(concurring).
My concurrence in the result here is based solely on the obviousness of the claimed invention under 35 U.S.C. § 103, concerning which the following additional observations may be in order.
The Supreme Court in considering section 103 in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966), pointed out the importance of the factual considerations which must be taken into account before arriving at the legal conclusion of obviousness. The instant case, it seems to me, is one in which the record establishes a factual basis for this legal conclusion.
The only significant difference between the claims at bar and the permanent magnets disclosed in the Blume, Jr. patent is found in the type of elastomer used as a matrix for the magnetic particles. Applicant claims the use of at least one component selected from the group consisting of flexible chlorosulfonated polyethylene, polyisobutylene and chlorinated polyethylene as the elastomer in their permanent *473magnets as opposed to the disclosure of Blume, Jr. which calls for an elastomer of rubber, polyvinyl chloride or polyethylene.
In view of this difference, I agree with the statement of the issue as set forth in the solicitor’s brief:
The sole point in issue, therefore, appears to be whether the utilization of a permanent magnet with the claimed polymers or blends of those polymers incorporated therein as an elastomer would or would not have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art with the disclosures of the Curtis, Strain and Renfrew et al. references before him at the time the applicant devised his product. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
As a preliminary observation it should be noted that we are here dealing with what the record shows to be a developed and sophisticated art. Thus, one seeking to improve the flexibility of the prior art magnets (Blume, Jr.) using polyethylene as a binder, would be led by the art to seek modifications or blends thereof which would impart greater flexibility. This search would involve a study of literature relating to the modifications or blends of polyethylene as taught by the secondary references.
While appellant has asserted an increase in magnetic strength, presumably as a solution to some problem which may have existed in the art, this at best is what the Supreme Court referred to in the Deere case as a “secondary” factor. However, even the 20% increase in magnetic strength alluded to by appellant in his brief would seem to be obvious from the facts of record. An increase in the ferrite content reduces the amount of polymer in a given magnet, as the nonmagnetic material between the magnetic particles is decreased, the magnetic strength of the magnet can be increased not only because of the additional magnetic material present but also because of the reduction of the leakage flux.
These factors support the conclusion that it would have been obvious at the time of appellant’s invention to use the more elastic polymers suggested by Curtis, Strain, and Renfrew et al. which permitted the addition of increased amounts of ferrite particles. There was ample reason to do so if one but followed the suggestions in the art leading to what appellant here claims as his invention.
In discussing the characteristics of the magnets which produce the alleged improvement, appellant refers to the fact that claims 22-24, 26, 27 and 29 recite specific percentages of the components in the blend of binding material. However, appellant did not show factually that such proportions were anything more than obvious variants of the materials disclosed in the prior art. In this connection it is noted that appellant’s brief admits that when blends of polymers are employed, the ratio of the two binding materials which go to make up the blend may be varied without affecting the magnetic strength of the magnet.
For the foregoing reasons I concur in the result reached by the majority.