(concurring in the result). The question here is whether a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has power to deny renewal of a professional bondsman’s lawfully granted authority upon the basis of an opinion, reached without a hearing, that he lacks the requisite qualifications.1
The .history of this case is essential to understanding the legal problem which it presents. It began on November 18, 1947, when a judge of the District Court considered John W. Carter’s application for authority to engage in the bonding business, found him morally and financially qualified, and granted such authority for a period of two years. Carter then engaged in the business.
• About a month later, on December 19, 1947, the same judge entered an order revoking the authority because he wanted to make further investigation of Carter’s moral fitness. He, and later other judges of the District Court, considered that revocation to be nothing more than a restoration of Carter’s original application to .a pending status. This appears from the fact that on June 8, 1948, the same judge *26was joined by three others in entering an order denying “the application of John W. Carter to' engage in the bonding business in criminal cases in this Court.” The “application” thus denied was not a new one, but was that which had been granted November 18, 1947. The order of denial was based on a report made by the F. B. I. which the judges refused to disclose to Carter. In our decision on appeal,2 we treated the two orders as having revoked the original grant, and set them aside on the ground that keeping the F. B. I. report secret offended against the due process clause.
The judges of the District Court sought certiorari to review our reversal of their revocation orders, but presumably permitted Carter to> function as a bondsman during the brief remainder of the period of his authority. He was told, however, that, regardless of the long suspension, the District Court would regard his authorization as expiring on November 17, 1949, two years after its grant.
Consequently, on that day he filed an application for renewal. He showed that his financial status, which was acceptable before, remained unchanged. He filed affidavits as to> good character, made by the same affiants who had supported his initial application. He also' filed his own affidavit that, during his term, he had abided by the provisions of the statute.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari on December 12, 1949. The next day, without a hearing, a judge of the District Court entered the following order: .
“The application of John W. Carter for renewal of his license to engage in the bonding business in this Court is denied on the ground that in the opinion of the Court he lacks the qualifications for a bondsman.
“The recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals in the case of In the Matter of John W. Carter, decided August 1, 1949, and not yet reported, relates solely to revocation of a license once granted and does not apply to original applications, or to renewals, which are in the administrative discretion of the Court.”
When he so ruled, the judge had nothing before him except the application for renewal and supporting papers and, presumably, the secret F. B. I. report. Carter appeals.
I agree with my brothers Edgerton, Bazelon and Fahy that the District Court’s order should be set aside, but my reasons for reaching that conclusion are quite different from those of Judge Edgerton and Judge Bazelon. They adopt the reasons for reversal recited in the majority opinion of the panel of three judges who first heard this appeal.3 Thus they treat Carter’s request for renewal of his authority as though it were on the same footing as an original application for such authority, but nevertheless say it could not be denied without a due process 'hearing having been first afforded.
I disagree on both points. A bondsman’s application for renewal is on a very different plane than is an original application, as I shall attempt to show hereinafter. If I were convinced that Carter’s status as an applicant for renewal was the same as that of an original applicant, I should vote to affirm, because a mere application confers no property right, and no other federal right of an original applicant is asserted here which would be violated by a denial without a due process hearing.
Judges Edgerton and Bazelon rely upon In re Summers, 1945, 325 U.S. 561, 65 S.Ct. 1307, 89 L.Ed. 1795, which they apparently regard as holding that an application for admission to the bar may not be rejected unless the rejection is based “upon a proceeding which contains the elements of due process of law, i. e., a hearing and revelation of all data upon which a decision is to be based.”4 So they conclude, on the basis of the Summers case, that an original application for authority to’ engage in the bonding business may not *27be rejected except after a due process hearing.5
I do not understand the holding of the Summers opinion to be that which those two of my colleagues find in it. Summers’ application for admission to the Illinois bar was denied by the highest court of the state because he would not, being a conscientious objector, swear to uphold the Illinois constitution, which requires men of his age to serve in the militia in time of war.
