(dissenting).
A side-by-side comparison of the contested marks here in issue will of course yield the arguable distinctions which control the decision of majority. Such a ritual, almost invariably, exploits the trivial, ignores the important, and winds up with a finding of fact that is far from realistic. For that reason the method has been universally condemned because , it is not the proper criterion by which the likelihood of confusion is to be determined. E. g., Vital Foods Corporation v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 156 F.2d 77, 33 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1136; United Drug Co. v. Mercirex Co., 182 F.2d 222, 37 C.C.P.A., Pat*762ents, 1063. See also my opinion in Irma Hosiery Co. v. Schulman, 201 F.2d 891, 40 C.C.P.A., Patents,-.
It is a matter of common knowledge that the ordinary person in making a purchase of inexpensive household or personal articles is not likely to remember, nor is he bound to look for and analyze, the details of the contested marks and labels of competing vendors, even if he should happen to know as a matter of fact that there are competing vendors. Magitex Co., Inc. v. John Hudson Moore, Inc., 154 F.2d 177, 33 C.C.P.A., Patents, 956, 959. It may be. noted also that under modern methods of merchandising a purchaser of the goods may frequently have no opportunity to make such an examination and comparison. In any event, there is no law by which a shopper is required to carry a dictionary in one hand and a microscope in the other in order to detect the minute distinction between an established brand and a phony trademark. Celanese Corp. of Americh v. Vanity Fair Silk Mills, 47 F.2d 373, 18 C.C.P.A., Patents, 958; Guggenheim v. Cantrell & Cochrane, 56 App.D.C. 100, 10 F.2d 895.
The dictionaries contain the word “favorite” but not the word “favora,” and •here the newcomer has apparently appropriated a device to trap the unwary purchaser. See Celanese Corp. of America v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 154 F.2d 143, 33 C.C.P.A., Patents, 857. The latter term is essentially nothing more than the primary name for one of the characteristics of appellee’s goods, and as such is incapable of trade-mark usage and of denoting the source or personal origin of appellee’s goods. Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 150 F.2d 432, 32 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1223.
Moreover, compound marks having one or more syllables in common may be confusingly similar, although there is a wide difference in the remaining portions of the mark. See, e. g., In re Brockway Glass Company, 154 F.2d 673, 33 C.C.P.A., Patents, 969; Coty, Inc. v. Perfumes Habana, S. A., 190 F.2d 91, 38 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1180. The same rule has been applied for years in other federal courts of competent jurisdiction, as noted by Judge Page in Northam-Warren Corporation v. Universal Cosmetic Co., 7 Cir., 18 F.2d 774, 775:
“Whether there is an infringement of a trade-mark does not depend upon the use of identical words, nor on the question as to whether they are so similar that a person looking at one would be deceived into the belief that it was the other; but it is sufficient if one adopts a trade-name or a trademark so like another in form, spelling, or sound that one, with a not very definite or clear recollection as to the real trade-mark, is likely to become confused or misled.”
In view of the fact that the corporate names of both of these competing vendors-consist primarily of the word “Continental,” confusion in trade seems all the more likely. Therefore in the public interest, as well as that of appellant, the law of unfair competition should be applied against appellee. Champion Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130, 67 S.Ct. 1136, 91 L.Ed. 1386; Coty, Inc. v. Perfumes Habana, 190 F.2d 91, 38 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1180, 1185; Jewel Tea Co., Inc. v. Kraus, 7 Cir., 187 F.2d 278, 282.
It is true as quoted by the majority that the rule under our procedural practice in recent trade-mark litigation, we are holding that precedents in such cases are of very little, if any importance. In fact, we are pronouncing the heresy so often that it has become routine in this court. No other courts have been cited which have adopted the same or a similar philosophy. Appellant in its brief here cited and relied upon the procedure followed and the holding made for a unanimous court by Presiding Judge Graham in American Products Co. v. Leonard, 53 F.2d 894, 19 C.C.P.A., Patents, 742.
There the mark “Zanol” was held confusingly similar to the registrant’s mark “Zeno” for chemical supplies and in fortifying his position Judge Graham cited five similar cases of this court to the sanie legal effect. In other words, we have apparently shifted our position in trade-mark litiga-*763fion from time to time from a logical to a psychological basis, with the result that in •one instance we have overruled the previous judgment of our court where the marks and goods in a subsequent suit were identical with those of a previous case. Merritt-Taylor, Inc. v. C. B. Shane Corp., 195 F.2d 535, 39 C.C.P.A., Patents, 916, 919. In a series of other cases we have authorized the registration of identical marks because, as noted, the goods of the newcomer were not precisely the same as those upon which widely-advertised and long established marks had been previously used. E. .g., Alligator Co. v. Larus & Bro. Co., Inc., 196 F.2d 532, 39 C.C.P.A., Patents, 939.
It is my opinion that there is no justification whatever for authorizing the registration of the applicant’s mark here in issue and thereby adding to the wide confusion already existing in the markets for the purchasing public with respect to the sale of merchandise. See John Morrell & Co. v. Doyle, 7 Cir., 97 F.2d 232.