislature has concluded that the law is necessary. Rather, the Court has independently examined the evidence before the legislature to determine whether an adequate foundation justified the challenged burdens. For example, in Craig, the Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma legislature lacked an adequate basis for permitting women to consume low-alcohol beer at a younger age then men.32 See 429 U.S. at 204, 97 S.Ct. 451. The Court recognized that the state had legitimate interests in traffic safety and public health, see id. at 199-200, 97 S.Ct. 451, but found that the gender distinction did not “closely serve[]” these interests. Id. at 200, 97 S.Ct. 451. Although the state proffered statistics showing that young men were more likely than women to be arrested or injured in alcohol-related traffic incidents, the Court questioned the accuracy of these statistics and closely scrutinized the numerical correlations on which the state relied, concluding that the data provided an “unduly tenuous ‘fit.’ ” Id. at 201, 97 S.Ct. 451. Likewise, the Court noted that the data did not address the “salient” characteristics of the challenged burden because it did not expressly relate sex, age, and consumption of the specific type of alcohol at issue. See id. at 202-03, 97 S.Ct. 451. The looseness of these statistics is disturbingly parallel to the eviden-*568tiary shortcomings in the instant case because the present record lacks evidence of a connection between the salient characteristics of age, time, and violence.
As in Craig, a plurality of the Supreme Court in Turner Broadcasting refused to accept that interests which in the “abstract” were important could “in fact” justify a particular burden. 512 U.S. at 664, 114 S.Ct. 2445. In Turner, where the Supreme Court was asked to affirm a decision by Congress to require cable operators to carry local broadcast signals, the Court recognized that Congress was entitled to “substantial deference,” but refused to uphold the statute because the record provided insufficient evidence of a “genuine” problem creating a “need” for the particular burdens that Congress imposed. Id. at 665, 114 S.Ct. 2445. Rather than rely on legislative “findings,” the Court remanded for further development of facts sufficient to permit the judiciary to fulfill its “obligation to exercise independent judgment” and test Congress’s inferences against the record. Id. at 666, 114 S.Ct. 2445. The Court also rejected statistics proffered by the government because they were either too general or failed to address the salient features of the regulations. For example, statistics showing that the programming rules would prevent broadcasters from being dropped from cable systems were unhelpful because they did not explain what the consequence of such action would be, and whether there was a “serious risk of financial difficulty” for broadcasters absent the regulation. Id. at 667, 114 S.Ct. 2445. Likewise, the Court faulted the “paucity” of evidence describing the precise burdens that the statute imposed on cable operators because the absence of such evidence precluded the court from determining whether the burdens were substantially broader than necessary to achieve Congress’s goals. See id. at 667-68, 114 S.Ct. 2445. This evidentiary failure is similar to the problem in the instant case: this court lacks sufficient evidence to determine whether the curfew restrains too many minors in too severe a manner in light of the volume of crime for which minors of the targeted ages are responsible during the targeted hours.
This court has been similarly vigilant when applying intermediate scrutiny. In Lamprecht, the court, writing through Circuit Justice Thomas, reviewed gender preferences within the FCC’s scheme for licencing radio stations. Recognizing that it must defer to the policy judgments of Congress and the FCC, the court nevertheless demanded “meaningful evidence” of a link between the rule and an important purpose. 958 F.2d at 393. It then went on to dissect the statistics supporting the gender distinction, concluding that awarding women licences solely on the basis of gender did not advance the goal of. programming diversity because, among other reasons, stations owned primarily by women were only 1.25 times more likely to broadcast “women’s programming” than stations owned by men. See id. at 397. The court concluded that this correlation, and similar evidence, was an insufficient predicate to survive intermediate scrutiny. See id. at 398.
Decisions of other circuits affirming curfews do not suggest a contrary methodology, as the curfews under review were founded upon sturdier evidence. In Schleifer, the Fourth Circuit reviewed a curfew enacted by Charlottesville based on specific data documenting a crime problem in that city with reference to the age of offenders, see 159 F.3d at 850, the time of occurrence, see id., and the place of occurrence, see id. at 851. Moreover, the city supplemented evidence of the effects of curfews in other cities with specific analysis relating these studies to local circumstances. See id. at 850. This greater effort at tailoring established the requisite congruence and thus led the Fourth Circuit to conclude that the curfew is “a meaningful step towards solving a real, not *569fanciful problem.” Id. at 849.33 By contrast, there is little basis in the present record on which the court may rely to make the same statement about the D.C. curfew, or to conclude that the curfew is not substantially over-restrictive.
