This appeal arises out of the holding of the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964).
More than 20 years ago Appellant was tried and convicted on a charge of robbery.1 2No appeal was taken. In 1964 Appellant first attacked his 1946 conviction by a petition in the District Court, Clifton v. United States, Civil No. 2316-64, which was treated by the court as a petition for a writ of coram, nobis.2 That petition was denied. Following Jackson v. Denno, supra, a second petition was filed in 1965. In this second petition from which the instant appeal is taken Appellant rests on the single ground that the District Court in the 1946 trial had not afforded him an independent hearing such as is now required to pass on the voluntariness of the confession which was admitted in evidence against him.3
*356Search for the stenographic verbatim record of the 1946 trial was unavailing but the District Judge who presided at that trial heard Appellant’s petition and relied on detailed personal longhand notes of the trial which he had preserved. On the basis of these notes the District Judge made findings that he had in fact conducted an independent hearing on the issue of voluntariness of the confession and “found on the basis of the evidence that the confession was voluntary * * * and admitted the confession.” Accordingly, the District Judge denied the contemporaneous petition, United States v. Clifton, 239 F.Supp. 49, 51 (D.D.C. 1965).4
The question to be resolved is whether the procedures applied in the 1946 trial and the instructions to the jury were “fully adequate to insure a reliable and clear-cut determination of the voluntariness of the confession * * Jackson v. Denno, supra, 378 U.S. at 391, 84 S.Ct. at 1788.
The Government’s position is that the District Judge who tried the case in 1946 made findings on the basis of his 1946 longhand notes, that he conducted an independent hearing on voluntariness out of the presence of the jury before deciding to submit that issue to the jury, and that this procedure, generally conforming to the so-called Massachusetts procedure approved in Jackson, fully satisfied the requirements of Jackson.
Appellant contends that the Court in Jackson expressed doubts as to the procedure in this jurisdiction.5 He *357thus argues that “by stating that he [the District Judge] followed the ‘traditional practice’ in this district, the court * * * has virtually conceded that the procedures utilized in determining the volun-tariness of appellant’s confession do not meet the constitutional criteria laid down in Jackson.” We do not agree. Doubts as to past practice do not necessarily mean that the requirements of Jackson were not met in Appellant’s case. See Mitchell v. Stephens, 353 F.2d 129, 142 (8th Cir. 1965).
The critical issue raised by Appellant is that “the decision in Jackson v. Denno * * * requires that the trial judge, in addition to holding a preliminary hearing out of the presence of the jury, make a specific finding that the confession was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant also contends that the District Court did not instruct the jury that it was required to find the confession voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt in order to rely on it. The fact is that the Supreme Court did not pass on either of these questions in Jackson.
Jackson v. Denno requires only that the procedures applied in these circumstances must be “fully adequate to insure a reliable and clear-cut determination of the voluntariness of the confession,” 378 U.S. at 391, 84 S.Ct. at 1788; it made no attempt to define the standard to be applied by the trial judge in his preliminary determination of voluntariness,6 and the Court expressly disclaimed any ruling on jury instructions concerning the consideration of voluntariness, 378 U.S. at 375 n. 5, 84 S.Ct. at 1779.
In his charge to the jury in the 1946 trial, the District Judge did not specifically single out the confession, apart from the other evidence, and define the standard applicable to it. We note, however, that the confession was in fact the essence of the Government’s case. The Judge instructed the jury that the Government had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty and had committed every element of the offense charged. It does not seem possible to us that the jury would have failed to understand that in order to convict they must believe beyond a reasonable doubt both its voluntariness and its substance, i. e., the truth of the facts recited in the confession.
The District Judge, however, did not in 1946 or in the hearing from which this appeal is taken, spell out by what standard he evaluated the confession before submitting it to the jury. We are not unmindful that the Fourth Circuit has held that the District Judge must find the confession voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt when making his preliminary determination. United States v. Inman, 352 F.2d 954, 956 (4th Cir. 1965).7 The opinion of that court contains no extended discussion or treatment of the vexing problem left unresolved by Jackson. The determination of whether a confession is voluntary is, in substance, *358a ruling on its admissibility as evidence. State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis.2d 244, 249, 133 N.W.2d 753, 762 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1017, 86 S.Ct. 1941, 16 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1966); State v. Keller, 240 Or. 442, 448, 402 P.2d 521, 525 (1965). Nowhere in the law — civil or criminal — has it ever been thought that a trial judge, in passing on admissibility of evidence in a jury case, must use the reasonable doubt standard.8 The Supreme Court in Jackson pointedly failed to make any comment on this crucial issue, as Mr. Justice Black sharply noted in his dissenting opinion, 378 U.S. at 404-405, 84 S.Ct. at 1795-1796.
