(dissenting).
The Subversive Activities Control Act1 aims to prevent a world-wide Communist conspiracy from accomplishing its purpose in the United States. § 2(15). Section 3(3) defines “Communist-action organization” as an organization which “(i) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and (ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist movement * Those objectives are “the overthrow of existing government by any means necessary and the establishment in its place of a Communist totalitarian dictatorship.” Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 89, 81 S.Ct. 1357, 1406-1407, 6 L.Ed.2d 625 (1961).
Section 3(4) of the Act defines “Communist-front organization” as an organization that “(A) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by a Communist-action organization, and (B) is primarily operated for the purpose of giving aid and support to a Communist-action organization, a Communist foreign government, or the world Communist movement * * The .Communist Party is a Communist-action organization. But I think the Board has not shown that the American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born “(B) is primarily operated for the purpose of giving aid and support” to the Communist Party.2 “The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by the preponderance of the evidence, [are] conclusive.” § 14(a). But what the Act means is a question of jaw for the court.
Congress might have made Communist control the sole test of a “Communist-front organization.” But Congress chose to include in the definition a purpose element as well as a control element. Also, Congress chose not to outlaw the Communist Party or prohibit all of its activities. Besides the objectives of overthrowing the government and establishing a dictatorship, the Party has innocent objectives and innocent activities. These are known to include, e. g., promoting public school integration. They have been shown to include contesting the deportation of aliens and promoting their naturalization. Congress did not say, and I think Congress did not mean, that a “purpose of giving aid” to a Communist-action organization in promoting an innocent objective makes an organization which it controls a Communist-front organization. I think the word “purpose” in § 3(4) should be read in connection with the word “objectives” in § 3(3). This context indicates that “purpose” is intended and should be understood to be limited to the purpose of aiding a Com*62munist-aetion organization to advance the objectives of the world Communist movement.
The way in which the Act deals with •Communist-front organizations confirms this understanding. The Act does not stop with requiring these organizations to register and furnish information. Most of the severe penalties prescribed in §§ 5(a) and 6(a) of the Act apply not only to members of Communist-action organizations but to members of Communist-front organizations also.3 These sections of the Act make it “unlawful” for members of either sort of organization to hold any non-elective office or employment under the United States, or to be employed by any labor organization, or to use a passport, or even to apply for a passport. The validity of these severe penalties is not now before us. But in my opinion their severity shows that Congress had no intention of inflicting them on otherwise innocent people merely because of membership in otherwise innocent, organizations that the Communist Party uses to advance an innocent aim.
Moreover a limited interpretation of the term Communist front is necessary if serious constitutional questions are to be avoided. The Communist Party case determines that constitutional rights in-eluding freedom of speech are not violated by enforcing the registration and information requirements of the Act against organizations that are primarily ■operated for the purpose of overthrowing the government and establishing a totalitarian dictatorship. 367 U.S. at 104-105, 81 S.Ct. at 1414-1415, 6 L.Ed.2d 625. But it is quite doubtful that these same requirements may constitutionally be enforced against an organization that is not shown to have the same ■or similar purposes. It is even more ■doubtful that the severe penalties of §§ 5(a) and 6(a) may constitutionally be inflicted on the members of such an organization. Although the last question is not now before us, it is bound to arise if “Communist-front organization” is finally given the broad interpretation which this court now gives it.
Activities protected by the first amendment cannot be restrained because of association with an organization some of whose activities are not so protected. In DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L.Ed. 278 (1937), the Supreme Court held that although the Communist Party was engaged in unlawful activities, punishing a member for helping the Party conduct a meeting that had only lawful purposes violated his constitutional right of free speech. The Court said:
“The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. * * * The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects.” [299 U.S. at 365, 57 S.Ct. at 260, 81 L.Ed. 278.]
In Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 81 S.Ct. 1469, 6 L.Ed.2d 782 (1961), the Court sustained the constitutionality of a broad clause of the Smith Act directed against members of the Communist Party by interpreting the clause as intended to apply only to those members who intend to engage in or further the Party’s sinister activities. The Court said: “Thus the member for whom the organization is a vehicle for the advancement of legitimate aims and policies does not fall within the ban of the statute * * 367 U.S. at 229, 81 S.Ct. at 1486, 6 L.Ed.2d 782.4
This court does not directly express a conclusion with regard to the Commit*63tee’s purpose. It does say that the Board’s conclusion that the Committee “was a Communist front within the terms of the statute was well founded.” Majority Opinion p. 60. But the court’s opinion is devoted almost entirely to the subject of control by the Communist Party. The otherwise lawful purposes of an organization do not become unlawful simply because it is controlled by an organization that has the same lawful purposes together with other purposes that are unlawful. Neither the Board nor the court says the preponderance of the evidence supports a conclusion that the Committee is primarily operated for the purpose of aiding the Communist Party to advance the world Communist movement’s objectives of overthrowing the government and establishing a totalitarian dictatorship. It seems to me clear that the preponderance of the evidence does not support such a conclusion. I would therefore set aside the Board’s order.
