(concurring).
I am unable to agree with the majority’s construction of § 6 of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 403, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1971d. As I read the statute, the appellant was ineligible for relief under § 6 because it was not likelihood of persecution which made him unable to return to the Dominican Republic, found on sufficient evidence in the court below to be the place of his last residence. However, I concur in reversing the judgment of the district court because the government failed to comply with the procedures prescribed by § 243(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 212 (1952), 8 U. S.C.A. § 1253(a), and the order of deportation to Hong Kong is for that reason invalid.
The district court ruled that in order to obtain the benefit of § 6, an alien must show that “he is unable to return to the country of his birth, or nationality, or last residence” and that as to all three, the inability must be “because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion.” I agree with the district court.1 The majority believes with the Ninth Circuit, Cheng Lee King v. Carnahan, 253 F.2d 893 (1958), that so long as an alien is unable to return to one of the three places designated because of persecution or fear of persecution and is unable to return to the other two for any reason whatever, he has met the statutory requirements.
The mere fact that a person cannot gain entry to the place of his birth, nationality, or last residence will not keep him in this country. See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 243(a) which designates the countries to which aliens shall be deported.2 Nor will the fact that in one or two of such places he fears persecution, if he can safely go to the third. Cheng Lee King, supra. Thus in this case, had the appellant been denied admission in all of such places for reasons not involving persecution, he would have been deported. Similarly, had the Dominican Republic been willing to receive him, he would have been deported notwithstanding his inability to go to China, the country of his birth, because of persecution.
I am unable to see why the threat of persecution in one place should be deemed to “cover” other places closed to the appellant for reasons not involving persecution. Our immigration laws do not guarantee an alien admission unless three other countries where there is no threat of persecution will consider his application for entry. Had the appellant been born and always resided in the Dominican Republic, he would not be entitled to relief under § 6, since persecution would not be involved. He is in no worse position than if that were the case; yet under the majority view, the fact of persecution in China, irrelevant to his status in the Dominican Republic, protects him. The appellant’s situation cannot be compared to that of one who fears persecution in the land of his birth or nationality, where he has resided, and *476who has not found a residence elsewhere. For such a person, it is persecution which has closed all the likely doors to him and set him adrift.
The majority reasons that § 6 complements §§ 2-4 of the Refugee Relief Act, 67 Stat. 400, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, §§ 1971-1971b, by extending relief to persons who are temporarily in this country as nonimmigrants but who otherwise qualify for entrance under those sections. It then reasons that §§ 2-4 would admit one who, whatever his status in the country of his birth, could not return to the place of his last residence by reason of persecution. Therefore; the majority says, since § 6 is to be read to conform to the other sections, it must allow to remain a nonimmigrant who, unable for any reason to return to the country of his birth, cannot return to the place of his last residence by reason of persecution. The final step in this chain of reasoning is that since § 6 “envisions no priorities among the three countries [birth, nationality, and residence],” the same result must be reached for a non-immigrant who for any reason cannot return to his last residence and fears persecution in the country of his birth.
But it is crystal clear that .§§ 2-4 would not admit to this country one who has had a residence abroad solely because the country of his birth might persecute him; those sections impose requirements not limited to the one that the alien be “out of his usual place of abode and unable to return thereto” and “not * * * firmly resettled.” 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1971(a). The majority thus reaches by a series of steps a result in conflict with its original premise that the various sections must be read as nearly as possible as one. By the majority’s reasoning, one who entered this country as a nonimmigrant and then for some reason cannot return to his last residence is given a statutory preference over one who equally fears persecution in the land of his birth or nationality but who has remained in his last residence abroad.3
It is true that one who has maintained a residence elsewhere is better off than one like the appellant, who, having had such a residence, came temporarily to this country as a nonimmigrant and is now denied permission to return to his residence. But had the appellant been deported from the Dominican Republic for reasons not involving persecution, §§ 2-4 would not gain him admission here simply because he might be persecuted in China and had no place else to go. And that is the closest parallel to the situation of this case. The sole distinction is the appellant’s nonimmigrant status. Yet it is that very distinction which the majority, pursuant to legislative policy, claims should not be determinative.