It is one thing to call for this high standard of proof from the ultimate fact finders and quite another to ask that this issue be resolved preliminarily by the judge beyond a reasonable doubt contrary to all the law governing admissibility of evidence. We think Mr. Justice Black was correct in suggesting that to vest this essentially fact finding function in the judge would constitute a ■“downgrading of trial by jury,” 378 U.S. at 405, 84 S.Ct. at 1796 (dissenting opinion). We are not persuaded that it is more logical or reasonable that a confession, alone among all the myriad of evidentiary material, be singled out for a unique standard of appraisal. It would be difficult to distinguish, so far as jury ■impact is concerned, the weight of a confession from other forms of damaging utterance — inconsistent statements and admissions, for example, heard by persons other than the police. Cf. Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274, 66 S.Ct. 544, 90 L.Ed. 667 (1946).9 Under the Massachusetts procedure we see no basis for a special and unique “admissibility” standard which places the judge in the temporary role of a “juror,” denigrating the historic fact finding role of jurors.
The concurring opinion views Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897), as the source of the strict “reasonable doubt” standard for trial judges in the preliminary determination of voluntariness required under Jackson for the so-called Massachusetts procedure. The pertinent language in Bram is as follows:
The rule is * * * that, in order to render a státement admissible, the proof must be * * * sufficient to establish that the making of the statement was voluntary * * *, 168 U.S. at 549, 18 S.Ct. at 189.
******
Any doubt as to whether the confession was voluntary must be determined in favor of the accused * * *, 168 U.S. at 565, 18 S.Ct. at 195.
Judge Leventhal concedes that the most that can be said for the “any doubt” language of Bram is that it was a “quantum of proof” reference, used in a quantitative sense. Bram does not establish a standard which marks off on a qualitative scale the degree of certainty which a *359trial judge must employ before letting the jury evaluate both voluntariness and accuracy of a confession.10
The only alternative interpretation of Bram is to say that “any doubt” as used there means that the slightest scintilla of qualitative doubt regarding voluntariness would require the trial judge to ban the confession from any jury determination of voluntariness under its obviously lesser “reasonable doubt” standard. This would go far beyond imposing a mere “reasonable doubt” standard- on trial judges in their preliminary determination of voluntariness. Thus, if we are to read Bram literally we must conclude that it calls for an absolute “any doubt” qualitative standard, and no reason appears why this should be reduced arbitrarily to a “reasonable doubt” standard. The language in Bram is simply “any doubt” not “any reasonable doubt.” This analysis seems clearly apparent from the very wording of the questioned sentence in the Bram opinion. That Court was simply saying that doubt must be determined in favor of the accused regarding voluntariness of confessions.11 It was not addressing itself to framing a standard.
Additionally some mention should be made of a troublesome contradiction in the position that it is from Bram that we draw the “reasonable doubt” standard to be utilized by the trial judge in his preliminary determination but that Jackson’s requirement of voluntariness hearings by the trial judge need not be retroactively applied to govern cases where some pre-admission voluntariness hearing was in fact held. It is reasoned that the required standard, “beyond a reasonable doubt,” is an old one, established by Bram; but its expression is considered to be new since Jackson, with respect to whether this standard should have retroactive application. Under the concurring interpretation, Jackson is retroactive only in its requirement for a preliminary determination of voluntariness by the trial judge. Jackson, it is reasoned, need not be retroactively applied when some judicial screening did take place, although imposing a less restricted standard of doubtfulness. Yet it is this very standard which Judge Leventhal claims was established long ago by Bram. For these reasons we are unable to accept the concurring interpretation of Bram and Jackson with respect to the issue now before us.
We repeat again that Jackson does no more than call for a procedure that will give a “reliable determination on the voluntariness issue * * 378 U.S. at 387, 84 S.Ct. at 1786; we reject the argument that a United States District Judge cannot make that “reliable determination” on conventional admissibility criteria, leaving any resolution of reasonable doubt as to that evidence in its traditional province — the combined judgment of twelve jurors. We hold that the confession should not be admitted in evidence unless the trial judge makes a pre*360liminary determination and an express finding that on all the evidence he is satisfied that the confession was voluntarily made.12 We note that Judge Leventhal’s opinion sees little difference between a standard that the District Judge be “satisfied” of voluntariness and that he be persuaded of that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. If the determination of the District Judge is to submit the confession to the jury, however, he should not indicate that he has made a preliminary decision that it was voluntarily made, but he should specifically instruct that they are not to give any weight to the confession unless they, as ultimate fact finders, are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt on all the evidence that it was voluntarily given by the accused.
