(dissenting).
Study of the record convinces me that no error prejudicial to the defendants *230occurred in the trial and that the plaintiff’s verdict and judgment should be affirmed. Indeed, the only question which might give me pause is as to the action of the trial judge in taking the issue of negligence from the jury — a course which suggests a sharper differentiation between the correlative concepts of negligence and unseaworthiness than the modern precedents appear to support. But if there were error here, it was in the defendants’ favor and hence gives no basis for reversal on their appeal.
For the rest, Mosley’s own testimony (the only evidence bearing on the accident) gave convincing support to the two claims of inadequate lighting and improper appliances — both classic instances of unseaworthiness, as indeed the opinion demonstrates with ample citations. Mosley testified as to the difficulty of seeing the metal wedged in the chute because of the darkness and his inability to dislodge it with the improvised scrap metal hook which was his only tool. That then he slipped while standing on scrap and trying thus unsuccessfully to clear the chute would seem to present an obvious case for the jury to decide. My brothers are hard pressed to find grounds for taking these issues from the jury, and never do make clear the basis for their decision or indeed what further or other evidence they think the plaintiff should have produced. It is now well settled, contrary to earlier views, that a claimant need not produce expert testimony as to the inadequacy of the ship’s equipment, but the jury may make obvious deductions from the nature of the accident. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 82 S.Ct. 1119, 8 L.Ed. 2d 313, reversing a decision of this court, made that quite clear. In the light of the Salem principle I see no basis for ruling as a matter of law either that the appliance was adequate or that proximate cause was lacking. As we have recently held, “[t]he burden of selecting proper tools is not upon the seaman.” Street v. Isthmian Lines, 2 Cir., 313 F.2d 35, 38.
Regretfully I must conclude that this is yet another instance where my brothers determinedly deny the benefits of trial by jury to Jones Act plaintiffs. See citations in my dissents in Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 2 Cir., 312 F.2d 893, and Nuzzo v. Rederi, A/S Wallenco, Stockholm, Sweden, 2 Cir., 304 F.2d 506, 511, 514.
I would affirm.