(dissenting).
I join in Judge Smith’s dissent to which I would add only the following thoughts.
In In re Hartop, 311 F.2d 249, 50 CCPA 780, 792, after reviewing a number “of the so-called reduction-to-praetiee cases decided by this court,” we summarized our view of them as follows:
“In some of the cases, the court found actual reduction to practice had been established; in others, no actual reduction to practice was found. However, running through ■all nine cases cited is the same expressed or implied criterion, namely, how would one skilled in the art interpret the experiments or tests. If the court was convinced that one ■skilled in the art would accept a particular test or experiment as a ‘possibility’ or ‘reasonable certainty’ or ■“probability’ or that it was ‘reasonably predictable’ that a tested invention would operate as alleged or have the utility alleged, a reduction to practice was found; otherwise, the court found no reduction to practice.”
I think White has shown all that the law, as this court has propounded it, requires.
I also feel that the majority has failed to appreciate the essential simplicity of the claimed invention and its relation to the prior art as a mere improvement thereon. Reading the record and observing the reactions of my colleagues to it and to appellee’s brief has given me the feeling that appellee has succeeded in hiding this essential simplicity behind a great cloud of dust without anything specific upon which to rest his case.
In my view the evidence adequately establishes the only two things that had to be established: (1) that the paddles added to the old gyro structure would effectually increase damping; and (2) that the linearity of damping is not thereby sacrificed.