Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON.
PER CURIAM:The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) found, in agreement with the Administrative Law Judge, that the petitioner, Crowley Marine Services (“Crowley”), violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) by refusing to provide the Inland Boatmen’s Union of the Pacific (“IBU” or “Union”) with a copy of an arbitration award involving Crowley Petroleum Transport, Inc. and the Seafarers International Union (“SIU”). See Crowley Marine Services, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. No. 92, at 10, 1999 WL 1046770 (Nov. 10, 1999). The Union had reason to think that the disputed arbitration award addressed the manning of a tanker that replaced a Union-serviced barge; therefore, the award was relevant to the Union’s assessment of how best to protect the interests of their affected bargaining unit members. The Board specifically found that Union representatives believed that the alleged work-syphoning arrangement might be in violation of articles 1, 2 and 38 of its collective bargaining agreement with the petitioner. See id. at 9. The Board therefore ordered Crowley to furnish the Union with a copy of the arbitration award. Crowley argues that the Board’s order is unjustified, because the arbitration award is irrelevant to the Union’s legitimate interests under the NLRA. We reject Crowley’s claim.
There is no doubt that, on the record before us, the Board was fully justified in finding merit in the Union’s request for the information in connection with a possible grievance claim. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that the Union communicated to Crowley that the arbitration award was reasonably relevant to pending and possible future grievance claims. See, e.g., id. at 5 (finding that the Union explained the relevance of its request in written correspondence). As the Board explained, the information was sought and needed “to enable the Union to make an informed judgement [sic] about pursuing [contract grievance] remedies.” Id. at 8. Crowley argues, convincingly, that the record does not support a finding *1297that the requested information should be given to the Union to support future contract negotiations or a possible recognition demand. This is beside the point, however, because the information was properly sought in connection with possible contract grievance claims. Accordingly, the Board did not err in determining that the information sought should have been provided to the Union.
An employer’s duty to bargain in good faith with a labor organization representing its employees has long been acknowledged to include a duty to supply the union with requested information that will enable the union to perform properly its duties as a bargaining representative. This duty “undoubtedly extends to data requested in order properly to administer and police a collective bargaining agreement.” Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local Union v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 358 (D.C.Cir.1983).
Moreover, the Union was not required to show conclusively that the information it sought was technically “relevant” or that its request was based on a meritorious grievance. Rather,
[t]he fact that the information is of probable or potential relevance is sufficient to give rise to an obligation ... to provide it. Under this “discovery-type standard,” NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. at 437, 87 S.Ct. at 568, “ ‘relevant’ is synonymous with ‘germane’ ” and, in the absence of some valid countervailing interest, an employer must disclose information requested by a union as long as that information has a bearing on the bargaining process. Local 13, Detroit Newspaper Printing & Graphic Communications Union v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 271-72 (D.C.Cir.1979).
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 711 F.2d at 359-60 (footnotes omitted).
Under this well-established case law, not much is required to justify a union’s request for information that is related to its bargaining unit representation functions. And the judgment of the Board on this score is entitled to “great deference,” because “[djetermining whether a party has violated its duty to ‘confer in good faith’ ” is “particularly within the expertise of the Board.” Local 13, Detroit Newspaper Printing & Graphic Communications Union, 598 F.2d at 272. Substantial evidence in the record supports the Board’s conclusion that the Union met the required showing that the requested information was related to possible contract grievance claims.
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Crowley’s petition for review is denied, and the Board’s cross-application for enforcement is hereby granted in accordance with this opinion.