Plaintiff brought this action alleging jurisdiction under Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3). The complaint alleges that plaintiff was maliciously suspended by the Dean of Students of Brooklyn College ; that on appeal the President of the College arbitrarily sustained the suspension and that later the Faculty Council of the College, acting upon the recommendation of its Faculty Committee on Orientation and Guidance, unlawfully dismissed plaintiff permanently; that thereafter on appeal for reinstatement to the Board of Higher Education, that Board illegally denied plaintiff’s request for a fair hearing and that the State Commissioner of Education refused to reverse the action of the Board and the College, rendering unconstitutional decisions in so doing.
Because of these allegations, plaintiff claims a grievance under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution in that he was deprived of his liberty, denied due process, and refused equal protection of the law.
The complaint contains no allegation that he was discriminated against by reason of race, creed, or previous condition of servitude.
*14The defendants, New York State Education Commissioner (hereinafter called The Commissioner), New York City Board of Higher Education (hereinafter called The Board), and Brooklyn College (hereinafter called The College), in their answers, generally denied plaintiff’s allegations and moved to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim against The Board and The College; that the plaintiff had already appealed his dismissal to The Commissioner and had been denied relief, and that the complaint failed to show the deprivation of the plaintiff of any right secured to the plaintiff by the United States Constitution or United States Law. A detailed affidavit was filed with the Motion to Dismiss.
At the trial, Judge Rayfiel treated the Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment and granted the summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Steier v. New York State Education Commissioner, D.C.E.D.N.Y.1958, 161 F.Supp. 549.
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The public colleges of the City of New York, of which Brooklyn College is one, constitute a unit of the public school system of the State of New York. Under Section 6202 of the Education Law of the State of New York, McKinney’s Consol. Laws, c. 16, The Board, a body corporate, separate and distinct from the Board of Education of the City of New York, which administers the affairs of the public elementary and secondary school system, is authorized to govern and control those educational institutions in the City which are of collegiate grade. Included among the powers and duties of The Board provided by Section 6202 of said Law is the power to “prescribe conditions of student admission, attendance and discharge.” The Board has prescribed such conditions, which, so far as they are here pertinent, are contained in Sections 214a, 216, and 217 of its by-laws. Section 214a provides, inter alia, that each student obey all the rules, regulations and orders of the duly established college authorities, and shall conform to the requirements of good manners and good morals. Section 216 provides that, in th°e event of the violation of such rules, regulations or requirements, the Dean may reprimand the student involved, suspend him for a period not exceeding one term, or deprive him of certain college privileges. He may also recommend the dismissal of the student, but such disciplinary action may be imposed only by the President, or by the votes of a majority of the members of the Faculty Council. Section 217 provides that the student involved in disciplinary action by the Dean or the Faculty Council may appeal to the President, whose decision is final, except in the case of a dismissal, in which event appeal may be made to The Board.
Under the Education Law, the Education Department of the State of New York is charged with the general management and supervision of all the public schools in the State, and The Commissioner is the chief executive and administrative officer of the Department. Section 310 of said Law provides that in a case such as the instant case a “person conceiving himself aggrieved may appeal or petition to the commissioner of education who is hereby authorized, and required to examine and decide the same, * * * and his decision in such appeals, petitions or proceedings shall be final and conclusive, and not subject to question or review in any place or court whatever.”
If one believes the decision of The Commissioner was arbitrary, capricious, or palpably illegal, one may file a petition under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act of New York in a New York Supreme Court for a review of the decision of The Commissioner. Craig v. Board of Education, 173 Misc. 969, 19 N.Y.S.2d 293, affirmed 262 App.Div. 706, 27 N.Y.S.2d 993; Knapp v. Chisholm, Sup., 144 N.Y.S.2d 191.
To determine whether the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York had any jurisdiction of this case, we must look at the undisputed facts as contained in the affidavit of Charles A. Brind, Jr., counsel for Commissioner. These facts are not denied by the plaintiff.
*15Plaintiff entered Brooklyn College in the fall of 1952. He apparently became convinced that certain of the student organizations were too much dominated by the College Administrator. He assumed the role of a reformer. On November 22, 1954, and again on February 24, 1955, he wrote letters to the College President which were obviously bitter and in one of which intemperate language was directed against the office of Student Administration of The College. On March 3, 1955, as a result of these two letters, the Dean of Students suspended the plaintiff for the remainder of the term. In his letter of suspension the Dean quoted a by-law of the Board of Higher Education which reads as follows:
“S. 155, a — Student Discipline.
“Each student enrolled in any college or school under the control of the Board of Higher Education and every organization, association, publication, club or chapter shall obey all the rules and regulations and orders of the duly established college authorities, shall give punctual and courteous attention to all college duties, shall use the property of the institution with care and economy, shall conform to the requirements of good manners and good morals, and shall obey the laws of the City, State, and Nation within college grounds and elsewhere.”