Given the inadequacy of the District’s statistics, all that remains to justify the curfew are bare assumptions about the demographics of crime and conventional political wisdom. Neither is sufficient to justify a sweeping restriction of minors’ fundamental right to movement. See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 664, 114 S.Ct. 2445 (plurality opinion); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975); Gault, 387 U.S. at 29-30, 87 S.Ct. 1428. Cf. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 448-49, 105 S.Ct. 3249. If the legislature wants to solve pressing problems by carving exceptions to fundamental rights, intermediate scrutiny requires that it use a restrained and delicate blade; here, the D.C. Council sliced broadly with too little regard for available evidence.
Nor can the evidentiary deficiencies be overcome by looking to the experiences of other cities, as the court and the District of Columbia urge. The experience of other cities with law enforcement tools may be relevant and may provide useful information to inform the D.C. Council’s decisions. But this is not the same as saying that the tools used by other cities can be imported without consideration of the characteristics of the two communities. In concluding that the D.C. Council could properly rely on the experiences of New Orleans, San Antonio, and Dallas with juvenile curfews, the court relies on Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52-53, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986), in which the Supreme Court acknowledged that intermediate scrutiny permits one jurisdiction to rely on evidence accumulated by another addressing a similar problem. Compare City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989). Yet under Renton, a city may rely on data collected in another city only “so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.” Renton, 475 U.S. at 52-53, 106 S.Ct. 925. Indeed, Renton and Seattle, the city that had gathered the data on which Renton relied,- chose different remedies to their common problem. See id. at 52, 106 S.Ct. 925. By contrast, the D.C. Council appears to have adopted the Dallas ordinance “wholesale” without attempting to tailor it, save in a few very inconsequential ways, to the District’s circumstances. 942 F.Supp. at 678. The need for substantial tailoring precludes off-the-rack solutions on the scale present here. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 52-53, 106 S.Ct. 925. Thus, while Renton’s, reasoning may be applicable, the D.C. Council failed to establish a fit between local circumstances and the borrowed ordinance and data.34
*570Finally, efficacy can be no substitute for constitutional scrutiny. See Op. at 544. Assuming that the decline in arrests of juveniles during curfew hours demonstrates the curfew’s effectiveness during its brief three-month period of operation, the efficacy of the curfew cannot alone save it from constitutional infirmity.35 The fact that well-enforced nocturnal juvenile curfews reduce crime is hardly surprising; minors cannot readily injure the public when not permitted to mingle with it. But it is equally clear that a nocturnal adult curfew would also reduce crime, as would 'extending the present juvenile curfew to cover the entire day.36 Yet both options would be extreme, and raise the same question as the instant case: whether the severity of the District of Columbia’s remedy is warranted by a substantial relation to an important interest. A court reviewing an adult curfew could not substitute effectiveness as a proxy for constitutional propriety, and this court likewise must look b.eyond any apparent attractiveness of the curfew to determine if it is a constitutionally acceptable exercise of legislative authority.
In a time too-often punctuated by reports of senseless youth violence and untimely death, and of promising lives lost to the sadly familiar vices of the streets, minors are easy targets of ambitious law enforcement measures, as well as well-intentioned government paternalism, and cannot readily defend their rights in political fora. When challenges to legislative reforms are presented, it falls to the courts to ensure that the political branches respect minors’ rights even as they exercise their considerable discretion to assess and promote minors’ best interests in the face of pervasive threats. See, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. at 21-22, 87 S.Ct. 1428. The court appropriately concludes that intermediate scrutiny best serves this important but limited judicial role of protecting fundamental rights while deferring to delicate legislative judgments. Applying such scrutiny to the record at hand, the court falters, however, attempting to finesse the congruence required by intermediate scrutiny. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent, concluding that in the absence of a record warranting deference the curfew does not survive the heightened scrutiny that accompanies the burdens it places on minors’ right to free movement.
. Only four judges of the court expressly state that the curfew does not burden a fundamental right, while Judges Wald and Tatel join me in concluding in Part II that it burdens a fundamental right to movement. Judge Garland, in concurring in Part III of my opinion, agrees that the Curfew Act implicates constitutional rights of minors. Chief Judge Edwards likewise agrees that the curfew implicates significant rights of minors. Judges Ginsburg and Henderson do not reach this question because they would sustain the curfew even under the heightened standard of review that would apply assuming a fundamental right were at stake. In discussing minors' fundamental right of movement in Parts I and II, therefore, I refer to Part 11(A) of Judge Silberman’s opinion as that of a “plurality.” Elsewhere I refer to Judge Sil-berman’s opinion as that of “the court.”
