(dissenting).
The court is, of course, familiar with the established principles applicable to judicial review of Labor Board findings, and there is no point in reiterating them. My disagreement arises from what I regard as a misapplication of these standards and a substitution of the court’s conclusions for those of the Board which are strongly supported. Instead of inquiring whether there is support in the record as a whole for the Board’s conclusions, the court’s inquiry here seems to be whether there is evidence to support a contrary conclusion.
The majority states that the company “had personal discussions” with some of the employees, but there is scant attention to the character of these discussions. These were not bland conversations. The record is replete with evidence of bitter and coercive interviews, persistent attempts to pry into individual employees’ union attitudes and activities, interrogation of workers to discover what had happened at union meetings, probing as to the number of union pledge cards an employee had in his pockets, direct questions to employees as to how they intended to vote in the representation election, coupled with warnings to “better leave it [the union] alone,” threats of pay cuts, loss of bonuses and vacations if the union won the election.
In the context woven by many such incidents the Board was well within the bounds of its authority in holding that the employer had violated section 8(a) (1) of the Act. The holding should not be disturbed.
Out of this background arose the two discharges found by the Board to be discriminatory under sections 8(a) (3) and d).
Violations as to Jack Harris
The court, substituting its conclusions for those of the Board and its Examiner, finds that Harris was discharged for threatening two other employees. Although Harris may have made such threats on June 5, there is substantial support in the record for the Board’s view that the employer merely seized upon them as a pretext to discharge Harris for his pro-union views and activities. Southern Materials had been under the firm impression that Harris was an anti-union employee, but from the above incident it learned for the first time that he held pro-union views. Harris was thereupon summarily discharged even though his work record during three years of employment was unblemished. One of the two employees to whom his threats were addressed was an anti-union man who had likewise threatened Harris, but only Harris was singled out for severe discipline. No action whatever was taken against the anti-union employee. It was for the Board, not this court, to interpret these events and determine the real motivation for the discharge.
The employer and now the court undertake to bolster their view by reliance on Harris’ activities after his discharge. These later events could not possibly have entered into the company’s decision to discharge him. There is no justification for importing into the case Harris’ post-discharge conduct. Nor is a reviewing court authorized in a case of this nature to apply sub silentio the doctrine of unclean hands, or to substitute its policy views for those of the Board.
Violations as to William H. Sawyer
This employee was deliberately hounded out of his job because he dared to assert his lawful right to assist the unionization effort. There is substantial evidence to support the Board’s conclusion that Sawyer was discriminatorily transferred from his home in Richmond to Lynchburg, and that his treatment was designed to force him to quit his job. The court prefers to believe the employer’s version that Sawyer was transferred when, in the normal course of the employer’s business at Lynchburg, an “emergency” arose, and that Sawyer “agreed” to a change in assignment. It further finds that Sawyer quit his job in “disappointment” over the union’s loss of the election. In doing so, it overlooks *246several highly significant facts underlying the Board’s conclusion.
After Sawyer, an active union adherent, rejected Vice-President Wingo’s suggestion that he persuade fellow employees to vote against the union, Wingo chided Sawyer for “messing around” with the union and getting the employees “upset.” Several days later and, by happy coincidence from the employer’s standpoint, less than two weeks before the election, an “emergency” was created by the company’s firing of its crane operator in Lynchburg. Sawyer was the Richmond crane operator summarily chosen to be transferred, notwithstanding that the company had in Richmond two other crane operators, one of whom had previously worked in Lynchburg. Both of these had less seniority than Sawyer, and although he pleaded that his wife was ill, no consideration was shown him. He was peremptorily told, “You have to go or quit.”
The Board found that the employer’s true motivation was first manifested in the order of transfer, and still more clearly highlighted when Sawyer reached his new duty station. Immediately on his arrival in Lynchburg he was questioned by his foreman as to possible union activities. The foreman persisted and there was another unpleasant encounter. Sawyer decided to quit rather than run the risk of “further trouble” which might provoke him to attack the supervisor if he continued harassing Sawyer for his union activities. When informed of Sawyer’s decision to quit, Wingo, who had found fault with Sawyer for “messing around” with the union, made no effort to ascertain the reason despite Sawyer’s good record of twelve years.
This evidence presents at least an adequate basis — some might think it a compelling one — for the Board’s conclusion that Sawyer’s sudden transfer to Lynch-burg and harassment there by his foreman stemmed from the company’s fear and resentment of his union activities. It also fully supports the Board’s inference that Sawyer’s decision to quit was not a volitional act but the inevitable result of the employer’s anti-union discrimination. NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., 339 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1964).
Other 8(a) (1) Violations
Instead of addressing itself to the specific charges of 8(a) (1) violations in an effort to determine whether the Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, the court undertakes to deal with matters of credibility of witnesses, inferences to be drawn from failure to call witnesses and other matters. While this approach is appropriate for a hearing examiner, these matters are not so broadly in our discretion. We are barred by our limited scope of review from making an independent judgment when the record contains solid support for the findings under review.
Because I think that there is substantial basis for the Board’s findings, I would enforce its order.