I concur, for the reasons set out below, in the view expressed in Judge Edgerton’s opinion that the indictment, charging appellant with rape must be-dismissed because appellant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was denied.
I emphasize first that appellant’s claim that his trial was not speedy in the constitutional sense relates only to events occurring after the District Court, “upon the basis of the testimony” of two psychiatrists, allowed him on March 12,1962, *123-to withdraw his plea of guilty, given ■nearly two years earlier, to the lesser (included) offense of assault with intent to commit rape; after the Acting Superintendent of St. Elizabeths Hospital, to which appellant had been committed for mental examination on his own motion, reported on June 11, 1962, that in the -opinion of the Hospital’s staff the appellant was mentally competent to stand trial; and after the appellant was released on June 14, 1962, to the United States Marshal to be returned to jail .and tried.1
The trial finally occurred on July 8, 1963, more than a year after June 14, 1962. The facts bringing about this long delay are set out chronologically in the ■attached appendix. I must conclude that in the circumstances this delay in trial for more than a year was so prejudicial, •oppressive, and vexatious as to amount to a violation of appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
When the District Court allowed withdrawal of the plea of guilty to the lesser included offense in March 1962, it set the case for trial on the following July 16. However, on June 12 the trial was continued by the court until October 8, 1962, as the Assignment Commissioner noted, because of the summer schedule and the unavailability of jurors and witnesses. No further explanation appears. I think this delay cannot be condoned for the reasons given. The appellant was to be tried on a charge for which the death penalty might be imposed. The District Court is required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 50 to give preference to criminal proceedings and I think particularly to one of this type, where since May 12, 1960, .appellant appears to have been either in jail or in a mental hospital. We judicially know that criminal cases are tried during the summer months pursuant to the reduced summer schedule, and that jurors can be made available for this purpose. Witnesses also can generally be made available by subpoena or their testimony be taken by deposition, and in the absence of some persuasive showing to the contrary, the trial should have occurred in the summer months. To be sure, the appellant did not ask the District Court to appoint new counsel for him2 until August 14, 1962, and counsel was appointed to represent him on August 17. Notwithstanding this, I think that the postponement of trial until October 8 was not shown to be justified. The record before us does not indicate that after his appointment counsel asked for or required nearly two months for preparation.
I need not go fully into the matter of the delays beyond October 8, 1962, until trial of the case was actually commenced on July 8, 1963. Some of them were perhaps unavoidable, such as the postponement from July 1 to July 8, 1963, and some appear to be attributable to the appellant or to the various counsel appointed to represent him. But the appellant pro se on January 10, 1963, moved to dismiss the indictment against him because, as he alleged, he had not had the speedy trial guaranteed him by the Constitution, and subsequent like motions were filed by him on April 24, 1963, and May 21, 1963. Even assuming arguendo, contrary to what I have said, that the delay before January was satisfactorily explainable in its entirety, I think that the receipt of the first motion on January 10, 1963, protesting the delay on constitutional grounds, required the District Court to take the necessary steps to see that the trial then set for January 21, 1963, take place on that day, *124or as soon thereafter as possible.3 Instead, there were successive postponements until January 28, March 11, April 22, May 13, May 14, July 1, and finally July 8. Although the reasons given for the various postponements may have justified a postponement for a reasonable period in most or perhaps all of the instances, I think it was unreasonable, and in violation of appellant’s constitutional rights, to order postponements for the length of time allowed in at least the three instances where the trial was delayed for more than a month. In my view, the case should each time have been put on a day-to-day basis, see fn. 3, so that unreasonable delay would not occur. Cf. King v. United States, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 193, 265 F.2d 567, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 998, 79 S.Ct. 1124, 3 L.Ed.2d 986 (1959), including the dissent in which I concurred.
It is my view also that the delay is not shown not to have prejudiced the defendant in defending himself at his trial. Cf. Williams v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 51, 250 F.2d 19 (1957). He took the stand at his first trial, which resulted in a hung jury. At the trial held on July 8, 1963, he was unable, according to statements of his appointed counsel, to communicate effectively and thus to testify. Since the report to the District Court by the Acting Superintendent of St. Elizabeths Hospital on June 11, 1962, stated that it was the opinion of the Hospital Staff that “Marshall is mentally competent to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and to assist properly in the preparation of his defense,” an assumption is required for present purposes that the appellant had the ability at that time to communicate effectively. His loss of that ability prior to trial clearly indicates, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, that substantial prejudice to appellant’s defense resulted in the long delay before his trial occurred on July 8, 1963.
