(dissenting):
I dissent.
As indicated in my dissent in United States v. Robinson, decided today, I believe that Escobedo v. Illinois requires us to reverse this conviction, founded in part on Cone’s statements to the agents after his arrest, when he had not been advised of his right to counsel or his right to remain silent. There can be no question but that the criminal process had shifted from investigatory to accusatory and had focussed upon Cone. The marihuana had been intercepted and followed to the addressees. They had given statements accusing Cone and detailing the planned delivery to Cone, thereupon carried out under the surveillance of the agents and followed to Cone’s possession at the agreed place of delivery. The investigation was complete, the agents had learned that Cone had shipped the drug from Panama to himself at New York. Without limitation of the rights and duties of the agents to continue investigation as to the involvement of others, Escobedo makes it plain that the use against Cone of self-incriminatory statements elicited for that purpose by agents after he became the target of the investigation arid had indeed been arrested for the crime and was without counsel is forbidden. The Constitution requires that his right to counsel be enforced unless competently waived — and there can be no serious claim of waiver here.
It is possible to read Escobedo very narrowly and confine it to its particular facts, but I submit that this does violence to the opinion’s explanation of the rationale of the holding and to the dissenters’ understanding of what the Court’s opinion meant. Moreover, grudging inch by inch acquiescence can only prolong litigation and the uncertainty of enforcement officials and delay steps to improve promptness in assuring the provision of counsel and development of alternative investigatory techniques. I would reverse for new trial with Cone’s admissions after arrest, in the absence of counsel, excluded.