That a coordinate tribunal has reached a different conclusion, United States v. Inman, supra, has led us to ponder carefully on this problem. We are presented with one choice which seems to us to maintain the role of lay jurors in their historically high place and another which limits them to resolving only those fact issues which can be “safely” entrusted to their collective judgment. For a generation judicial trends have been to exclude from the jury all evidence thought to have been unfairly or improperly secured, and more recent holdings place stringent limits on the use of any utterance by an accused. In the future trial judges will be evaluating only those utterances of an accused which have already passed through the whole gamut of screening processes outlined in McNabb, Mallory, Escobedo, Massiah, and Miranda. The prospects now are that trial judges, otherwise much overburdened, will not be overworked in passing on the voluntariness of the few confessions which will survive the application of these cases. At the very least, it seems to us to be reasonable to continue functioning without departing from the traditional rule reaffirmed by this holding. The future experience of this and other circuits may indicate a different rule is desirable. Perhaps this is why the Supreme Court left these issues unresolved in the face of Mr. Justice Black’s astringent comments —so that the ultimate solution could be based on experience rather than on prophecy.
The order of the District Court is,
Affirmed.
. Crim. No. 76574, April 5, 1946.
. Since Appellant has already served his sentence under the 1946 conviction which he seeks to collaterally attack, the attack would ordinarily be moot, e.g., Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 909, 4 L.Ed.2d 963 (1960). Moreover, since Appellant is currently serving a sentence under a New York state conviction, the normal vehicle for collateral attack, 28 U. S.C. § 2255 (1964), is unavailable, Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418, 79 S.Ct. 451, 3 L.Ed.2d 407 (1959); Farnsworth v. United States, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 121, 198 F.2d 600 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 915, 73 S.Ct. 338, 97 L.Ed. 706 (1953). However, his 1946 conviction was relied upon in New York where he was sentenced under a multiple offender statute. It is claimed that he will not be subject to a lawful sentence as a multiple offender if the 1946 judgment of conviction in this jurisdiction cannot stand. Where a practical effect on a present sentence may result from a successful attack on a conviction and sentence already served, the proper remedy is a writ in the nature of coram, nobis, United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954). Both the District Court and the Government assume that a petition for a writ in the nature of coram nobis is the proper remedy in this case.
. Appellant has made two other contentions for the first time on appeal. One-allegation is that the confession evidence-was obtained in violation of Federal Rule-of Criminal Procedure 5(a). Such claims-are not cognizable in a coram nobis proceeding, e.g., Moon v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 301, 303, 272 F.2d 530, 532 (1959); cf. Thornton v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. -, 368 F.2d 822 (1966); Plummer v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 211, 212, 260 F.*3562d 729, 730 (1958). Appellant’s other argument is that his confession was obtained in violation of the rule articulated in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). In addition to the fact that this was not raised in the District Court and is untimely, the Supreme Court has recently ruled that Escobedo need not be given retroactive effect, Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966).
. The Government concedes the retroactive application of Jaokson. We also note that Jackson has been listed by the Supreme Court itself as one of the new constitutional rules to be applied retroactively, Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 726-729, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628-629 n. 13, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965). The Court has also remanded cases concluded prior to Jackson for proceedings consistent therewith, indicating retroactive application. See Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43, 85 S.Ct. 174, 13 L.Ed.2d 109 (1964); McNerlin v. Denno, 378 U.S. 575, 84 S.Ct. 1933, 12 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1964). See also Com. ex rel. Butler v. Bundle, 416 Pa. 321, 326, 206 A.2d 283, 286 (1965) (“the most persuasive authority for the proposition that the principle of Jackson v. Denno is to be applied to convictions finalized prior to the date of that decision is Jackson itself”).
. The Court’s Appendix to Jackson referred to the procedure in the District of Columbia as follows:
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, does seem to sanction a variation of the New York practice, with the requirement that the judge hold a full preliminary hearing, at which the defendant may testify, outside the presence of the jury. It is not clear what the trial judge must find before admitting the issue of voluntariness to the jury. Sawyer v. United States, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 381, 303 F.2d 392; Wright v. United States, 102 U.S. App.D.C. 36, 250 F.2d 4 (where the confession could be found voluntary, the issue is for the jury).
