(concurring).
I concur fully in Judge BROWNING’S opinion.
When, as here, there has been a complete disregard of a positive statutory command to record closing arguments, I find myself in a predicament. I do not want to order a new trial merely for want of this recording, in the absence of some proof of prejudice. And still, I know that if, in fact, government counsel made the kind of argument dealt with in Ginsberg v. United States, 5 Cir., 257 F.2d 950, 955, 70 A.L.R.2d 548, or in Wagner v. United States, 5 Cir., 263 F.2d 877, 884, I would seriously consider reversal for “plain error”, whether objection was or was not made at the time. Compare Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 248, 63 S.Ct. 561, 87 L.Ed. 734.
That any such thing happened is extremely unlikely, but it is not impossible, as the cases cited show. Perhaps the chances are only one in ten thousand, but since I believe that never, if we can possibly avoid it, should any man stand convicted where plain error occurs, I think we have taken here the only step that *297will make certain that appellant is assured a fair trial.