(concurring specially).
I concur, with the following additional statement. This court had the poweiunder the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651, to take the action it took on the former appeal. United States v. Lynd, 5 Cir., 1962, 301 F.2d 818. However, in my judgment it was more properly a matter for mandamus. The issue did' not go to a denial of temporary relief as such, but to a delay in granting or denying the relief and this court should have spoken to the District Court through, a Writ of Mandamus.
This would have afforded the District Court a chance to be heard. It might have avoided the necessity of this court taking the case over prior to a decision in the District Court. It would have-avoided the multitudinous handling, by way of contempt hearings and otherwise,, since the grant of the original relief by this Court, with no further action having been taken in the interim on the main-case in the District Court. This case-serves as a classic example of the pitfalls-to be encountered, with the attendant disruption and delays in the orderly administration of justice when courts depart from the time-tested processes of law.