(concurring) :
I concur in the result reached by Judge Danaher and in his treatment of the two grounds relied upon by the District Court, but I think it important to add a word regarding what I conceive to be appellant’s responsibility in the hearing to be held following our remand.
The fact that Tracy Roosevelt Corporation felt impelled to come forward to head off an impending lien on the Roosevelt Hotel, describing itself (as had the notice of lien) as “owner” and presumably paying a premium to appellant and giving it some security against ultimate liability on the bond, is strongly suggestive of an interest of some kind on its part in that piece of realty. It may not have been the record owner, but that by no means precludes its having an interest that will support a mechanic’s lien. Thus, I do not think that the stipulated negation of record ownership was adequate by itself to satisfy appellant’s burden of coming forward with an explanation of why it once signed and filed a bond characterizing Tracy Roosevelt Corporation as “owner,” but now claims flatly that there is no indication that the latter had any interest of any kind.1 Ap*435pellant may, of course, be able to adduce a satisfactory explanation that will rebut the presumption, or prima facie showing, of lienable interest which I think arises in the special circumstances of this case. If it does, the ultimate burden will remain on appellee to establish that Tracy Roosevelt had an interest to which its lien could have attached in the absence of a bond.
. Although the proof normally associated with estoppel has not been forthcoming, I do note that the bond was filed May 16, 1957, and that it was not, as I read the record, until the hearing on its mo*435tion for default judgment on June 15, 1962, that appellee was fully placed on notice of appellant’s contention that Tracy Roosevelt Corporation was devoid of any interest in the property. Until that latter date, appellee was certainly entitled to feel that, if it could establish the debt owing to it, it would be assured of payment. The fact and exact amount of that debt were later stipulated by appellant and appellee.