The Supreme Court of the United States, recognizing that under the state law the Illinois Supreme Court had acted ministerially, pursuant to judicial power, in rejecting the application, nevertheless took jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution of the United States to determine whether Summers’ constitutionally derived right to the free exercise of religion had been denied or abridged by the rejection of his application. The Court decided that his constitutional right had not been denied or abridged thereby, and so affirmed the Illinois decision. It seems perfectly plain, therefore, that Summers’ assertion that his religious freedom had been violated was the sole reason which impelled the Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction.
The Court’s opinion does not indicate that Summers claimed he had been deprived of any sort of property right without due process of law. Had he made such a claim, I am quite sure the Supreme Court would have rejected it, for it is clear to me that one does not acquire any sort of constitutionally protected property right simply by applying for admission to the bar. If that be true, it follows that no such right is acquired by merely applying for initial authority to act as a bondsman in the District of Columbia.
In our opinion on Carter’s first appeal,6 we said:
“ * * * when an authorization to engage in the bonding business has been approved by the District Court and is outstanding, it can be revoked, prior to the expiration of its term, only upon a proceeding which contains the elements of due process of law, i. e., a hearing and revelation of all data upon which a decision is to be based.”
This holding was based upon what we called “the key and controlling fact in the situation”, which we described thus:
“ * * * The application had been granted. Carter had an authorization. He was engaged in business. The action of the court was not to deny him something he was seeking; it was to deprive him of something which he had.”
That is to say, Carter had acquired a property right, protected by the Constitution. We added, in the first opinion:
“It may be true that the grant of authority to engage in the bonding business is an administrative act. But the deprivation of that right, once granted, is a judicial act, requiring due process of law.”
Unfortunately, we also said in the course of the opinion, 85 U.S.App.D.C. at page 230, 177 F.2d at page 76:
“* * * It is also clear that the authorization is for a term, at the expiration of which the same considerations govern renewal as govern original approval * * * » 7
The foregoing statement was obiter dictum. When we wrote it, Carter’s original term had not expired, and so we were not considering an application for renewal. Indeed, in another part of the same opinion we took care to emphasize that the case then before us “does not concern the power or procedure of that court [the District Court] in renewing an authorization upon expiration of the stated term.”
*28Consequently, we have presented to us now, for the first time, the question whether “the same considerations govern renewal as govern original approval.”
Having decided that Carter’s right to' do business was, during the original two-year period, a property right of which he could not be deprived without due process of law, we are now squarely confronted with the question whether that property right is extinguished when the stated term expires, with the result that renewal may be denied ex parte, or whether a hearing must be afforded before such denial.
If Carter’s authorization was a property right during the term, it was no less a property right as the term ended. So, the refusal to renew deprived him of property, in both practical and legal effect, just as surely as did the revocation during the term. Although the authorization was for a stated period, since it was nevertheless constitutionally protected property, he had a right to believe it would be continued SO' long as he did not lose the statutory qualifications the court had originally found him to> possess. He established a business upon that reasonable expectation. This language used by the Supreme Court of Iowa 8 is apropos:
“ * * * Where the state confers a license to engage in a profession, trade or occupation, not inherently inimical to the public welfare, such license becomes a valuable personal right which cannot be denied or abridged in any manner except after due notice and a fair and impartial hearing before an unbiased tribunal. Were this not so, no one would be safe from oppression wherever power may be lodged, one might be easily deprived of important rights with no opportunity to defend against wrongful accusations. This would subvert the most precious rights of the citizen.
“The state cannot, by issuing only annual licenses, ingeniously thwart these precious rights.”
I think the foregoing is a sound statement. It follows that the “key and controlling fact in the situation” is the same as it was on the first appeal:
“ * * * Carter had an authorization. He was engaged in business. The action of the court was not to deny him something he was seeking; it was to deprive him of something which' he had.”
Upon the basis of that controlling fact, we said in the first Carter opinion, “the deprivation of that right [to> engage in the bonding business], once granted, is a judicial act, requiring due process of law.” That is still true, in my opinion. And it is true, whether the deprivation be by revocation of the right or by denial of an extension of its term.