I think the government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Committee is primarily operated for the purpose of giving aid and support to the Communist Party in advancing any objective, even an innocent one.5 As the court points out, both the American Committee and the Communist Party attacked and attempted to change our government’s policy toward the foreign born, and defended individuals, many of them Communists, who were affected by the policy. But as the court also says, the Committee “enlisted in behalf of many non-Communists.” Majority Opinion p. 57. I think the evidence does not show that the Committee was primarily operated for the purpose of giving aid to the Party in advancing any objective, rather than for the purpose of advancing the Committee’s own objectives which the Party shared. To treat the Party’s control of the Committee, and the overlapping of their memberships and objectives, as proving that the Committee was primarily operated for the purpose of aiding the Party would read the element of purpose out of the Act and make it unnecessary for the government to prove anything more than control.6
Our first opinion in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 66, 109-110, 223 F.2d 531, 574-575 (1954), states that the Board had found secret practices of the Party to have been engaged in for the purpose of concealing the Party’s true *64nature and promoting its objectives, whereas the Party contended its purpose in using the secret practices had been to protect Party members from oppression. We said:
“This question, whether the secret practices of the Party are for the purpose of protecting the liberties of the members or are for the purpose of promoting the objectives of the Party, is a nebulous one. The two purposes may well overlap. In so far as protection of its members from public identification as Communists also promotes the objectives of the Party, both purposes could exist together. In a doubtful situation such as that on this point, we strike the finding as to purpose.” [96 U.S. App.D.C. at 110, 223 F.2d at 575.]
I think we should strike the finding as to purpose in the present case. In the former case, the finding as to purpose was a subsidiary one and we affirmed the Board’s order without it. In the present case, the American Committee’s purpose is a crucial question. But this should not lead us to abandon the principle we formerly adopted.
When the control and the purpose that show an organization to be a Communist front are both established, its lawful activities do not insulate the organization and its members from the sanctions directed against fronts. But lawful activities cannot, in my opinion, make an organization a front.7 A Communist-front organization is like a man with a false beard. The Subversive Activities Control Act directs us to remove the beard but not without proof that it is false.
. 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781 et seq. (1958).
. Although Congress juxtaposed the word “substantially” in § 3(4) (A) with “primarily” in § 3(4) (B), the majority nonetheless says that “primarily” means “substantially.” Majority Opinion p. 57. To support this construction of the Subversive Activities Control Act, reference is made to the Banking Act of 1933 where, in a widely different context, the word “primarily” appears alone. I think the word “primarily” in § 3(4) (B) must be given its ordinary dictionary meaning of “principally” or “chiefly.”
I have not considered the Board’s finding that the American Committee “(A) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled” by the Communist Party.
. Section 5(a) (1) (D) prohibits employment in defense facilities of members of Communist-action organizations only. See also §§ 0(b), 7(d) (4), and 8.
. Cases such as American Communications Ass’n C. I. O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925 (1950); Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 82 *63S.Ct. 302, 7 L.Ed.2d 256 (1961); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115, 78 S.Ct. 180, 2 L.Ed.2d 140 (1957) ; Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 83 S.Ct. 1819, 10 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1963), are not to the contrary. The latest expression of Supreme Court doctrine makes plain that certain civil sanctions may be imposed based on evidence of a “meaningful association” with the Communist Party characterized by awareness of its “distinct and active political nature” ; but such sanctions may not rest on evidence of an “association” with the Party — much less with one of its alleged front organizations — characterized by a belief that it is “a group solely trying to remedy unsatisfactory social or economic conditions, carry out trade-union objectives, eliminate racial discrimination, combat unemployment, or alleviate distress and poverty.” Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, supra 374 U.S. at 473 — 474, 81 S.Ct. at 1821-1822, 10 L.Ed.2d 1013.
. The Board concluded that the Committee operates to serve a two-fold purpose of the Party: “(a) to seek to prevent the denaturalization and deportation of officers and members of the Party, and (b) to win the goodwill of the foreign bom and obtain from them adherents to and support for the Party and for Party programs.” Report and Order of the Board at 21 (June 27, 1960).
. Although conduct may sometimes show purpose, I think the Committee’s ambiguous conduct in this case does not support an inference of any purpose other than protection of the foreign born. In the Communist Party case, on the other hand, the proof included “long-continued, totally unwavering identity of policy linos” between the Party and the Soviet Union, including identical positions on “forty-five major international issues during thirty years.” 367 U.S. at 59, 61, 81 S.Ct. at 1391-1392, 6 L.Ed.2d 625.
. This court illustrates what seems to me its misunderstanding of the law by characterizing as “of course Communist doctrine” the American Committee’s position that laws requiring deportation of present or former Communist aliens “were premised on political opinion and threatened the freedom of all American people to their political opinions.” Majority Opinion p. 59. This view of the deportation provisions is held by many loyal Americans. See also the Board’s similar argument:
“Even Abner Green’s testimony that in defending Eisler in the deportation proceedings [the American Committee] was supporting the Bill of Rights, was consistent with the position of the Communist Party that ‘To advocate action against Communists is to destroy the Bill of Rights.’ ” Report and Order of the Board at 29.