Plaintiff appealed this suspension to the College President — to no avail. However, on August 2, 1955, plaintiff applied in writing for readmission. On September 7th a conference was held between plaintiff, his mother, the Dean and a Professor, and on that day plaintiff wrote a letter to the Dean reiterating his mistake of undignified manner of expression in the letters which caused his suspension and generally promised if reinstated to abide by the rules and regulations and to generally have a change of spirit.
As a result of the conference and his letter, on September 17, 1955, the Dean unblocked his registration, but stipulated that during the coming year plaintiff could not participate as an officer in any student activity organization, and also warned plaintiff that The College would take a serious view of any violation of the letter or spirit of the understanding as outlined in plaintiff’s letter of September 7th. In January, 1956, plaintiff received a warning from the Dean that in the Dean’s opinion plaintiff was not keeping the agreement leading to plaintiff’s reinstatement.
In June, 1956, after the academic year was completed, the Dean wrote the plaintiff that though still showing deficiencies, plaintiff had made certain gains. However, plaintiff was notified that during the fall term of 1956 he could not hold office or membership in any student organizations.
Plaintiff caused to be published in the first issue of the College paper, dated September 20, 1956, the story of his latest probation — claiming the probation was caused by the discriminatory and vindictive policies of the College Administration. On September 21st plaintiff was suspended for the second time as of September 24th because of his “continued disregard of the rules and regulations.”
Plaintiff and his parents promptly appealed this second suspension to the College President — again to no avail. In December plaintiff applied for reinstatement. As a result he was asked to appear before the Faculty Committee on Orientation and Guidance. This he did. This Faculty Committee unanimously recommended plaintiff’s dismissal for the following reasons:
1. In spite of the fact that Mr. Steier knew he was not to appear on campus during his suspension he
a. was seen in Boylan Hall placing leaflets in staff and stu-ent mail boxes on December 4th. (Dean Coulton’s letter to Dean Stroup dated December 6, 1956.)
*16b. entered the Executive Council Meeting and refused to leave on October 17. (Mr. Bees-ley’s letter to Dean Coulton dated October 18, 1956.)
c. on the same day (Mr. Peder-sen’s note to Dean Stroup received on October 23, 1956) Mr. Pedersen writes: “I obtained the services of a patrolman who escorted Mr. Steier out of the meeting.”
2. Mr. Steier has used abusive language in letters written to College officials.
a. In his letter of November 19, 1956, to Dean Stroup he wrote: “I can come to no other conclusion, therefore, but that you may have committed a deliberate, and malicious lie.”
b. Again in a letter to President Gideonse on November 22, 1956, he wrote “Those students, however, who place conscience above their graduate school recommendations and permanent record cards do have the gumption to protest such vile indecencies as have been displayed by your Office of Student Activities.”
3. In spite of the clear restrictions placed on Mr. Steier’s eo-curric-ular activities for the period September 1956 until June 1957, he was in attendance at the Students for Campus Democracy booth of the Club Fair on September 19, 1956. (Dean Coul-ton’s note to Dean Stroup dated September 19, 1956.)
4. There is no indication that Mr. Steier understands that his behavior is inappropriate.
a. He writes, “I make no apologies for having appeared on the Brooklyn College campus ' since my suspension for what I feel to be legitimate reasons.” (Mr. Steier’s six page paper of December 4, 1956, page 6.)
b. In the same paper (Mr. Steier’s six page paper of December 4, 1956, page 1) he says: “And if my ‘willingness to cooperate with college authorities’ means turning my back on this fight, then I question both the legal and the moral right of a public official to issue such an ‘injunction.’ ”
On December 20th plaintiff was notified that the Faculty Council approved the recommendation of the Faculty Committee and that he was dismissed.
Plaintiff then appealed — in accordance with New York Law and the rules and regulations of the Board of Education — to that Board. After a hearing, this appeal was denied and he thereafter appealed to the Commissioner of Education of New York. After a hearing, this appeal was denied. Thereafter this action was started.
The protection to citizens of the United States by the “privileges and immunities” clause includes those rights and privileges which, under the laws and Constitution of the United States, are incident to citizenship of the United States, but does not include rights pertaining to state citizenship and derived solely from the relationship of the citizen and his state established by state law. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497.
The “privilege” of attending The College as a student comes not from federal sources but is given by the State. Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, 293 U.S. 245, 261, 55 S.Ct. 197,“ 79 L.Ed. 343.
