In upholding the action of the Board, this court has candidly based its action upon a speech by the company president which is said to have “interfered with the employees’ freedom of choice”. It also indicates that, but for the speech, a different result might have been reached.
This case is controlled by a principle imbedded in constitutional authority, and recognized by the National Labor Relations Act itself, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(c), which says:
“The expressing of any views, * * * shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”
It is obvious that the president of respondent company had a definite aversion to the recognition of a union in its factory. He had a right to his opinion and a right to state it. That there were those who disagreed with him is evidenced by the repeated efforts to secure the vote of a majority of its employees at a board-controlled election. There Was no reason why respondent’s president might not state his views to its employees prior to either of the elections. His right to do so existed correctively *844tvith the right of union organizers to present to the employees their views of the benefits of a union. Both sides had the right of fair comment.
■ The success which the president’s arguments met when the employees considered them vis-a-vis with the arguments and contentions of those who argued for the recognition of the union, should not be nullified by the brand of “unfair labor practice”. Moreover, I believe that employees, who have listened to the arguments of both sides, should be given a free rein in deciding their own fate, in surroundings which they understand and that their rights should not be tested under “laboratory conditions” in which, it is said, the Board must hold elections.
l I would deny enforcement of the Board’s order.