(concurring).
All members of the court appear to be in agreement that the district court could find laches here even if the number of days on which service could be made did not reach the one year total required by 32 L.P.R.A. § 253, inasmuch as laches may be found even though a statute of limitations has not run, see Russell v. Todd, 1940, 309 U.S. 280, 288 note 1, 60 S.Ct. 527, 84 L.Ed. 754, and, seemingly, there was adequate opportunity from time to time to make service over a period of four and a half years. One small point divides us. As the dissent points out, in Flores v. A. H. Bull Steamship Co., D.C.D.P.R.1958, 167 F.Supp. 841, at page 842, filed six months after the original opinion (denominated “Order”) in the case at bar, the court stated that its decision herein had not been by “mechanical application of the statute of limitations,” but had been in the exercise of discretion, “after consideration of many factors.” However, the Flores opinion is not part of this case, and when we look at the record before us we find no such indication. On the contrary, the court states simply that it is “following the analogy of the statute.” Marrero v. The S.S. Kathryn, D.C.D.P.R.1958, 161 F.Supp. 420, 421, 422. Then, even after the Flores opinion, the court denied a motion for rehearing herein, filing “conclusions of law,” one of which was, “At no time *304* * * Was * * * any * * * statute of limitations of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico tolled.” Unless the “frequent and regular” visits of respondent’s vessels totaled 365 days during the pertinent period, as to which, as is pointed out, there is no affirmative finding, this ruling could not be supported.1 Since it is not clear that such error, or possible error, did not enter into the court’s ultimate decision, I concur in the remand.
. It may be that other conspicuous and readily attachable property was in the district, but this does not appear, either.