(dissenting).
With understandable respect for the effort evident in the court’s opinion, and with full recognition of the closeness of this case, I reluctantly am unable to accept its evaluation of legislative history and its conclusion that the Gaming Act worked an implied repeal of the Settlement Act.
The court, in my view, errs in two respects. First, it invokes a generally applicable principle of statutory interpretation— statutory language, if clear, forecloses recourse to legislative history — in an area where this teaching is not so absolute, i.e., when two federal statutes, literally read, are in tension. Second, when the court deigns to consider the legislative history of the later, supposedly impliedly repealing statute, the Gaming Act, it undervalues it, characterizing it as “carefully selected snippets” that “fail[ ] to establish ... a clearly expressed legislative intention.” Ante pp. 697-698.
The most apposite recent authority of which I am aware is Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981), in which two federal statutes contained irreconcilably different formulae for the distribution of revenues from the lease or sale of minerals from wildlife refuges. The Court acknowledged that the consolidated cases before it “involve[d] two statutes each of which by its literal terms applies to the facts before us.” Id. at 266,101 S.Ct. at 1678. There, as here, the argument was made that the plain language of the later statute controlled and made improper any resort to legislative history.
The Court agreed that the statutory language was the starting point, but stated that “ascertainment of the meaning apparent on the face of a single statute need not end the inquiry ... because the plain meaning rule is ‘rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.’ The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect.” Id. at 265-66, 101 S.Ct. at 1677-78 (citations and footnote omitted).
The Court then stated:
Without depreciating this general rule [that the more recent of two irreconcilably conflicting statutes governs], we decline to read the statutes as being in irreconcilable conflict without seeking to ascertain the actual intent of Congress. Our examination of the legislative history is guided by another maxim: “ ‘repeals by implication are not favored,’ ” Morton v. Mancari, 417 *707U.S. at 549 [94 S.Ct. at 2482], quoting Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 [56 S.Ct. 349, 352, 80 L.Ed. 351] (1936). “The intention of the legislature to repeal must be ‘clear and manifest.’ ” United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 [60 S.Ct. 182, 188, 84 L.Ed. 181] (1939), quoting Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S. 596, 602 [1 S.Ct. 434, 439, 27 L.Ed. 251] (1883). We must read the statutes to give effect to each if we can do so while preserving their sense and purpose. Mancari, supra, [417 U.S.] at 551 [94 S.Ct. at 2483]; see Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 394, 60 S.Ct. 337, 339, 84 L.Ed. 340 (1940).
Watt, 451 U.S. at 266-67, 101 S.Ct. at 1678.
The Court then, despite the absence of any explanation in the legislative history for adding the word “minerals” to the later legislation, after studying “the few legislative materials pertinent,” was persuaded “that Congress intended to work no change in the preexisting framework.” Id. at 267,101 S.Ct. at 1678.
The dissenting three justices argued as does the court in this case, but they did not prevail. So far as I have been able to ascertain, Watt has not been eroded since its issuance.
It seems clear to me, at least, that the legislative history in this record reveals not merely the lack of a “clear and manifest” Congressional intent to repeal, but an affirmative intent that the pre-existing legislation should remain intact. An examination of the history reveals an express explanation, a deliberate, pre-planned colloquy with the floor manager of the legislation (the chairman of the Select Committee on Indian Affairs) as the very first exchange with interested Senators following his introductory presentation.
In his presentation, Senator Inouye referred both to the objective of “determining what patterns of jurisdiction and regulation should govern the conduct of gaming activities on Indian lands” and affirmed the principle “that by virtue of their original tribal sovereignty, tribes reserved certain rights when entering into treaties with the United States, and that today, tribal governments retain all rights that were not expressly relinquished.” 134 Cong.Ree. S12649 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1988).
Immediately at the conclusion of the chairman’s presentation, the following colloquy took place:
Mr. PELL.
Mr. President, I would like to thank the managers of S. 555, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, and particularly the chairman of the Select Committee on Indian Affairs [Mr. Inouye], for their hard work and patience in achieving a consensus on this important measure.
In the interests of clarity, I have asked that language specifically citing the protections of the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act (Public Law 95-395) be stricken from S. 555. I understand that these protections clearly will remain in effect.
Mr. INOUYE.
I thank my colleague, the senior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. Pell], and assure him that the protections of the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act (P.L. 95-395), will remain in effect and that the Narragansett Indian Tribe clearly will remain subject to the civil, criminal, and regulatory laws of the State of Rhode Island.
Mr. CHAFEE.
Mr. President, I too would like to thank the chairman [Mr. Inouye] and members of the Select Committee on Indian Affairs for their cooperation and assistance. The chairman’s statement makes it clear that any high stakes gaming, including bingo, in Rhode Island will remain subject to the civil, criminal, and regulatory laws of our State.
134 Cong.Ree. S12650 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1988).
Following the colloquy other senators made comments or asked questions. A colloquy similar to that quoted above, between Senator Reid and the chairman, established the extent to which an earlier piece of legislation dealing with gambling devices would be altered by the bill under discussion! 134 Cong.Ree. S12650 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1988). Still another exchange concerned the scope *708of actions allowed under a grandfather clause. 134 Cong.Rec. S12651.
Were such responsible and calculated floor exchanges with managers of legislation to be rendered of little or no account, the character of the legislating process would suffer a substantial constriction, and a valued opportunity for clarification, minor correction, and fine tuning would be lost. I do not think the judiciary should be a party to any such result.
Certainly in the instant case, this legislative history supports the conclusion that the Rhode Island Senators thought the implied repeal language unnecessary because they did not believe that the jurisdictional provisions of the Gaming Act applied to the Settlement Act. That this accorded with the intent of the Senate seems equally clear, unless we are to proclaim this traditional kind of colloquy with leadership mere smoke and mirrors.
I think it also worth noting that the colloquy includes a statement by the bill’s sponsor and floor manager, whose remarks usually are afforded substantial weight. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27, 102 S.Ct. 1912, 1920-21, 72 L.Ed.2d 299 (1982); United States v. Mass. Maritime Academy, 762 F.2d 142, 149 (1st Cir.1985).
I add that the colloquy, although clear and to the point, is not the only evidence of Congressional intent. The Senate report also mentions that “nothing in the [Gaming Act] will supersede any specific restriction or specific grant of Federal authority or jurisdiction to a State which may be encompassed in another Federal statute, including the Rhode Island Claims Settlement Act [and the Maine] Indian Claims Settlement Act.” S.Rep. No. 446, 100th Cong.2d Sess. 12 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3082 (citations omitted). While the court concludes that the report, issued before the deletion proposed by Senator Pell, is of no present relevance, I do not think it can so easily be discounted. Rather, it seems to me entirely consistent with the colloquy with the Rhode Island senators.
If, therefore, we assign proper weight to the legislative history, I think it unavoidable that we would have to conclude that the Gaming Act had effected no implied repeal of the Settlement Act. If, of course, the Congress were to feel that an injustice had been done to appellees, it could provide a remedy through supplemental legislation.24
I therefore, with great reluctance, dissent.
. Our circuit similarly has looked to legislative history to help resolve a conflict between a federal and a state statute. In Local Div. 589 v. Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618 (1st Cir.1981), we were asked to determine whether § 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c), preempted a conflicting Massachusetts statute. The text of § 13(c) did not answer this question. Our close examination of the legislative history, however, persuaded us that Congress did not intend for this statute to preempt conflicting Massachusetts law.