. Specifically, I dissent from Part 11(A) of Judge Silberman’s plurality opinion, which states that the curfew does not implicate a fundamental right to movement; I concur in the conclusion of Part III(A) of the court’s *554opinion holding that intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard for reviewing burdens on minors’ fundamental rights; and I dissent from the court's holding in Part 111(A) that the curfew survives intermediate scrutiny. I do not reach the issues that the court resolves in Parts 11(B), III(B), and IV. See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 144 F.3d 798, 817 (D.C.Cir.1998) (opinion of Rogers, J.).
. While the curfew defines a category of “minor[s],” see D.C.Code § 6-2182(5), this opinion uses "minors,” "juveniles,” and "children” interchangeably. These terms are not precise because the cutoff age for adulthood varies throughout the D.C.Code from under 15, see D.C.Code § 3-301, to under 16, see D.C.Code§§ 16-1021, 22-2011, 24-1101, to under 17, see D.C.Code§ 22-2001, to under 18, see D.C.Code §§ 3-401, 3-441, 16-2301, 21-301, 24-1101, 28:1-103, 31-401, to under 21, see D.C.Code§ 16-2301.
. The Supreme Court has subjected classifications based on old age to rational basis review, see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976), but has not considered classifications based on youth. Whether laws that target the young rather than the elderly would warrant a different result under the political process theories on which the Court has relied in this area, see, e.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313, 96 S.Ct. 2562; Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 113-14 & n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938), is a question for another day; while appellees-plaintiffs have advanced a vaguely stated equal protection theory, they have not attempted to define a suspect or quasi-suspect class.
. The Supreme Court has avoided such age-based distinctions in other fundamental rights cases. For example, in abortion cases, the Court has never held that the underlying right is separately defined for adults and juveniles. Instead, the court has weighed state interests against minors’ interests in light of the right at issue. See, e.g., Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 117 S.Ct. 1169, 137 L.Ed.2d 464 (1997); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 110 S.Ct. 2926, 111 L.Ed.2d 344 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 110 S.Ct. 2972, 111 L.Ed.2d 405 (1990); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 101 *557S.Ct. 1164, 67 L.Ed.2d 388 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976). But cf. Reno v. Flores 507 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993); id. at 341, 113 S.Ct. 1439 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
. Neither Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion nor Justice White’s dissenting opinion address Justice Scalia’s methodology for defining rights. See 491 U.S. at 132, 138, 109 S.Ct. 2333 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 157, 109 S.Ct. 2333 (White, J., dissenting).
. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). Cf. Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 267-68 (3d Cir.1990).
.Whether such rights apply to all minors of any age is irrelevant because the curfew applies to all minors under 17, and thus presents no occasion to distinguish among age groups or speculate about when a particular age cutoff might warrant additional deference. In discussing rights burdened, by a curfew, there is no reason to become distracted by the claims of toddlers. Neither the D.C. Council nor the District of Columbia in the district court indicated that persons of tender ages were part of the problem that the curfew sought to remedy.
. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969); see also Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74, 96 S.Ct. 2831; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).
. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 89 S.Ct. 733; West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943). The plurality cites Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968), for the proposition that minors have narrow First Amendment interests. Op. at 539. However, in Ginsberg the Supreme Court held only that states may use separate standards of obscenity for adults and children to account for the different reactions of minors and adults to similar material. See id. at 637-38, 88 S.Ct. 1274. This holding is hardly surprising because obscenity is not protected speech, see id. at 635, 88 S.Ct. 1274, and obscenity standards focus in part on audience composition and thus may account for the differences between adult and juvenile audiences.
. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-82, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-68, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); Gault, 387 U.S. at 28, 87 S.Ct. 1428.
. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538, 93 S.Ct. 872, 35 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). But see Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993).
. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989).
. See generally Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823-25, 834-35, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988) (plurality opinion).
. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354-55, 100 S.Ct. 594, 62 L.Ed.2d 540 (1980).
. Even if custody were a relevant concept, simply reciting its presence would be insufficient to negate a generally applicable right. Cf. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974) (holding, in the analogous area of prisoners’ rights, that inmates in state custody generally possess rights that are "not inconsistent with ... status as a prisoner or with the legitimate peno-logical objectives of the corrections system.”). Even if minors are in some form of custody, they possess rights not inconsistent with their status as minors or with the legitimate objectives of the custodial entity. The court would therefore need to inquire whether a curfew survives this test.
. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 143 L.Ed.2d 689 (1999); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982); Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418, 101 S.Ct. 2434, 69 L.Ed.2d 118 (1981); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174, 62 S.Ct. 164, 86 L.Ed. 119 (1941); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97 (1908); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274, 21 S.Ct. 128, 45 L.Ed. 186 (1900); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1872); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430, 20 L.Ed. 449 (1870); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180, 19 L.Ed. 357 (1868); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 47, 18 L.Ed. 745 (1867); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492, 12 L.Ed. 702 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting); Cotfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D.Pa.1823) (per Washington, Circuit Justice). Cf. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 39, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting, while discussing "the right of a colored person to use an improved public highway,” that "personal liberty consists, says Blackstone, in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to whatever place one’s own inclination may direct, without restraint, unless by due course of law”) (quotation marks omitted).
. Even the plurality concedes that a “draconian” curfew could implicate a fundamental right, see Op. at 9, avoiding the question of whether the present curfew would be impermissible if applied to adults. If the curfew would fail intermediate scrutiny as applied to adults, then the court has given scant weight to minors' rights; if not, then the court’s conception of fundamental rights is too narrow.
. The Third Circuit held that the “right to move freely about one’s neighborhood or town” was subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, and that such restrictions were reviewable under intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. See Lutz, 899 F.2d at 268-69.
. Cf. Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 255-56, 94 S.Ct. 1076. But cf. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 264, 277, 113 S.Ct. 753, 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993); Wardwell v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of Cincinnati, 529 F.2d 625, 627-28 (6th Cir.1976); Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900, 902-03 (5th Cir.1975).
. The record does not indicate whether the curfew impedes interstate travel, which is likely because numerous residential communities in the District of Columbia abut the Maryland and Virginia borders, and the region shares an integrated mass transit network. The curfew thus prevents young District of Columbia residents from leaving and presumably attempts to bar young Virginia *562and Maryland residents from entering their nation's capítol, with limited exceptions (in the form of "defenses” to the curfew).
. Less clear, however, is the origin of this right, which the Supreme Court has never authoritatively pinpointed, partly because of the differences, and thus potentially distinct origins, among the discrete rights that the Court has addressed. Among the possible sources of the right are the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, see, e.g., Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 505-06, 84 S.Ct. 1659; Kent, 357 U.S. at 125, 78 S.Ct. 1113; Williams, 179 U.S. at 274, 21 S.Ct. 128, the privileges and immunities clauses of Article IV, see, e.g., Saenz, - U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 143 L.Ed.2d 689; Ward, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 430; Paul, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 180; Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52, and the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e.g., Saenz, - U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 143 L.Ed.2d 689; Edwards, 314 U.S. at 178, 62 S.Ct. 164 (Douglas J., concurring); id. at 183-84, 62 S.Ct. 164 (Jackson, J., concurring); Twining, 211 U.S. at 97, 29 S.Ct. 14; Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79, and the dormant commerce clause, see, e.g., Edwards, 314 U.S. at 174, 62 S.Ct. 164. Given the Supreme Court's reluctance to attach the right to movement to a single constitutional provision, see, e.g., Guest, 383 U.S. at 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170; Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. at 418-19, 101 S.Ct. 2434; Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 280 n. 4, 94 S.Ct. 1076 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630, 89 S.Ct. 1322, there is no reason for this court to resolve the debate; rather, it suffices here simply to conclude that the complaint states a claim subject to review under the balancing test generally applied to fundamental rights, most frequently under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.
. Two circuits have applied strict scrutiny to juvenile curfews based on the assumption that a fundamental right was at issue; none has applied rational basis scrutiny. See Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir.1997); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir.1993).
. Intermediate scrutiny emerged from equal protection and First Amendment jurisprudence, but is also appropriate in due process cases. See Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 847; Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994); Moore, 431 U.S. at 499, 97 S.Ct. *5641932 (plurality opinion); cf. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83-84, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). Moreover, the instant due process claim has equal protection overtones because the court in part uses the status of the plaintiffs to determine the scope of their entitlements. Borrowing from equal protection analysis is thus particularly appropriate given the need to tailor adult due process rights to younger claimants.
. Section five of the curfew also applies to seventeen year-olds when operating a motor vehicle. The scope of this motor vehicle curfew is unclear: it applies "after midnight” but has no termination time. If challenged, this omission could prove problematic. See Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir.1976).
. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT tbl. 31 (1994); DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT tbl. 31 (1993); DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT tbl. 29 (1992); DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT tbl. 24 (1991); DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT tbl. 27 (1990).
