(concurring).
On the bare allegations of the petition, seeking “all property, tangible or intan-
gible * * * of the alleged bankrupt * * * ” without further identification, it is not too clear to me what rights petitioner has in the real estate which was conveyed to appellant by Mrs. Mackin and which is described in the opinion, and found by the court below, to be “not an asset of the estate of the alleged bankrupt.” I think it no answer to say that the general conveyance of April 28 to which she contributed was an assignment for the benefit of Mackin’s creditors and hence that the receiver was entitled to it. This is true as to Mackin’s property. Whether, strictly, he made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or attempted to prefer certain creditors, his action was voidable. Mrs. Mackin, however, was entitled to do with her own property whatever she pleased, and if she wanted to give it to appellant, that was her privilege. (Alternatively, she might have been willing to convey for her husband’s creditors only if there was going to be no bankruptcy.) The receiver’s maximum interest is in property in the possession of the bankrupt’s assignee to which a subsequent trustee may have a claim. Such property he may presently preserve, pending resolution of conflicting claims by the bankruptcy court. See section 69, sub. a, 11 U.S.C.A. § 109, sub. a; §§ 2, sub. a(3), 2, sub. a (21), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 11, sub. a(3), 11, sub. a(21); Murphy v. John Hofman Co., 1909, 211 U.S. 562, 29 S.Ct. 154, 53 L.Ed. 327; Whitney v. Wenman, 1905, 198 U.S. 539, 25 S.Ct. 778, 49 L.Ed. 1157; cf. Sharpe v. Doyle, 1880, 102 U.S. 686, 26 L.Ed. 277. But I could not agree that a receiver or trustee has any rights in property that indisputably had belonged to a third party simply because it had been conveyed to an assignee for creditors. Cf. Feder v. John Engelhorn & Sons, 2 Cir., 1953, 202 F.2d 411.
However, the fact that Mrs. Mackin had received the property from her husband less than two months before, coupled with her readiness to make this conveyance, suggests that his transfer to her may have been in fraud of creditors, a fact which would entitle a trustee to *508make a claim under sections 70 or 67 (d) of the act. Accordingly, making reluctant allowance for petitioner’s failure to assert such a claim, and interpreting the court’s opinion as leaving such an issue to the later determination of the bankruptcy court, I am willing to concur in the result.