In the case of University of Maryland v. Coale, 165 Md. 224, 167 A. 54, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the University could suspend students who refused to take the regular course in military training, though their refus*17al was based on conscientious religious conviction. The Appeals Court there held such action of the President and Regents of the University was not in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. When this case was sought to be appealed to the United States Supreme Court, jurisdictional statements were submitted. The United States Supreme Court dismissed this appeal for the want of a substantial federal question. See Coale v. Pearson, 290 U.S. 597, 54 S.Ct. 131, 78 L.Ed. 525.
And in State ex rel. Steinle v. Faust, 55 Ohio App. 370, 9 N.E.2d 912, at page 914, the Ohio Appellate Court ruled that education is purely a matter of state concern, and no rights, powers or duties concerning it have been either expressly or impliedly granted to the Federal Government within the limitations of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The Education Law of New York and the rules and regulations promulgated by virtue of it were strictly followed. These have been held to be constitutional by the New York Court. See Barringer v. Powell, 230 N.Y. 37, 128 N.E. 910; Bullock v. Cooley, 225 N.Y. 566, 122 N.E. 630.
Copies of all documents filed by The Board, including charges made against the plaintiff by The College, were served upon him. He filed numerous documents and exhibits in his own behalf. He argued his appeals orally. At the hearing before The Commissioner, he was afforded the same rights and privileges as were available to The Board — all as prescribed by the rules.
Judge Rayfiel, in his opinion, quoted aptly from two pertinent New York State cases — as follows:
“In the case of Bean v. Wilson, 200 Misc. 183, 108 N.Y.S.2d 939, at page 942, affirmed 279 App.Div. 277, 110 N.Y.S.2d 94, the Court said, ‘The Commissioner is authorized and required to examine and decide appeals and petitions by persons conceiving themselves aggrieved * * * and his decision in such appeals, petitions and proceedings is final and conclusive and not subject to question or review in any place or court whatever, Education Law, § 310; People ex rel. Board of Education etc. v. Graves, 243 N.Y. 204, 153 N.E. 49; Barringer v. Powell, 230 N.Y. 37, 128 N.E. 910; People ex rel. Hylan v. Finegan, 227 N.Y. 219, 125 N.E. 97; Bullock v. Cooley, 225 N.Y. 566, 122 N.E. 630; People ex rel. Jennings v. Finley, 175 App.Div. 204, 161 N.Y.S. 817, except when it is shown purely to have been arbitrary or palpably illegal.’
“In the proceeding: O’Brien v. Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 140, 173 N.Y.S.2d 265, 149 N.E.2d 705, decided March 26, 1958, the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, in passing upon an appeal, brought on alleged constitutional grounds, seeking to annul a decision of the Commissioner, said: ‘The Commissioner of Education held a hearing at which, though no one was called to testify or give evidence, an opportunity was accorded for full oral argument, the submission and exchange of briefs and the filing of any and all affidavits, exhibits and other materials the parties desired.’ The Court further said: ‘Quite obviously, and we recently so held in a case very similar to the present one, the Commissioner of Education’s resolution of a dispute on conflicting affidavits without an oral hearing neither directly involves the construction of the constitution nor poses a constitutional question of any kind. (See Kuhn v. Com’r of Education, 2 N.Y.2d 749, 157 N.Y.S.2d 383, 138 N.E.2d 742.)’” [161 F.Supp. 552.]
While it may well be that the remedy provided the plaintiff under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Act is an administrative remedy available to the plaintiff, and one that he has not exhausted, and therefore this action is im*18properly brought (see Baron v. O’Sullivan, 3 Cir., 258 F.2d 336, 337), we prefer to place our decision squarely on the ground that the complaint and uncontro-verted facts clearly demonstrate there was no jurisdiction in the United States District Court.
Here we have a student who was suspended. He was then taken back at his request on certain terms. Thus, in effect, he was on probation. The College felt he violated his probation and dismissed him — for its own reasons.
Education is a field of life reserved to the individual states. The only restriction the Federal Government, imposes is that in their educational program no state may discriminate against an individual because of race, color or creed.
As so well stated by Judge Wyzanski in Cranney v. Trustees of Boston University, D.C., 139 F.Supp. 130, to expand the Civil Rights Statute so as to embrace every constitutional claim such as here made would in fact bring within the initial jurisdiction of the United States District Courts that vast array of controversies which have heretofore been raised in state tribunals by challenges founded upon the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. It would be arrogating to United States District Courts that which is purely a State Court function. Conceivably every State College student, upon dismissal from such -college, could rush to a Federal Judge seeking review of the dismissal.
It is contrary to the Federal nature of -our system- — contrary to the concept of the relative places of State and Federal Courts.
Whether or not we would have acted as did the Administrator of Brooklyn College in dismissing the plaintiff matters not. For a Federal Distinct Court to take jurisdiction of a case such as this would lead to confusion and chaos in the entire field of jurisprudence in the states and in the United States.
The judgment dismissing the complaint is affirmed on the ground that the United States District Court lacked jurisdiction over this matter.