.The District of Columbia did offer a chart purporting to document crimes by juveniles during curfew hours. The district court found, however, that this chart was "woefully deficient” because it included crimes by minors not covered by the curfew, was "undated ... [and] prepared by an unknown author, under circumstances that are also mysterious,” and contained unreliable information. 942 F.Supp. at 677. For example, the chart suggests that more juvenile crimes were committed during the 6-8 curfew hours than other, more reliable, data show were committed during the entire 24 hour day during the same period. See id. Despite the district court's rejection of this evidence — even after a hearing in which the District of Columbia sought to defend it — the court has decided to credit it. See Op. at 543-44 n.5.
. Given the evidentiary problems as to age and time, I do not address possible deficiencies with regard to where the crime and victimization occur.
. See Deposition of Jeffrey A. Butts.
. See Snyder, Howard. "Time of Day Juveniles are Most Likely to Commit Violent Crime Index Offenses.” Adapted from Sick-mund, M., Snyder, H., Poe-Yamagata, E. Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1997 Update on Violence. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1997. OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book. Available: http: //ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/qa053.html.
.On appeal, the District of Columbia obliquely contends that it has statistics showing a high incidence of crime during curfew hours, but in the district court it conceded that the D.C. Council did not consider such data. See 942 F.Supp. at 676-77; see also Deposition Testimony of Sally B. Weinbrom at 60.
. The court distinguishes Craig because it concerned “the hotly contested and sensitive question as to the differences between men and women,” which the court deems ”[in]comparable” to the instant case where the "[pllaintiffs do not dispute that the difference between adults and minors generally justifies a government’s differential treatment of minors....” Op. at 542-43. Yet the court seems to forget that in this section of its analysis, it has assumed that the curfew burdens a fundamental right, which, given the intrusions by the curfew, renders the curfew “hotly contested and sensitive.” Moreover, the court's attempt to limit the instruction in Craig by reference to the Supreme Court’s statement "that proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause,” 429 U.S. at 203, 97 S.Ct. 451, is no more successful. For, as it admits, the court must still address the plaintiffs' “dispute [about] this particular differential treatment [that] interfered] with their ‘fundamental’ right to free movement.” Op. at 542-43. Craig, as well as other intermediate scrutiny precedent, tells the court how to proceed.
. The opinion of the Fifth Circuit affirming the Dallas curfew likewise suggests that Dallas presented more evidence than the District has presented in the instant case, including statistical data that fit the ages covered by the curfew, the time of offenses, and the places they occurred, see Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493, although the opinion does not provide enough detail to conclude whether the court exercised the scope of review that Craig and other cases demand. It is of some significance, however, that this was the second time that the Fifth Circuit had considered a juvenile curfew, and its opinion indicates that the deficiencies that the court had previously identified in the first curfew had been rectified. See id. at 494.
. In addition, the Renton analogy may be inapt to the extent that curfews present more complex questions, and are thus more in need of tailoring to local peculiarities, than the zoning at issue in Renton. Moreover, Renton involved one city borrowing data from another when it could not have collected any data of its own, in an effort to prevent a problem that had not yet arisen. See 475 U.S. at 44, 50-51, 106 S.Ct. 925. Forcing Renton to develop local data would have been extraordinarily burdensome in an area of law (zoning) over which cities have substantial discretion. In contrast, the District of Columbia had ample opportunities to examine its own local juvenile crime problem in light of local demo*570graphics and available resources. Requiring evidentiary tailoring here would therefore not be inconsistent with the more permissive result in Renton.
. Relying on arrest statistics, see Op. at 544, can be misleading because arrests often do not occur contemporaneously with offenses, and presumably will decline during periods— such as curfew hours — when potential arres-tees are not out in public. For example, the curfew led to fewer arrests of fugitive minors and minors carrying weapons, but this does not mean that the curfew reduced the number of juvenile fugitives or weapons offenders living in the city. Seemingly more relevant in assessing the curfew’s effectiveness would be whether juvenile crime fell during curfew hours, and whether juvenile crime increased during non-curfew hours or after the district court's injunction. Along these lines, it is interesting to note that while juvenile crime fell during the period in which the curfew was in effect, it also appears to have continued to fall significantly even after the district court enjoined enforcement of the curfew. See Jay Matthews, “Lives of D.C. Children Improve, Study finds,” Washington Post, September 3, 1998, Metro section (citing the Fifth Annual D.C. Kids Count report). While this data may not preclude the possibility that the curfew might have precipitated an even greater decline had it remained in force, it does undermine the court's inference that the decline in juvenile crime during the curfew period is attributable to the curfew.
. Extending the D.C. curfew to encompass the entire day (other than school hours) may seem like a fanciful hypothetical, but at oral argument counsel for the United States contended that such' a curfew would survive rational basis scrutiny.