The simple fact is that § 6 does differ significantly from the other sections. Section 2(a) defines a “refugee” as one
“who because of persecution, fear of persecution, natural calamity or military operations is out of his usual place of abode and unable to return thereto, who has not been firmly resettled, and who is in urgent need of assistance for the essentials of life or for transportation.”
The majority notes with approval the ruling in Chien Fan Chu v. Brownell, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 204, 247 F.2d 790 (1957) that applicants under § 6 need not meet all the requirements of § 2(a). Plainly then, the two sections differ as to those whom they protect. Section 3 imposes a general maximum on the number of visas to be issued to refugees, and § 4 allocates the total among various groups. Nonimmigrants under § 6 are not included in these quotas, but are included in a separate, unclassified quota of 5000. Since §§ 2-4 so clearly impose requirements on refugees inapplicable to nonimmigrants, it is difficult to understand the majority’s insistence that § 6 *477imposes no requirements on nonimmi-grants inapplicable to refugees.
The majority concedes the difficulties of its construction of § 6, but argues that the result would be more absurd if it ruled the other way. Yet the supposed absurdity arises only because the majority blinks the differences between the requirements of §§ 2-4 and § 6 at the same time that it recognizes them. The sum of the difference is that the former sections afford entry to those who are uprooted from their homes by persecution, while the latter allows to remain here those who, having anticipated that they would have to depart, find closed because of persecution the countries to which their natural desires might lead them. Since our general immigration laws do not suspend deportation simply because an alien cannot gain entry to the country of his choice, I see no difficulty in reconciling the various provisions.
It is not for this court to decide how far the “humane policy of the act” should extend, nor should we reach out for a particular interpretation because another may seem “oppressive.” These are matters for congressional determination. On the other hand, we cannot avoid the careful construction of a statute on the ground that Congress can correct our errors.
The second part of this case concerns the propriety of the order directing deportation of the appellant to Hong Kong pursuant to § 243(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. That section directs that if an alien fails to designate the country to which he chooses to be deported or if the country which he designates refuses to receive him or fails to respond within three months to an inquiry whether it will do so, he shall be deported “to any country of which such alien is a subject national, or citizen if such country is willing to accept him into its territory.” Only after this possibility has been explored and has failed may deportation be directed to a country within other specified categories.
The appellant contends that he is a national and citizen of the mainland of China and that since the Attorney General made no prior inquiry of the mainland government whether it would accept the appellant, the order of deportation to Hong Kong was not made pursuant to the prescribed procedure and is void. Since the appellant was born and resided on the mainland until his flight to the Dominican Republic,4 his contention must be upheld, unless the inquiry which was made to the Nationalist Government whether it would receive him on Formosa satisfied the requirements of § 243 (a). In my opinion it did not.
The government has contended in the past, and this court has held, that the Chinese mainland is a “country” to which an alien may be deported under § 243(a). United States ex rel. Tom Man v. Murff, 264 F.2d 926 (2 Cir.1959); United States ex rel. Leong Choy Moon V. Shaughnessy, 218 F.2d 316 (2 Cir.1954). In Chan Chuen v. Esperdy, 285 F.2d 353 (2 Cir.1960) (per curiam), we refused to accept the technical argument that Hong Kong was a colony of the United Kingdom and therefore not a “country,” and said: “[A]ny place possessing a government with authority to accept an alien deported from the United States can qualify as a ‘country’ under the statute.” Id. at 354. See also Rogers v. Cheng Fu Sheng, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 115, 280 F.2d 663, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 891, 81 S.Ct. 222, 5 L.Ed.2d 187 (1960). It would do violence to the ordinary' use of language if within a single section of a statute, the word “country” had one meaning when used alone and another when used in the phrase “country of which such alien is a subject national, or citizen.” Such a result could be justified only if national policy clearly demanded deference in this respect to the nonrecognition of the Communist government.
