(dissenting) :
I would grant this petition for rehearing en banc for the following reasons:1
(1) This court upholds the trial court’s refusal of petitioners’ request for an instruction that the testimony of a paid police informer was to be considered with caution, especially where a criminal record was shown. As Judge WASHINGTON pointed out in his dissent to the court’s opinion, this holding is in conflict with our long-settled rule that requires such an instruction when requested. The court’s reliance on Cratty v. United States, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 286, 163 F.2d 844 (1957), is misplaced. There the charge was not requested, and the only issue was whether in the circumstances of that case the omission constituted plain error.
(2) Petitioners’ claim that they were denied a speedy trial is substantial. The Government waited eight months after the alleged crimes before seeking arrest, although it needed no further evidence of crime or identity. During this time petitioners, without notice of charges against them, had no reason to preserve their memory of the times or circumstances to which the charges relate. That prejudice resulted seems almost certain from the circumstances of the case. See my dissent to denial of rehearing en banc in Wilson v. United States, 118 U.S.App. D.C. 319, 321, 335 F.2d 982, 984 (1964).
(3) In any event, action on this petition should be withheld to await the disposition of pending cases in this court in which the issue of delay will be considered on augmented factual records.2
*236WILBUR K. MILLER, Senior Circuit Judge, prior to his retirement on October 15, 1964, voted to deny the aforesaid petition.
PAHY, Circuit Judge, would grant appellants’ petition.
WRIGHT, Circuit Judge, did not participate in the foregoing order.
. Petitioners also request the court to modify its characterization of their arguments on appeal
“(a) that they were denied a speedy trial after arrest (Hardy’s arrest on March 19 and Ferguson’s on April 27, 1963); joint trial on August 19, 1963;
“(b) that this delay along with delay in arrest for eight months after the alleged offense (date of offense, August 27, 1962) deprived them of a fair trial in violation of due process of law * *
Petitioners request that it read:
“(a) that they were denied a speedy trial by reason of the delay between the commission of the alleged offense on August 27, 1962 and the trial held on August 19, 1963;
“(b) that this delay deprived them of a fair trial in violation of due process of law * •
Although petitioners have accurately characterized the argument they made, I think the matter is not appropriate for en itme consideration.
. Order of January 28. 1964, Ross v. United States, No. 17,877; Order of November 3, 1964, Jackson v. United States, No. 18,597; Order of November 10, 1964, Roy v. United States, No. 18,285; Order of November 19. 1964, Mackey v. United States, No. 18,525; Order of November 23, 1964, Godfrey v. United States, No. 18,442; Order of December 11, 1964, Woody v. United States, No. 17,965; Order of December 16, 1964, Johnson v. United States, No. 18,207.