Appellant was indicted for housebreaking, D.C.Code Ann. § 22-1801 (1961) and for rape, D.C.Code Ann. § 22-2801 (1961). Pie was tried before a jury and convicted on both counts and sentenced to concurrent terms of three to ten years in prison.
The housebreaking and rape took place on May 17, 1961, at approximately 5 a. m. and were promptly reported to the police. Shortly thereafter the complaining witness was taken to D.C. General Hospital where she was examined by a Dr. La-rocca, who made a report of his findings. In preparing for trial, the government, pursuant to the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1958),1 provided the defendant with a list of witnesses who were to be called to prove the government’s case. The examining doctor was listed as a government witness but by the time the case came to trial he was no longer in the District of Columbia and was un*869available. As part of the foundation for the medical report the prosecutor sought to qualify a representative of the hospital as a witness. The defense objected to testimony of this witness on the ground that her name was not on the list of government witnesses. The government then withdrew the witness and did not attempt thereafter to offer the medical report into evidence. Later, during the course of the trial, out of the hearing of the jury, defense counsel told the prosecutor that if he could see the hospital records “it might be possible that we would be able to stipulate the records * * */> Neither party pursued the matter thereafter. We note that the defense could have examined these records as a matter of right either before or during trial by taking appropriate steps, assuming the prosecution resisted an informal request. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 16, 17(c); D.C.Code Ann. § 14-308 (1961).
In the prosecutor’s closing argument the following comment was made to the jury:
“Now, ladies and gentlemen, something has been said about medical evidence in this case. You heard me bring a person in here from D.C. General Hospital with the records from D.C. General Hospital, and the defense counsel jumped up and objected to the records sight unseen. I don’t have to say anymore about that. They have to concede the records — ”
Defense counsel made timely objection to the prosecutor’s remark, thereby preserving the question for purposes of appellate review.
In the course of their deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge requesting, among other things, that they be allowed to see the medical report. This request was properly denied for the obvious reason that the report was not in evidence in the case. This episode suggests the jury considered that the medical report was of some importance to the decision they were required to make.
After the jury had sent in its request for the medical report, defense counsel moved for leave to see it. The prosecutor objected, and the court denied the motion. The court’s ruling was plainly correct since the records were not in evidence. The prosecutor then said, “I might say, Your Honor, for the sake of the record, this record would not reflect very much. It would indicate that the doctor did not find any evidence of rape.” He explained that he had planned to offer medical testimony to explain why there had been no evidence of trauma.
The likely impact of the prosecutor’s remark in his closing argument emerges when one considers that the medical report was not in evidence and its contents were unknown to the jury. It is possible if not probable that the prosecution’s references to the medical report conveyed the impression — contrary to the fact— that the report was helpful to the prosecution and damaging to the accused and that by the invocation of a technical objection the defense had prevented the jury from considering important information. In the context of this trial on a charge of rape, a capital offense, the remarks of the prosecutor were improper and prejudicial and require a new trial.
Since a new trial must be had it is incumbent upon us to treat two other points raised by appellant because they may arise on retrial.
Appellant contends that it was error to receive the testimony of the complainant’s mother relating to the telephone call made by complainant immediately after the alleged attack. This testimony was properly received in evidence. Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 416, 249 F.2d 508 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932, 78 S.Ct. 413, 2 L.Ed.2d 415 (1958); Wheeler v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 159, 211 F.2d 19 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019, 74 S.Ct. 876, 98 L.Ed. 1140 (1954). See also Wabisky v. D.C. Transit System Inc., D.C.Cir., 309 F.2d 317 (1962).
*870 Appellant took the stand in his own behalf. The thrust of his testimony was that although he had relations with the prosecuting witness it was with her consent. On cross-examination, the government, in an effort to impeach his credibility asked appellant about the contents of an affidavit he executed pursuant to Rule 17(b), Fed.R.Crim.P.2 The prosecutor was allowed to read the contents of that affidavit to the jury. In pertinent part it stated:
“That the testimony he or they [the witnesses] is expected to give if subpoenaed is to establish that I was not present at the scene of the crime, at the time it was allegedly committed.
“Third. That the evidence of the witness or witnesses is material to the defense because it will establish my alibi.”
Defendant’s objection to the use of the affidavit was overruled. We are advised on this appeal that the affidavit was prepared by court appointed counsel after consultation with his client.
The appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the government to use the affidavit for impeachment purposes because the statement was “compelled testimony” and hence violates his right against self-incrimination. This contention would be well founded if appellant had been compelled to make the statements in the affidavit.3 It is true that appellant was required to make a showing before the court below that he needed the named witnesses, the testimony they were expected to give, that their testimony would be relevant to the issues being tried and that he was unable to pay the costs of securing the witnesses. This showing is required by Rule 17(b) to screen out frivolous requests for witnesses. Murdock v. United States, 283 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1960); Reistroffer v. United States, 258 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 927, 79 S.Ct. 313, 3 L.Ed.2d 301 (1959); cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 (1962). Appellant was called upon to make a showing which a non-indigent is not required to make, but he was not compelled to make a false statement.4 On this record appellant has stated under oath once that he was present at the time and place of the alleged criminal act and once that others would swear he was *871elsewhere at that time. These statements are mutually inconsistent on their face. The issue is not which statement was the truth but narrowly whether the appellant was a truthful witness. It goes directly to the issue of appellant’s credibility; it is not a broadside impeachment by showing bad character.5 For the limited purpose of impeaching the appellant through his inconsistent statements under oath the trial court properly overruled objection to the impeachment use of the affidavit. See Tate v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 283 F.2d 377 (1960).
The holding in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954), is not directly in point but its underlying rationale is dis-positive of appellant’s claim. Here as in Walder “there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility.” An indigent is indeed “compelled” to make a showing he lacks resources or assets in order to have the court appoint counsel, supply witness fees and filing costs, but if it develops that he has a large bank account can it be thought he can successfully prevent impeachment for his false statement to the court?
An accused is not compelled to testify but if he does he is “compelled” to tell the truth at the risk of impeachment by what he has said on some other occasion, as, for example, in a tax return he was “compelled” to file. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 46 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed. 1054 (1926); Leeby v. United States, 192 F.2d 331, 334 (8th Cir. 1951). That he may be indicted for perjury also, is beside the point. In many contexts a citizen is compelled to give information to his government; tax returns,6 passport applications, affidavits in litigation, are but a few. But he is also compelled in another sense to tell the truth or bear the consequences, one of which is to suffer impeachment as a witness. The falsehood in the instant case, whether in the affidavit or in the witness chair, constituted a grave obstruction to the administration of justice and it would be intolerable if appellant could assert any bar to its use to test his veracity.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
. “A person charged with [a] capital offense shall at least three entire days before commencement of trial be furnished with * * * a list * * * of the witnesses to be produced on the trial for proving the indictment * *
. “Indigent Defendants. The court or a judge thereof may order at any time that a subpoena be issued upon motion or request of an indigent defendant. The motion or request shall be supported by affidavit in which the defendant shall state the name and address of each witness and the testimony which he is expected by the defendant to give if subpoenaed, and shall show that the evidence of the witness is material to the defense, that the defendant cannot safely go to trial without the witness and that the defendant does not have sufficient means and is actually unable to pay the fees of the witness. If the court or judge orders the subpoena to be issued tíre costs incurred by the process and the fees of the witness so subpoenaed shall be paid in the same manner in which similar costs and fees are paid in case of a witness subpoenaed in behalf of the government.”
. Tucker v. United States, 151 U.S. 164, 14 S.Ct. 299, 38 L.Ed. 112 (1894), while factually distinguishable supplies a rationale consistent with the conclusions we now reach. There the Court held a defendant’s affidavit made to secure subpoenas for his witnesses at government expense could be used to impeach his trial testimony. Objection was made by Tucker on the grounds the material was barred as being a “pleading of a party” or evidence obtained by discovery and hence was inadmissible under a statute proscribing use of such matter in a criminal ease.
. At this stage we have no way of knowing whether appellant swore falselj' in his affidavit or in testifying on trial; however, it is impossible for both stories to be time. The appellant’s indigency, even under the beneficent rule in Cop-pedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 (1962), gives him no privilege to lie, either on the stand or in an affidavit filed with the court.
. Offering the affidavit in evidence in the government’s case in chief to prove guilt would present totally different problems. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65-66, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954), would seem to preclude such use. In this case each of the two conflicting statements was inherently exculpatory rather than incriminating. The dissent incorrectly states that the government’s contention in this case is that appellant’s affidavit “may be used against him in a trial for his life.” More precisely, the government sought to use appellant’s prior statements for impeachment only and now asks us to sustain that use. It does not urge that the evidence be allowed as evidence in chief. We note also that by its very nature appellant’s affidavit reflects nothing as to guilt or innocence, but reflects only on credibility. Nothing in the instant case resembles the “compulsory discovery” or “compelling the production of his private books and papers, to convict him of crime,” alluded to by the dissent.
. The Supreme Court has approved the government’s use of compelled tax returns as evidence in chief in prosecutions for the crime of tax evasion. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 133, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954). A fortiori the compelled tax return may be used for the limited purpose of impeaching the taxpayer’s credibility as a witness in his own behalf. Leeby v. United States, 192 F.2d 331, 334 (8th Cir. 1951). Cf. Jackson v. United States (1), 48 App.D.C. 269 (1919) (Affidavit in support of a motion to sever by one co-defendant properly allowed for impeachment when that co-defendant chose to become a witness.)