*478To rule that for purposes of § 243(a), the Chinese mainland is a country of which an alien may be a subject national or citizen imposes no greater requirement on this government than that the immigration authorities inquire whether the Communist government will accept this alien on its territory, something which we have already required it to do in other situations arising under § 243(a). Tom Man, supra.5 See Leong Choy Moon, supra, 218 F.2d at 319. The same requirement was imposed in Lu v. Rogers, 164 F.Supp. 320 (D.D.C.), affirmed per curiam, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 374, 262 F.2d 471 (1958). It does not interfere with this government’s policy of nonrecognition in any other respect, nor does its imply anything about the capacity of the Communist government to confer citizen status in any other context. In short, I would simply recognize the realities of the situation here as we have done when it was the government that was asserting its power to deport to the mainland of China.
It is true, as the government contends, that § 243(a) was designed to facilitate deportation proceedings by increasing the number of places to which deportation may be ordered, Chan Chuen, supra, but nothing that I have said here runs counter to that policy. And since § 243 (a) does not authorize deportation to any country at all unless specified countries, including the one of the alien’s choice, have denied admission, it is plain that Congress had in mind also the reasonable desires of the alien. It would be harsh indeed and contrary to the spirit of the statute if an alien could be denied deportation to a country with which he had all his natural ties simply because this government had, perhaps temno-rarily, withheld or withdrawn diplomatic recognition from the government in power for reasons unconnected with the alien’s status as a citizen of that country. Yet that is where the government’s logic leads.
The district court ruled that the failure to comply with § 243(a) was in effect harmless error, inasmuch as the appellant has been attempting to avoid deportation to the Chinese mainland from fear of persecution. It might be enough to say that in a matter of such consummate importance to an individual as deportation proceedings, the courts should insist that the letter of the law be observed. In this case, there is further ground for not regarding this contention as frivolous. Under § 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 214 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1253(h), the Attorney General has authority to withhold deportation of an alien “to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to physical persecution and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.” Whether the Communist government would respond affirmatively to an inquiry concerning the appellant and whether, if it did, he could secure a stay of deportation under § 243(h) is beside the point until the Inquiry is made. It is sufficient now to note the possibility that had the government complied with the procedures of § 243(a), the appellant would not face immediate deportation.6 This is not a case in which the alien had designated as the country of his choice the one deportation to which he later claims will subject him to persecution; in such a case, it might rea*479sonably be argued that the designation constituted a waiver of the relief provided by § 243 (h). Appellant’s situation seems to be precisely that for which that section was designed. An application for relief under § 6 of the Refugee Relief Act should not have the effect of a waiver of the independent relief available under § 243(h), particularly when, as I find, § 6 is inapplicable to the appellant.
Since, in my view, the order of deportation to Hong Kong was improper, I concur with the majority in reversing the judgment of the district court.
. In Lubini v. Brownell, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 125, 251 F.2d 28, certiorari denied sub nom. Lubini v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 966, 78 S.Ct. 1005, 2 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1958), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit said in a per curiam opinion that an applicant for relief under § 6 must show that “he will be «subject to persecution ‘on account of race, religion, or political opinion’ in the country of his birth * * * and in the country ofi his nationality * * * and in the country of bis last residence * * The court did not discuss the particular issue presented here, but the quoted language suggests agreement with the district court’s and my construction of the statute.
. If none of the countries in certain prescribed categories will receive him, the alien may be deported “to any country which is willing to accept such alien into its territory.”
. This would be true even if the “last residence” requirement of § 6 is construed to mean less than the § 2(a) requirement that the refugee be “not * * * firmly resettled.”
. Between 1925 and 1934, the appellant resided temporarily in the United States. Before that period and after it (until his flight) he resided on the mainland.
. In Tom Man, supra, the court “assumed” that an alien could not be regarded as a “subject national or citizen” of the Communist government “because we do not recognize that as more than a de facto government.” 264 F.2d at 928. However, that issue was not necessary to the court’s ruling, which was only that deportation of an alien to the Chinese mainland must be preceded by an inquiry of the Communist government whether it will accept him.
. In the past blanket orders have been issued under § 243(h) temporarily staying the deportation of Chinese nationals who claim that they will be subject to persecution if deported to the mainland. See orders dated October 31, 1956 and June 14, 1957 in the case of Lee Sung, Fife A-7921505 — New York.