Since I have concluded that the indictment must be dismissed, I do not reach any of the other points raised.
Appendix (to Judge Washington’s opinion)
1. June 11, 1962: Letter from the Acting Superintendent of St. Elizabeths Hospital informing the District Court that in the opinion of the Hospital’s staff, appellant was “mentally competent” to stand trial and that, although he suffered from mental disease, the criminal offense with which he was charged, if committed by him, was not a product of that disease.
2. June 12, 1962: Trial date, originally set for July 16, 1962, by the District Court on March 15, 1962, at time it allowed appellant to withdraw his plea of guilty, was continued to October 8, 1962, because of “the summer schedule and the unavailability of jurors and witnesses.”
3. August 17, 1962: First counsel (#1)1 appointed to represent appellant.
4. October 1, 1962: Counsel #1 allowed to withdraw because of lack of experience with criminal law,2 and trial date continued to November 26,1962, because of neces*125sity of appointing new counsel for appellant.
5. October 2, 1962: Counsel #2 appointed to represent appellant.
6. October 8, 1962: Counsel #2 withdrawn (reason not disclosed) and Counsel #3 appointed.
7. November 15, 1962: Motion by appellant pro se to appoint other counsel for him3 and to extend time for trial.
Trial date continued frcm November 26, 1962, to January 21, 1963, on motion of Counsel #3 stating that appellant wanted a continuance because his attorney should have more time to prepare.
8. December 14, 1962: Counsel #3 withdrawn because of serious illness in his family and he was behind in his office work. Appellant had also requested other counsel on November 15 (see above).
9. December 19, 1962: Counsel #4 appointed.
LO. January 10, 1963: Motion to dismiss indictment filed by appellant pro se for alleged denial of a speedy trial.4
11. January 18, 1968: Motion to dismiss denied, following argument by counsel.
12. January 21,1963: Deposition of Dr. Julian, testifying on behalf of appellant, taken, and trial set for that date continued until January 28, 1963, because the United States Attorney was engaged in another trial.
13. January 28, 1963: Trial date continued to March 11, 1963, because appellant’s Counsel #4 was ill with flu.
14. February 13, 1963: Trial date continued to April 22, 1963, at Government’s request because the complaining witness was to have a child during March.
15. April 22,1963: Trial date continued to May 13, 1963, because Government counsel was ill.
16. May 13, 1963: Trial date continued to May 14, 1963, because Counsel #4 was engaged in trial in another court.
17. May 14,1963: Case called; on oral motion, Counsel #4 was allowed to withdraw because of charges by appellant that he was conspiring to bring about appellant’s conviction and would not properly defend appellant. Counsel #5 appointed and trial date continued to July 1, 1963, presumably to allow time for newly appointed counsel to prepare.
18. May 22, 1963: Counsel #5 withdrawn (reason does not appear) and Counsel #6 appointed.
19. July 1, 1963: Trial date continued until July 8, 1963, on order of court because new jurors had to be obtained and their names served on appellant.
20. July 8, 1963. Trial commenced.
21. July 10, 1963: Jury found appellant guilty as charged of rape.
22. July 29, 1963: Judgment of conviction entered and sentence fixed for period of 4 to 12 years.
. Before that time appellant was apparently represented by retained counsel. He dismissed that lawyer and, as stated, on August 14 sought new counsel.
. In a comparable situation in Smith v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C.-, -, 331 F.2d 784, 788 (1964), the District Court placed the case on a day-to-day basis, to be tried “as promptly as an opening developed with a court and counsel available.” The Smith case is of course also distinguishable in other ways from this one, including the facts that the delay there (between indictment and trial) was for only about five months and that this period did not include the three summer months.
. Since the date of the indictment appellant bad previously bad the services of five other attorneys.
. Although this court frequently appoints counsel without experience to represent persons accused of crime before this court, even in capital cases, Judge Edger-ton’s opinion states of Counsel #1: “He should not have been appointed in the first place. A capital trial is no place for a lawyer to begin acquiring experience in criminal practice.” I note that *125courts would be greatly handicapped in making appointments of counsel for representation of indigent defendants in capital cases if they must be confined to attorneys with experience in criminal law.
. Three of the attorneys appointed to represent the appellant prior to March 15, 1962, were permitted to withdraw; the first after he learned that appellant refused to tell him the true facts; another because appellant did not want him as his lawyer; the third because appellant did not want her representation and “discharged” her as defense counsel.
. Subsequent motions pro se to dismiss on this ground were filed on April 24, 1963, denied after hearing on May 3, 1963, and on May 21, 1963, denied after hearing and argument on June 19, 1963.