(dissenting).
The incompetent’s confinement in St. Elizabeths had nothing to do with his being a veteran. He was committed to the hospital, in 1937, under a statutory provision that when a person convicted of an offense is found to be insane he may be “confined in the hospital for the insane, and said person and his estate shall be charged with the expense of his support in the said hospital.” D.C.Code (1929) § 6-374, 31 Stat. 1340. Cf. Code (1940) § 24-301, 34 Stat. 113; Code (1951) § 24-301, 59 Stat. 311.
As a credit against this statutory liability, the incompetent’s guardian claims and this court awards compensation which is said to have been “otherwise due” from the Veterans’ Administration. In my opinion the award of this credit violates two Acts of Congress.
(1) “In an action by the United States against an individual, evidence supporting the defendant’s claim for a credit shall not be admitted unless he first proves that such claim has been disallowed, in whole or in part, by the General Accounting Office, or that he has, at the time of the trial, obtained possession of vouchers not previously procurable and has been prevented from presenting such claim to the General Accounting Office by absence from the United States or unavoidable accident.” 62 Stat. 972, 28 U.S.C. § 2406 (1948). The guardian has not offered such proof.
(2) With exceptions not relevant here, “the decisions of the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs on any question of law or fact concerning a claim for benefits or payments under any Act administered by the Veterans’ Administration shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decisions.” 38 U.S.C.A. § 1 la-2, 54 Stat. 1197, § 11.1 The Administrator decided that compensation for the period in question was not due.
He stated and restated that decision in the very letter from which this court quotes an explanatory sentence. He did so in these words, directly after the sentence the court quotes: “Our regulations require that in a case of this sort, all *21payments of compensation will cease. It appears from your letter that you contemplated paying all or part of the charge brought against the estate of the veteran for his care and treatment at St. Elizabeths Hospital and that you desire that the Veterans Administration retroactively pay you as committee of the veteran for your compensation at the rate of $100.00 per month to cover the period embraced in the bill from the hospital for his care and treatment. You •are advised that this cannot be done * * (Emphasis added.) That and only that is what the Administrator decided. The statement the court quotes, “The compensation of the veteran was discontinued by reason of the fact that he was being cared for by the Government, was insane, had no wife, child, or dependent parents, and his estate was over $1,500.00”, was nothing but the Administrator’s “reason” for his decision to discontinue compensation. The “reason” was the assumed “fact”. However erroneous the assumption of fact, and the decision based upon it, may have been, we have no “power or jurisdiction to review” the decision.
The court’s hypothesis seems to be that the Administrator decided, not only that the veteran was not entitled to compensation, but also that he was entitled, at the expense of some unnamed other branch of the Government, to free care in St. Elizabeths. We need not consider whether the Administrator was authorized to make such a decision. He did not purport to make it and was not even asked to make it. The court errs in saying the Government retained money “for that purpose”, i. e., the purpose of providing for the veteran’s care. The Administrator’s letter shows he retained money because he assumed or found as a “fact” that the man “was being” cared for by the Government. To find that he “was being” cared for by the Government is not to decide that he was entitled to be cared for by the Government.
Ng doubt the Administrator meant that the man was being cared for gratuitously. The assumption of fact was therefore erroneous. But the Administrator’s error is not our affair, for we have no power to review his decision. This court is transmuting his assumption of fact, which led to his decision denying relief, into a decision granting relief.
. “Veterans’ benefits are mere gratuities and ‘the grant of them creates no vested-right.’ ‘The United States is not, by the creation of claims against itself, bound to provide a remedy in the courts.’ ” Slocumb v. Gray, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 8, 179 F.2d 31, 34.