The principle just stated protects the individual in his personal rights and works no harm to the public interest. For, if evidence subsequently obtained tends to> indicate that the court erroneously and improvidently determined a bondsman to be qualified in the first instance, or if an originally well qualified bondsman becomes disqualified, the court may deny him the right to continue either by revoking his current authority or by refusing to renew it. But, in either event, the determination that he is unworthy to retain his valuable property right is the exercise of a judicial function which must be preceded by a due process hearing.
The statute does not stand in the way of the principle stated in the foregoing paragraph. It does not provide that a bondsman shall be relegated to the position of an original applicant when his fixed term expires, but rather indicates the contrary by saying that “before said authority shall be renewed the court shall require * * * an affidavit that since his previous qualification * * * he has abided by the provisions of this chapter”. This is the sole statutory reference to procedure on renewal.
A bondsman’s business is necessarily a continuing one. Though he had served only briefly, Carter was surety on bail bonds aggregating some $24,000 on the day the court refused to renew his authority. When the court found that he lacked the qualifications of a bondsman, it did not, I suppose, relieve him of liability on the bonds then outstand*29ing. Some of those bonds may remain in effect for many months. So, if it did not terminate all his liability when it refused renewal, the court continued to' that extent to accept him as a bondsman, after finding that he lacked the required qualifications.
It was suggested in argument that Carter could terminate liability by surrendering his principals. Perhaps so. But not without refunding to each a part or all of the fee which he had been paid. This would deprive Carter of his property in the money refunded.
It is held by some courts that a license is a privilege and is in no sense a property right, even during its term. See the cases collected in 53 C.J.S., Licenses, § 2, p. 449. This court, has held otherwise with respect to a license to engage in a business. United States ex rel. Daly v. MacFarland, 1907, 28 App.D.C. 552, 561. And we held in the first Carter case that a bondsman’s authority is a property right during its term. That being true, I think there is no Valid distinction between revocation and refusal to renew,' since the same consequences flow from both. Due process of law, being required for the one, should be and is required for the other.
The propositions set forth in this opinion, which are the basis for my conclusion that the order appealed from should be reversed, are amply supported by well-reasoned, convincing authorities. Leakey v. Georgia Real Estate Comm., 1949, 80 Ga. App. 272, 55 S.E.2d 818; State ex rel. Bierring v. Swearingen, 1946, 237 Iowa 1031, 22 N.W.2d 809; Gilchrist v. Bierring, supra; 45 Col.L.Rev. 67 (1945). Compare the following: Churchill Tabernacle v. Federal Communications Comm., 1947, 81 U.S.App. D.C. 411, 160 F.2d 244; Evangelical Lutheran Synod, etc. v. Federal Communications Comm., 1939, 70 App.D.C. 270, 105 F.2d 793; Journal Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 1931, 60 App.D.C. 92, 48 F.2d 461 ; Chicago Fed. of Labor v. Federal Radio Comm., 1930, 59 App.D.C. 333, 41 F.2d 422; Technical Radio Laboratory v. Federal Radio Comm., 1929, 59 App.D.C. 125, 36 F.2d 111; Goldsmith v. Clabaugh, 55 App.D.C. 346, 6 F.2d 94, certiorari denied 1925, 269 U.S. 554, 46 S.Ct. 18, 70 L.Ed. 408.
. The governing statute is 23 D.C.Code § 608 (1940).
. In re Carter, 1949, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 229, 177 F.2d 75, certiorari denied, 1949, 338 U.S. 900, 70 S.Ct. 250, 94 L.Ed. 554.
. In re Carter, No. 10504, decided January 18, 1951.
. In re Carter, supra, note 3.
. The opinion cited in the foregoing note includes this sentence:
“ * * * Since a court’s order denying an application to practice law is a judicial act, as the Supreme Court determined in the Summers case, so is a court’s order denying an application to do business as a bondsman.”
. In re Carter, supra, note 2, 85 U.S. App.D.C. at page 232, 177 F.2d at page 78.
. Strictly speaking, the quoted language referred, not to the statute, but to the rules of court promulgated under it. If it accurately construed the rules, then the rules go beyond the statute.
. Gilchrist v. Bierring, 1944, 234 Iowa 899,14 N.W.2d 724, 732.