(concurring in part and dissenting in part), with whom ALMOND, J., joins.
I regret the necessity to repeat the views expressed in the dissenting opinion in In re Tanner, 52 CCPA-, 343 F.2d 1018, 145 USPQ 345, that this court has *441no authority whatever, and the majority cites none, to direct the Patent Office to reopen prosecution to determine the effect, if any, of a terminal disclaimer. I again remind my colleagues that Congress has directed this court to restrict itself to “the evidence produced before the Patent Office,” and to confine its decision “to the points set forth in the reasons of appeal.” 35 U.S.C. § 144. Here, the proposed terminal disclaimer is not part of that evidence, is not in the record, is not mentioned in the reasons of appeal, and, as far as this court’s jurisdiction is concerned, does not legally exist.