(concurring separately) .
I concur in everything that is said in the majority opinion and in the result reached. However, it is my understanding that one of the primary facts which led to the justification of the allowance made was the fact that the applicant had in this particular case rendered services of an unusual value in the distribution of the fund to those to whom it belonged, thereby reducing the cost of distribution and increasing the percentage of the fund distributed to the multitude of individuals entitled to it. It seems to me that the importance of that fact in arriving at the result reached can and should with propriety be given more emphasis.
An allotment could not properly be made to applicant of any part of the residue fund to cover all or a portion of the expenses incurred and paid by applicant in distributing the fund merely and only because those expenses were incurred for that purpose, because applicant was obligated to pay the costs of distribution as one of the usual incidents resulting from the affirmance of the Commission’s order as required by the order of this court. Nor could an allotment of the residue or any part of it be made to applicant merely because it was “dead money”; as .the dissenting opinion characterizes it, because it was not “dead money” in the sense that it did not belong to anyone. The law makes ample provi*905sion for the ownership. But there are more serious reasons why the fact that all of the money impounded was not distributed should not justify giving it to applicant. Always when funds are impounded for years under these circumstances there is a considerable residue remaining, because disbursement cannot be made to many of those primarily entitled to it. If the utility is to understand that if it is unsuccessful in its appeal from an order of the Commission and there is money remaining after efforts to distribute it have been made, that it will be awarded any part of those funds to cover the expenses resulting from that appeal merely because there are such residue funds, then it will thereby be given to understand that it only has either to do a poor job of distribution, or to lend the court’s officials charged with distribution little or no assistance, or even to impede distribution by inefficiency or indifference, thereby creating a residue fund or a larger such fund, and thereby justifying an allowance or a larger allowance for costs and expenses resulting from the appeal. Such a rule would not only place a premium to the utility on inefficient distribution, but would also have a tendency to promote appeals and reviews of orders of the Commission.
I think that it should be definitely understood that it will not be enough to justify an allowance out of a residue fund to apply on expenses of distribution after unsuccessful appeal from an order of the Commission, that the utility show that it has, as the original impounding order required, paid the cost of distribution, that there was a residue fund remaining, and the other facts stated in the majority opinion, but it should also be required to show that it has done more than the impounding order required and has furnished services of a nature and value beyond those necessary to the usual and ordinary compliance with the conditions specified by the court in its impounding order, and that the allowance requested is a fair compensation for the value of the services rendered, beyond, the call of its duty. If that be clearly understood, then the incentive premium will be upon efficient and effective compli-anee with the court’s orders and not upon poor or non-compliance therewith.
The facts in this case justify the result reached under the above-stated principles, hence my concurrence in that result.