(dissenting).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, as it relates to responsibility for torts, in the District of Columbia,1 as elsewhere,2 is á creature of the courts. It would seem, therefore, that the courts here, as they have elsewhere,3 may undertake to relieve the District of this albatross.4 In this case, however, as I see it, the issue is not presented. In the District of Columbia,5 as elsewhere,6 responsibility for street safety has always been recognized as an exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine. Here the allegation is that the street intersection was unsafe because of the absence of a traffic control device. Whether this absence stemmed from an exercise of informed judgment on the part of the District Government or resulted from negligence is a question of fact which, if controverted, is for the jury.7
. Brown v. District of Columbia, 29 App. D.C. 273, 25 L.R.A.,N.S., 98 (1907).
. For a collection of the cases, see 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, § 29.6 (1956); Prosser, Law of Torts, pp. 77A-780 (1955).
. Sovereign immunity has been judicially abolished in whole or in part in: California — Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961), modified sub nom. Corning Hospital Dist. v. Superior Court of Tehama Co., 57 Cal.2d 488, 20 Cal.Rptr. 621, 370 P.2d 325 (1962) ;
Colorado — Colorado Racing Com’n v. Brush Racing Ass’n, 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957) ;
Florida — Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, Fla., 96 So.2d 130, 60 A.L.R.2d 1193 (1957) ;
Illinois — Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89, 86 A.L.R.2d 469 (1959) ;
Minnesota — Spanel v. Mounds View School District, Minn., 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962) ;
Michigan — Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961) ;
New Jersey — McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960);
Wisconsin — Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
But see Wilson v. Bittinger, 104 U.S. App.D.C. 403, 262 F.2d 714 (1958) ; Scull v. District of Columbia, 102 U.S. App.D.C. 104, 250 F.2d 767 (1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 920, 78 S.Ct. 703, 2 L.Ed.2d 715 (1958); Capital Transit Co. v. District of Columbia, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 199, 225 F.2d 38 (1955); Calomeris v. District of Columbia, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 364, 226 F.2d 266 (1955); Wilson v. District of Columbia, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 179 F.2d 44 (1949).
. Tlie doctrine of sovereign immunity has been the subject of a crescendo of criticism. See, e. g., Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 Xale L.J. 1, 1100 (1927); Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 Harv.L.Rev. 437, 461 (1941); Gellhorn & Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 Columbia L.Rev. 722 (1947).
. District of Columbia v. Boswell, 6 App.D.C. 402 (1895). For a collection of subsequent cases, see Booth v. District of Columbia, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 32, 33, n. 4, 241 F.2d 437, 438, n. 4 (1956).
. See 19 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. 1950).
. “ * * * In selecting and adopting a general plan of public improvement, * * * the municipal corporation exercises judicial discretion, but in carrying out the plan it acts ministerially, and must perform the work in a reasonably safe and skilful manner. Acting in good faith, it, therefore, would not be liable for an error of judgment in constructing such a system.
* * * * *
“ * * * Having adopted a plan and created an existing condition on the street in pursuance thereof, if it subsequently appears that the condition thus created renders the street unsafe, the District must go further and perform the duty cast upon it, growing out of its general supervision of the streets, to exercise ordinary care and take the neces*354sary additional steps to make the street, thus encumbered with the product of its plan, reasonably safe for travel.” District of Columbia v. Caton, 48 App.D.C. 96, 104-105, 106 (1918).
See also Booth v. District of Columbia, supra Note 5; District of Columbia v. Berberich, 56 App.D.C. 12, 6 F.2d 710 (1925); Spanel v. Mounds View School District, supra Note 3; Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409, 167 N.E.2d 63 (1960), noted, 61 Columbia D. Rev. 115 (1961) and 46 Cornell L. Quarterly 366 (1961); Eastman v. State, 303 N.Y. 691, 103 N.E.2d 56 (1951), reversing 278 App.Div. 1, 102 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1951).