(dissenting),
In my opinion ^ case presents a lain question o£ the law of negotiable instruments_
The rightS of the Pf^V* thf St0^en currency are governed by federal rather , , J^ ; , „ _ than by local law. Clearfield Trust Co. v. 318 U.S. 363, 366, 63 S.Ct 573, 87 L.Ed. 838; National Metropolitan Bank v. United States 323 U.S. 454, 456, 65 S.Ct. 354, 89 L.Ed. 383. The term “negotiabie» jts commercial sense is applied to paper wbicL passes in the business world from band to hand by endorsement and delivery, or by mere delivery, and which in the hands 0f a holder in due course is unaffected by defenses against it in the hands of the former owner. Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 562, 563, 25 L.Ed. 892. United States currency, by reason of the purpose of its creation, its issuance by the Government *134as its unconditional legal obligation to pay a sum certain on demand to the owner thereof, and the part it plays in the commercial life of the nation is essentially negotiable. See Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 326, 55 S.Ct. 428, 79 L.Ed. 907; Vermilye & Co. v. Adams Express Co., 21 Wall. 138, 22 L.Ed. 609; Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110, 122, 17 L.Ed. 857.
lt is settled law that a bona fide purchaser of a negotiable instrument, even though stolen'from its owner, acquires good .n/r j , a title against the owner. Murray v. Lardner, supra; Murray v. Wagner, 2 Cir., 277 F. 32; Pridgen v. Baugh & Sons Co., 4 Cir., 30 F.2d 353; American Express Co. v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 179 Okl. 606, 67 P.2d 55, 110 A.L.R. 972; Annotation 1 A.L.R. 717.
T . „ , , , , r ,. It is also well settled that a transfer of a negotiable instrument in payment of, or as a credit on, an antecedent or preexisting debt constitutes value, enabling the transferee to become a holder in due course, Sawyer v. Prickett, 19 Wall. 146, 166, 22 L.Ed. 105; Gunnison County v. E. H. Rollins & Sons, 173 U.S. 255, 275, 19 S.Ct. 390, 43 L.Ed. 689; Hamilton v. Fowler, 6 Cir., 99 F. 18, 22. See Deitrick v. MacCarthy, D.C.Mass., 13 F.Supp. 850, 85-853,
It is conceded that Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation had no knowledge at the time that the money turned over to it by Bales was stolen. Bales’ knowledge, under the circumstances, was not imputed to the Corporation. American National Bank v. Miller, 229 U.S. 517, 33 S.Ct. 883, 57 L.Ed. 1310; In re U. S. Hair Co., 2 Cir., 239 F. 703; Levy & Cohn Mule Co. v. Kauffman, 5 Cir., 414 F. 170, 176-177.
In my opinion, Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation became a holder in due course of the currency received from Bales, and deposited to its account at the bank, with a resulting interest in the currency superior to the claims of the Appellees. In re U. S. Hair Co., supra; National Bank v. Burkhardt, 10 Otto 686, 689-690, 25 L.Ed. 766; Wyer v. Dorchester & Milton Bank, 11 Cush., Mass., 51. It is my view that the judgment should be reversed,