(dissenting).
Lefkowitz began working for the Bureau in April, 1958. In February, 1961, he and Bradley, another adjuster, started *918an organizing drive in behalf of the Union. Both testified before the Board in support of a representative petition April 25, 1961. On May 19, Lefkowitz’ regional manager recommended his transfer to a one-man office or to New York. About the first of June Bradley was discharged, and contemporaneously Lefkowitz’ work was substantially doubled. In September his regional manager again recommended his transfer. In October Lefkowitz testified before the Board in support of a complaint alleging that Bradley was discharged for union activity. Later in October there was a conference in New York as a result of which Bureau officials Crit-ton and Searles arrived in Pittsburgh November 15 and reviewed Lefkowitz’ files. November 17 Lefkowitz was called in conference with Searles, Critton, and local officials. Late that day he called the Bureau’s personnel manager in New York. November 20 he submitted his resignation effective March 1, 1962. Pour days later his resignation was accepted, and he was told to turn in the company car and to cease work immediately. He was paid by the Bureau to March 1.
This skeleton of facts tells us nothing about the issue, which is whether Lefko-witz’ resignation was a constructive discharge. There is no doubt that he was “cocky”, with an exaggerated opinion of his importance. This is evidenced by his ambition to participate more fully in the Bureau’s profit and affairs, by the terms of his resignation and by his offer in it to make himself available if needed by the Bureau for not to exceed thirty days after March 1 upon terms which he laid down. These characteristics did not result in his being separated from the Bureau. As indicated, he was presumed to be, with qualifications, a satisfactory employee.
Decision upon the issue rests on matters of credibility as to what really was the cause of, or what led to, the resignation. These were largely questions of credibility in the peculiar province of the trier of fact to choose between conflicting versions of what happened.
This court should not usurp the pre-i rogative of the trier of fact to decide whom to believe. Because Lefkowitz made statements against his present interests, we are not to “think” that “on those occasions he told the truth,” or to find it strange “that the Board was will-’ ing to accept as true” his testimony, at the trial, that the statements against present interest were not true. We should not be critical of the Board’s, and the Trial Examiner’s, attaching “no significance” to Lefkowitz’ statements against interest, in view of his explanation that he feared telling the truth about his resignation would harm him. (And the Board was not required to pass moral judgment on Lefkowitz’ lying.) The^ Board, not we, had the power to measure! the credibility of Lefkowitz by comparing his statements against interest andJ his testimony at the trial.
Although there is a conflict in the evidence, after reviewing the record as a whole, I see no reason to upset the findings of fact made by the Board and the Trial Examiner. It is my opinion that the Board could reasonably infer that Lefkowitz’ trouble with the Bureau stemmed from his union activity, that the Bureau officials, in the Pittsburgh area and in New York, cooperated to render Lefkowitz’ relationship, knowing his characteristics, unbearable so that he would do exactly as he did. The Board was not required to draw the contrary inference that the majority opinion has drawn.
The Board’s inferences are borne out by testimony that Lefkowitz’ superior, early in November, 1961, approved his political ambition; that he was a young married man with little income other than his salary; that the primary political campaign was in May, 1962; that Lefkowitz objected to the idea of paying his salary with no work until March 1; and that Lefkowitz offered to work until April 1 if needed. There is testimony too that New York officials were sent to Pittsburgh with information that the *919Bureau was having “considerable trouble” with union activities, with Lefko-witz one of the leaders; that instructions were given to Lefkowitz’ superior to find “something wrong” with his files; that the officers from New York after reviewing the files found them “deplorable”, far below Bureau standards, and impliedly threatened discharge; and that the personnel manager in New York thereafter asked Lefkowitz, when discussing his resignation, whether Lefko-witz thought he might do better work in some area other than Pittsburgh.
In my opinion, the record as a whole supports the Board’s conclusion that the General Counsel had sustained his burden of proving the unfair labor practice alleged.