(dissenting).
Appellant here moved for judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity notwithstanding the verdict. The trial judge ruled that the motion should be denied on the merits.1 Here, the majority is substituting its judgment for that of the trier who saw and heard the witnesses and was in the best possible position to appraise the evidence and the weight to be accorded to it. His review2 of the case to my mind conveys complete conviction that the question was properly left to the decision of the jury.3 I understand that a jury is not bound to credit the opinions of psychiatrists but rather is free to accept or reject their testimony, just as it may do as to the testimony of any other witness.
There is no suggestion that there was error in the conduct of the trial, and I would affirm on the merits.
. He also concluded that he lacked authority to grant the motion. To the extent that Wright v. United States, 1957, 101 U.S.App.D.C.—, 250 F.2d 4, can be said to announce a different rule, I there joined in the dissent. Insofar as Douglas v. United States, 1956, 99 U.S. App.D.C. 232, 239 F.2d 52, can be said to have application, the opinion declared that “Each case must be decided upon its own facts.” 99 U.S.App.D.C. at page 239, 239 F.2d at page 59. It was also pointed out that directing a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is “a duty to be performed with caution * * * because of the deference due to the jury in resolving factual issues.” 99 U.S.App.D.C. at page 237, 239 F.2d at page 57.
. See Judge Holtzoff’s excellent opinion in United States v. Fielding, D.C.D.C. 1957, 148 F.Supp. 46.
. Cf. Bradley v. United States. 1957, 102 U.S.App.D.C.-, 249 F.2d 922.