378 U.S. at 400, 84 S.Ct. at 1793. On the same day the Court vacated and remanded two cases from this jurisdiction, Pea v. United States, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 410, 324 F.2d 442 (1963) and Muschette v. United States, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 239, 322 F.2d 989 (1963) for proceedings in conformity with Jackson, 378 U.S. at 569 and 571, 84 S.Ct. at 1927 and 1929, 12 L.Ed.2d 1039 and 1040.
Since that time we have had numerous occasions to interpret the practice in this jurisdiction in light of Jackson’s requirements and to resolve the doubts expressed therein. See Hutcherson v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 51, 351 F.2d 748 (1965); Green v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 351 F.2d 198 (1965); Butler v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 350 F.2d 788 (1965); Curtis v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 283, 349 F.2d 718 (1965); Luck v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 348 F.2d 763 (1965).
. In the subsequent case of Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43, 85 S.Ct. 174, 13 L.Ed.2d 109 (1964), the Court again did not articulate a standard other than to repeat the language of Jackson that a “reliable and clear-cut determination of the voluntariness of the confession” is required. 379 U.S. at 45, 85 S.Ct. at 176. See also Kinder v. Boles, 253 F.Supp. 817, 823 (N.D.W.Va.1966).
. See also State v. Ragsdale, 249 La. 420, 187 So.2d 427 (1966); People v. IIuntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 179 (1905); State v. Brewton, 238 Or. 590, 605, 395 P.2d 874, 881 (1905) (concurring opinion of O’Connell, J.). More recently, courts which follow tlie orthodox view in which only the trial judge passes on the voluntariness of the confession have opted for the reasonable doubt standard, e.g., State v. Keiser, 274 Minn. 205, 143 N.W.2d 75 (1960). These latter cases are the natural result of the rule that the trier of facts find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the orthodox view only the trial judge passes on the question of voluntariness of the confession. Under our procedure the trial judge and, if he finds the confession voluntary, the jury are permitted to do so, and since the jury is bound by the reasonable doubt standard, the logic of those cases requiring the trial judge to use the same standard at his preliminary determination is not compelling.
. E.g., Carlo v. United States, 286 F.2d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1961) (quantum of proof to be adduced on a summary proceeding to suppress evidence is not that required on trial of the issue of guilt or innocence); cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-173, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (no requirement that proof sufficient to establish guilt is required to substantiate existence of probable cause); Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 188 U.S. 208, 217, 23 S.Ct. 294, 47 L.Ed. 446 (1903) (judge should require prima facie proof only of existence of common design for admission of declaration of one party to alleged conspiracy); Shafer v. State, 214 Tenn. 416, 381 S.W.2d 254 (1964) (procedure for confessions is the same as in passing on admissibility of a search and seizure claim).
. Indeed, the evidence of an eye witness is likely to be at least as damaging as a confession; but no one has suggested that a trial judge must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the eye witness is truthful or that his testimony is voluntary. Resolution of the weight of such evidence is left for the jury.
It should also be noted that, in ruling on the admissibility of such highly incriminating evidence as a “bloody shirt” found in the possession of the accused, no test, qualitative or otherwise need be applied by the judge.
. Harrold v. Territory of Oklahoma, 169 F. 47 (8th Cir. 1909), is cited as clarifying the language of Bram to mean “beyond a reasonable doubt,” id. at 53-54. However, Judge Walter Sanborn clearly stated that in that circuit at that time it was solely the function of the trial judge to pass upon the question of voluntariness :
It was not the province of the jury to consider or determine that issue. It was the duty of the court alone to hear and decide it.
169 F. at 53. Assuredly, the ultimate trier of facts must be bound by a reasonable doubt standard. See note 7 supra.
. Judge Leventhal finds further significance in tile fact that Bram has been revitalized in Escobedo, Malloy, and Miranda. Yet Bram was never once cited in Jackson, where its relevance on the present issue resides, if it has relevance. Jackson expressly overruled Stein v. People of State of New York, 346 U.S. 156, 73 S.Ct. 1077, 97 L.Ed. 1522 (1953). Stein had thoroughly discredited Bram, id. at 190-191 n. 34, 73 S.Ct. at 1095 (Bram “is not a rock on which to build constitutional doctrine.”). If Judge Leventlml’s interpretation of Bram is correct, certainly the Court in Jackson, well aware that it was overruling Stein, would have taken notice of that interpretation of Bram, and answered the vei-y questions presented before us today.
. Even an orthodox jurisdiction such as Illinois has specifically rejected the reasonable doubt standard, see People v. Golson, 32 Ill.2d 398, 207 N.E.2d 68 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1023, 86 S.Ct. 1951, 16 L.Ed.2d 1026 (1966).