(dissenting).
Sensible and attractive as is Judge MOORE’S solution of this long litigated case, I am unable to square it with what seem to me controlling decisions of the Supreme Court, International Association of Machinists v. N. L. R. B., 1940, 311 U.S. 72, 61 S.Ct. 83, 85 L.Ed. 50; Franks Bros. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 1944, 321 U.S. 702, 64 S.Ct. 817, 88 L.Ed. 1020, and N. L. R. B. v. Warren Co., 1955, 350 U.S. 107, 76 S.Ct. 185, 100 L.Ed. 96, and an applicable precedent in our own Circuit, N. L. R. B. v. Stow Manufacturing Co., 2 Cir., 1954, 217 F.2d 900 certiorari denied 1955, 348 U.S. 964, 75 S.Ct. 524, 99 L.Ed. 751. While there are, as always, some factual differences between those cases and this, the differences do not affect the principle. Neither can the au-thoi'ity of those precedents be overcome *93by reliance on two of our decisions which antedate and are inconsistent with them; doubtless for this reason, in the Stow case, supra, Judge Learned Hand did not even cite his opinion in N. L. R. B. v. National Licorice Co., 2 Cir., 1939, 104 F.2d 655, although the facts in Stow would have made reliance on National Licorice most appropriate if the latter still had vitality.
I dissent, with regret; I would grant enforcement, with reluctance.