(concurring).
Litigants coming to this court would be more certain of their rights if we were more consistent in our methods of *944determining Congressional intent. Here, for example, a literal interpretation of the statute is rejected because there is no convincing evidence Congress intended to change the existing law. Quite opposite was the rationale employed in In re Palmquist, 319 F.2d 547, 552, 50 CCPA 839. There a literal interpretation was fiercely embraced although there was no evidence Congress intended to change the existing law. On the contrary, the prior practice of the Patent Office1 and the decisions of this court2 provided ample evidence that Congress did not intend to change the existing law.
. Ex parte Austin, 72 USPQ 384.
. In re Wenzel, 88 F.2d 501, 24 CCPA 1050; In re Ruscetta, 255 F.2d 687, 45 CCPA 968.