The principal error charged on this appeal is that the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution was so in-paired upon the trial, that no reasonable *808jury could have been satisfied beyond a reasonable .doubt of the accuseds’ guilt. This assumes that in a criminal prosecution the judge may not submit -the. case to the jury unless he is himself satisfied, not only that there is testimony from which the accused’s guilt may be inferred, but also that reasonable persons might be so satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. This theory is based on the postulate that the accused is entitled to a protection greater than that the jury must be told that they must not have any fair doubt of the guilt of the accused, and that there is this preliminary question for the judge to answer. Whether that is the doctrine in all the circuits we need not inquire, for it is the thoroughly established doctrine in this circuit that the only difference between a civil action and a criminal prosecution is in. the instruction that must be given to the jury that they must be convinced beyond all fair doubt*
The objection that the jurors were examined on the voir dire by means of the Attorney General’s list of “subversive” organizations we passed upon in United States v. Lebron, 2 Cir., 222 F.2d 531.
The charge was amply sufficient to inform the jury that the guilt of each defendant must be established independently of that of any other.
Judgment affirmed.
Becher v. United States, 2 Cir., 5 F.2d 45; United States v. Becker, 2 Cir., 62 F.2d 1007, 1010; United States v. Valenti, 2 Cir., 134 F.2d 362, 364; Wigmore § 2497.