On the basis of the essential facts stated in the court’s opinion bearing on the issue of likelihood of confusion, I respectfully dissent.
For reasons very similar to those which I stated in my opinion for the court in In re General Electric Co., 304 F.2d 688, 691, 49 CCPA 1186 (1962), I cannot see any real likelihood that those who would purchase Alford’s antenna and coaxial line components at prices from $300 to $50,000 and Alfred’s highly technical microwave and other electronic equipment selling from $1,000 to $9,000 would be confused as to source or anything else by the obvious similarities between ALFORD and ALFRED. There are also obvious differences. Like the marks VULCAN and VULKENE in the General Electric case, one mark, Alfred, is very common as a given name but Alford is relatively uncommon. It immediately strikes the consciousness as distinctly different for that very reason. Compare LUX and SHUX in Lever Brothers Co. v. Producers Chemical Service, 283 F.2d 879, 48 CCPA 744, wherein we found no likelihood of confusion even on cheap consumer products sold off the supermarket shelf.
Since I see no likelihood of confusion, I see no basis for an interference. I would vacate the board’s decision and remand for dissolution of the interference.